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I. INTRODUCTION
Legalized gambling is the fastest-growing industry in the United
States (perhaps the world) during the 1990s, and Indian' casinos are
the fastest growing segment of this industry.2 While "Itihis once offi-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REvw
* Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law, and currently Legal Advisor,
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1. "Native American" and "Indian" are now used interchangeably in the United
States, where the term "indigenous peoples," preferred by the international
human rights community, has not won wide acceptance. See Stephanie A. Levin,
Betting on the Land: Indian Gambling and Sovereignty, 8 STAN. L. & PoL'y REV.
125, 135 n.1 (1997) [hereinafter Levin, Betting]; infra notes 210-37 and accompa-
nying text.
2. See 141 CONG. REc. S10912 (daily ed. July 31, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simon);
AmoNTOY N. CAnoT, CAsiNo GAImNG: POLICY, ECONOMICS, AND REGULATION 1, 91-
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cially criminal activity is now being chosen by business and commu-
nity leaders as a lynchpin for economic development,"3 William
Safire, paraphrasing Lord Acton, argues that "[glambling tends to cor-
rupt; political power purchased by gambling money corrupts abso-
lutely."4 Many fascinating jurisprudential and public policy issues
emerge and, after two introductory sections, "Gambling" and "Indi-
ans," these issues are analyzed in Part IV: "Coasian Games." The
Coase Theorem5 is treated as central to law and economics analyses,
and as a metaphor6 about what does and should happen when repre-
sentatives of the seven players drop in and out of a poker-like game
93 (1996); Gary C. Anders, Estimating the Economic Impact of Indian Casino
Gambling: A Case Study of the Fort McDowell Reservation, in GAMBLING: PUBLIC
POLICIES AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 233, 234 (William R. Eadington & Judy A.
Cornelius eds., 1997); Jonathan Littman, And the Dealer Stays: Indian Gaming is
a 1990's Gold Rush with Lawyers Leading the Charge, 13 CAL. LAw. 45, 46 (1993);
see also William Eadington, Preface, in GAMBLING: PUBLIC PoLICIES AND THE SO-
COAL SCIENCES, supra, at xix, xix [hereinafter Eadington, Preface] ( O]ne of the
fastest growing industries of the past two decades [has spread worldwide.]"); Rob-
ert Robinson, The Economic Impact of Indian Reservation-Based Gaming Activi-
ties, in RESERVATION-BASED GAMING 8, 13 (National Indian Policy Center ed.,
1993) (stating that Indian gaming grew by 105% in 1991, and even more in 1992).
Robert Goodman divides the industry into seven sectors: state lotteries and
instant games; casinos, including Indian and riverboat; pari-mutuel racing and
sports gambling; "non-profits" such as charitable bingo and "Las Vegas Nights";
Indian high-stakes bingo; "mini-casinos," including machines in bars, conven-
ience stores, and race tracks; and Internet and interactive cable TV gambling.
See ROBERT GOODMAN, LEGALIZED GAMBLING AS A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC DE-
vELOPMENT 9 (1994).
3. GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 6; see Thomas R. Harris, Expansion of the Gaming
Industry: Opportunities for Cooperative Extension, in GAMBLING: PUBLIC POLICIES
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 2, at 383, 384 (noting that 30 years ago,
and in part as fallout from the 1950 Kefauver Committee investigation into or-
ganized crime, "legalized gambling was viewed as a very unsavory business
activity").
4. William Saire, The Interior Decorator, N.Y. TmImEs, Oct. 26, 1997, § 4, at 1. Safire
is inveighing against the alleged corruption of the Department of the Interior,
over the non-approval of an Indian casino in Wisconsin. See infra note 82 and
accompanying text.
5. See 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), reprinted in R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 95, 95 (Coase ed., 1988) [hereinafter
Coase, Social Cost]; see also Anthony D'Amato, Post-Revolutionary Law and Eco-
nomics: A Foreword to the Symposium, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 757, 761 (1992) ("In-
stead of being a saviour, Coase was a skeptic. Naturally, this wasn't the first
time in religious history that the Founder's message was ignored by acolytes who
... [were] raising money to build churches so as to create jobs for themselves.").
6. See Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The Ironic History of
the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REv. 397, 397-98, 405, 425 (1997) [hereinafter Far-
ber, Parody]; id. at 400 ("[Coase] helped set the terms of debate about the legal
system." (quoting Steward Schwab, Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen
and Economists Do Not, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1171, 1190 (1989)); id. at 410 ("Both
theoretically and empirically .... the Coase Theorem seems to fall well short of
being an ironclad law of human behavior.").
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from time to time. Betting and bluffing by these players resembles the
economists' "rent-seeking" behavior 7 in interesting ways, and some of
the Coase's amoral "bribes" become the corruption that troubles
Safire.
The three major players are sovereign in varying and often confus-
ing degrees: the federal government, the states (all but Utah and Ha-
waii have legalized gambling in varying degrees), and the tribes. Four
other players frequently influence the course of play: people and
groups opposed to extending legalized gambling for religious, moral,
or policy reasons; local governments, which express their views
through government-sponsored referenda or (on Indian gaming) to the
Department of the Interior;8 non-Indian casinos and other gambling
enterprises, which hope to gain and/or protect a market power in a
particular locality; and an amorphous international human rights
community, keen to enhance the tribes' "rights" to self-determination
and to development. The latter community may be unfamiliar to
American lawyers and economists, and it is thus accorded a separate,
section: "International Dimensions." Analyses are brought together in
Part VI, "Sovereign Dilemmas," where reforms are suggested because
existing laws are found to be allocatively inefficient, distributively in-
equitable, and developmentally unsound. While a neoclassical law
and economics focuses on allocative efficiency almost exclusively, 9 dis-
tributive issues and developmental potentials are sketched in this ar-
ticle because they seem particularly appropriate to the topic.lO
7. See infra notes 53-82, 206-08 and accompanying text.
8. See David E. Rosenbaum, Interior Secretary Denies Politics Had Role in Dispute
Over Casino, N.Y. TmIas, Oct. 31, 1997, at Al; Edward Walsh, Old Friends at
Odds Over Indian Casino, WASH. PosT, Oct. 31, 1998, at A01.
9. See James J. Heckman, The Intellectual Roots of the Law and Economics Move-
ment, 15 LAW & HIsT. REv. 327, 327-28, 332 (1997) (recognizing that economics
segregates efficiency from distribution and almost always deploys its "better" effi-
ciency tools because economists have no special competence in distributive mat-
ters, and stating that this 'may amount to a conservative bias or a blind spot in
neoclassical theory").
10. My approach could be regarded as par" of the "New Institutional Economics,"
exploring some of the many modes lying between discrete market transactions
and a centralized hierarchical organization and control. See OLIVER E. WxLIAm-
SON, THE EcoNoMc INSTrrTUTIONS OF CAPrrALISl 16 (1985); Steven P. Croley,
Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLU1M. L.
REv. 1, 6-7 (1998) (stating that theories of regulation tend to ignore processes and
institutions, and are thus "empirically unsubstantiated and normatively ques-
tion-begging").
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II. GAMBLING
"Suddenly, the world is gambling."'l In 1993, an estimated $394
billion was wagered in the United States; tribally-owned facilities ac-
counted for 3% to 6% of these wagers, with government-owned facili-
ties (including lotteries) accounting for 36%.12 Residents of Nevada
and New Jersey lead the wagering leagues, and Minnesotans come in
third at $558 per capita, in 1990.13 There is much analysis in the
literature, but little reliable data and few unbiased studies. Survey-
ing fourteen studies on the economic impact of gambling, Robert Good-
man concludes that ten of them are "unbalanced or mostly
unbalanced" 14 -designed to support the self-interested positions of
the various players.
States are important players, increasingly engaging in the "state
capitalism" that is most evident in Nevada. Gambling accounts for
half of employment and 40% of state revenue there, and Nevadans
hope that gamblers will leave their money and take their addictions
(and most other social costs) home with them.15 The Chicago Tribune
observed in 1992, "Illinois is already in the game. The only question
is: Do we play to win?"16 A later article stated that do-gooder organi-
zations, among others, in Ohio "choose to ignore that Chicago is in a
11. William Eadington, Understanding Gambling, in GAMBLING: PUBLIC POLICIES
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 2, at 3, 3.
12. See Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Principle and
Tribal-State Compacts Under the Indian Gaming Regulation Act, 29 ARiz. ST.
L.J. 25, 82 (1997).
13. See GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 7; see also Lawrence J. Truitt, The Regulation and
Economic Impact of Riverboat Casino Gambling in Illinois, in GAMBLING: PUBLIC
POLICIES AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 2, at 127, 127 (stating that legal-
ized gambling has increased 10% a year); Edward Walsh, States Try to Rein in
Tribal Gaming Boom, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1998, at A9 (recognizing that 188
tribes operate 285 gambling enterprises in 28 states, generating an estimated
seven billion dollars a year).
14. GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 16 (recognizing that particular studies underestimate
the extent to which costs and subsidies are hidden, and the extent to which gam-
bling "cannibalizes" existing businesses); see also Anders, supra note 2, at 235
(discussing Goodman's analyses); Edward Walsh, Both Sides of Gambling Debate
Feel They Have Winning Hand, WASH. POST, May 24, 1998, at A9 ("[N]o one has
done a good job of calculating the social impact of gambling." (quoting Kay Coles
James)); infra note 273 and accompanying text.
15. See Stephanie A. Martz, Note, Legalized Gambling and Public Corruption: Re-
moving the Incentive to Act Corruptly, or, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks, 13
J.L. & POL. 453, 461, 488 (1997); see also CABOT, supra note 2, at 61 (finding that
more than half of Nevada's public budget revenue comes from gaming taxes);
GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 50 ("No one cares if you suck money out of tourists
... ." (quoting I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law, INDLAN GAmiNG, Jan. 1992,
at 12, 17)).
16. Editorial, Play to Win the Casino Game, CHI. TRi., Sept 27, 1992, at 2, quoted in
GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 48 (noting that unlike surrounding communities, Chi-
cago does not yet have a casino).
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life-or-death competition for economic survival."' 7 Louisiana's hopes
that gambling revenues would overcome the fiscal crises of the 1980s
were disappointed, and the State has now assumed the "schizo-
phrenic" role of many other states: "While their official role was to reg-
ulate gambling, they are now using gambling to produce revenues and
jobs'"-to say nothing of Coasian bribes-while encouraging residents
and tourists to gamble.' 8
As is the case for "liquor stores, doctors, banks, milk producers,
holders of taxi medallions, accredited schools, and morticians," regula-
tion enables incumbent gambling enterprises to maintain their in-
comes above competitive levels-until a market "saturation" occurs.' 9
Gaming revenues are increased through a greater "penetration" of
these protected markets: more seductive advertising, and more excit-
ing (and probably more addictive) games. 2O Some economists will
thus agree with Paul Samuelson:
There is ... a substantial economic case to be made against gambling. It
involves simply sterile transfers of money or goods between individuals, creat-
ing no new money or goods. Although it creates no output, gambling does
nevertheless absorb time and resources. When pursued beyond the limits of
recreation, where the main purpose after all is to 'kill' time, gambling sub-
tracts from the national income.2 1
17. See John McCarron, Gambling Debts Already Piling Up, CHI. TRm., June 6, 1993,
at 3, quoted in GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 48.
18. GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 133; see also LOREN C. SCOTT & EARL RYAN, TiE Eco-
NoMucs OF CASINO GAABLING 1, 5-6 (1987) (noting that Louisiana's fiscal crises of
the 1980s meant that agencies could not plan and citizens could not be assured of
services, given an undiversified state economy and noting that there are 50 mil-
lion people within a 200 mile radius from Atlantic City, and 30 million from Las
Vegas, but only 14 million from New Orleans); Martz, supra note 15, at 461 ("[To
what extent can the state interest become so great as to undermine the state's
capacity to control?" (quoting JERoME SKOLNmcic, HOUSE OF CARDS: THE LEGALIZA-
TION AND CONTROL OF CASINO GA BLING 101-18 (1978)). In Louisiana, investors
in gambling "came from far and wide, expecting easy money in a state with easy
morals." In Louisiana, the Chips Fall, EcoNoMIsT, Dec. 6, 1997, at 26, 26. Per-
haps because of the shady circumstances surrounding its adoption and the legal
problems and rumors that followed, several riverboat casinos and their jobs
"sailed away," and a land-based casino is "mired in bankruptcy court." Id.
19. See ARMEN A. ALHcmAN & W=uiA R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPE-
TITION, COORDInATON, AND CONTROL 52 (3d ed. 1983); id. at 151 (stating that
"monopoly returns" are achieved by excluding competitors through "an artificial,
contrived restraint"); id. at 283 (recognizing that restricting access to markets is
often justified as a consumer protection, but it also protects producers against
other producers); Eadington, supra note 11, at 4 (discussing "monopoly rents,"
flowing from a regulation in the absence of a "natural" monopoly in gaming). On
the tendency to market saturation, see infra note 59 and accompanying text.
20. See John Warren Kindt, Legalized Gambling Activities: The Issues Involving
Market Saturation, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 271, 280-81 (1995) [hereinafter Kindt,
Saturation].
21. PAUL A. SAMIrELSON, EcoNoMIcs 425 (10th ed. 1976). This is a bit like the old
saw about decreasing national income by marrying your housekeeper.
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Then-Senator Paul Simon quoted Samuelson's view as a justification
for more stringent federal regulations, 22 and Jack Van Der Slk adds
that since gambling "produces . . . no new wealth, . . . it makes no
genuine contribution to economic development."2 3
With respect, the Samuelson/Van Der Slik view is wrong or at least
badly overdrawn. Citizens of Chicago seem to agree with it, however:
they see claimed casino benefits as a "redistribution and not a net
gain."24 As "entertainment" (an additional "output," contra Samuel-
son), $100 sunk into a slot machine is (a little) more likely to provide a
financial payoff than $100 sunk into an opera ticket. Both provide
psychic payoffs, or else there would be no repeat gambling or opera
customers, and it can be thought a matter of "taste" for the customer
or policymaker to prefer one payoff over the other. Both opera and
gambling are produced (Samuelson's "time and resources") with vary-
ing combinations of land (attenuated for an Internet gambling site),
labor, capital, technology, entrepreneurship, and a host of "political"
resources: chiefly legitimacy and philanthropic subsidies for opera,
and regulation and often-hidden political subsidies for gambling.25
These resources are valuable only because of how people use them;
owners are compensated according to (and sometimes beyond) their
resource's "opportunity costs"; and any profits the activity generates
reflect peoples' values by definition. These payoffs constitute "new
money," contra Samuelson, and "new wealth" for someone, contra Van
Der Slik. Even the Supreme Court seems to disagree with Samuelson
and Van Der Slik, at least with regard to Indian casinos. 26
A. Externalities
There are differences of course, between opera "buffs" and gam-
bling "addicts" for example. Gambling is hedged about with many
more rules; its entertainment value is (usually) not attributable to the
22. See 141 CONG. REC. S10914 (daily ed. July 31, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simon).
23. Jack R. Van Der Slik, Legalized Gambling: Predatory Policy, ILL. Issuzs, Mar.
1990, at 30, 30, quoted in John Warren Kindt, U.S. National Security and the
Strategic Economic Base: The Business/Economic Impacts of the Legalization of
Gambling Activities, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 567, 569 (1995) [hereinafter Kindt, Na-
tional]. Kindt is the most prominent law professor opposed to legalized gambling.
24. See GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 32 (citing a study by Joe Glick and Dana Herring).
25. For analyses based on political resources such as legitimacy, see Paul H.
Brietzke, Law, Legitimacy and Coercion: One View From Law and Economics, 25
VAL. U. L. REv. 343 (1991).
26. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 219 (1987).
Cabazon recognizes that the tribes are not merely marketing an exemption from
State tobacco taxes, as in Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 155
(1980). See id. Rather, the tribes "have built modern facilities which provide
recreational opportunities and ancillary services to their patrons, who do not sim-
ply drive on to the reservations, make purchases and depart, but spend extended
periods of time there enjoying the services the Tribes provide." Id.
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talents of artists and artisans; and it is repeated rather than ex-
hausted during consumption. Like opera, gambling provokes joy and
despair, but it also "destroy[s] lives and erode[s] compassion."2 7 Op-
era creates "externalities-costs and benefits which cannot be di-
rectly attributed to the parties to the transaction, such as an increased
urban congestion and additional revenues for restaurants and parking
garages-but gambling is easily distinguishable by the number and
magnitude of the externalities it creates. Granted that gambling cre-
ates wealth and a certain economic stimulus, can its negative exter-
nalities (social costs) be adequately "internalized"-borne by gambling
enterprises and/or the punters-under the two conventional models
examined in turn: regulation,28 and additional negotiations among
the players under the Coase Theorem?29
Like prostitution, abortion, and homosexuality, gambling is a con-
sensual act that some consider harmful to the participants and to soci-
ety. Because the data is scarce and perhaps biased, it is difficult to
untangle other externalities from the attitudes of people and organiza-
tions with religious or moral objections to legalized gambling. For ex-
ample, the debate over Internet gambling will likely follow the pattern
of arguments over Internet pornography because some people also
think of gambling as a vice or sin. Gambling threatens a misdirection
of breadwinners' attentions, by offering false alternatives to the puta-
tive link between rewards and hard work. But in the 1980s and
1990s, a general public opposition to gambling has been relaxed
through public exposure to worse "crimes," by desires for the tax relief
that gambling revenues supposedly bring, and allegedly as a result of
media-endorsed images of violence, of crime, and of morality being for
the individual rather than for society.SO Nonetheless, and somewhat
like the anguish of pro-lifers over a limited entitlement to abortion,
27. Eugene Christiansen & Julie Brinkerhoff-Jacobs, The Relationships of Gambling
to Entertainment, in GAmmLING: PUBLIC POUCIES AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra
note 2, at 11, 11-12.
28. See infra notes 53-82 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 118-208 and accompanying text.
30. See William N. Thompson & Ricardo Gazel, The Last Resort Revisited: The
Spread of Casino Gambling as a "Prisoner's Dilemma," in GAMBLING: PUBLIC PoL-
IcIEs AND THE SOCIAL ScIENcES, supra note 2, at 183, 186-87, 192; id. at 185 (stat-
ing that in the 1970s and 1980s, casinos faced a burden of proof of something like
beyond a reasonable doubt, but this changed in the 1990s-as a result of the tax
revolt movement and increased governmental and elite support for gambling); id.
at 192 (noting that religious opposition has been largely overcome by economic
needs). But see Martz, supra note 15, at 454, 456 (stating that of pro-gambling
referenda held in 1994-96, two won and 22 lost); New Wheels for Motor City,
ECONOMST, Apr. 11, 1998, 23, 23 ("Gambling initiatives have been defeated in
Ohio, Arkansas, Louisiana, Washington, Colorado, Iowa, and Nebraska in recent
years."); Vice Online and Offshore, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1998, at A18 (stating that
a Bill pending in Congress would make all online gambling illegal because,
among other things, Internet does not attend to local moral standards and like
1999]
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the social costs of offense to those with strong religious and moral ob-
jections to gambling are as real as they are incalculable.
The moralists' case is at its strongest on the subject of "problem"
gamblers or "addicts." As many as 9.3 million adults and 1.3 million
teenagers may have "some form of problem gambling behavior" in
America; states and localities growing more dependent on gaming rev-
enues have a similar "problem."31 Recognized by the American Psy-
chiatric Association as a pathology similar to alcohol and drug
addictions, gambling will likely claim more addicts through its in-
creased acceptability (a progressive legalization) and accessibility (an
increased number of local outlets).3 2 John Kindt argues that once
gambling is legalized, gambling addicts could increase from 0.77% of
Americans in the late 1980s to between 1.5% and 5%.33 Each gam-
bling addict costs society an estimated $53,000 a year, so South Da-
kota, for example, acquired an annual burden of approximately $371
million when it legalized gambling in 1989.34
Internet porn, Internet gambling increases access and is more difficult to police,
but it "almost" eliminates "effects on neighborhoods").
31. GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 17; id. at 5 (finding that electronic gambling is "more
decentralized, more available, more addictive, and more profitable to the gaming
industry) id. at 9 (recognizing that gambling is "the fastest-growing teenage ad-
diction," with the rate of pathological gambling among high school and college-
age youth about twice that of adults); see 141 CONG. REc. S10914 (daily ed. July
31, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simon).
32. See Kindt, National, supra note 23, at 581-82 (citing reports by Durand Jacobs,
the Government of Alberta, the Better Government Association, the 1976 U.S.
Commission on The Revision of the National Policy Toward Gambling, and the
American Psychiatric Association).
33. See id. at 581.
34. See id. at 582 (adjusting a Better Government Association report for inflation, in
1992 dollars, citing his own congressional testimony, and expressing some doubts
about the precision of these figures); id. (stating that the 1988 estimated annual
social costs of compulsive gambling were $80 billion, compared to $120 billion for
alcohol abuse); see also GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 64 (noting a study indicated
that 2.7% of Connecticut residents are "lifetime probable pathological" gamblers,
and their 1991 social costs of pathological gambling totaled $554 million-as
against $362 million in gambling revenues, and 2,500 jobs created). But see 141
CONG. REc. S10914 (daily ed. July 31, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simon) (noting
that the estimated social costs of problem gamblers range from $13,000 to
$30,000 per problem gambler per year).
Kindt has defined a broader "problem economic gambler," or PEG, as one who
loses approximately $1000 per year, or is a member of the 10% of the public
spending 50% to 84% of legalized gambling dollars. See John Warren Kindt, The
Economic Impacts of Legalized Gambling Activities, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 51, 60-61
(1994) [hereinafter Kindt, Economic Impacts]. He cites studies which estimate
that, PEGs in Illinois lose $1 billion per year, and are the primary target for
gambling enterprises. See id. at 77. Concerning "pathological" Native American
gamblers, Kindt references one study that puts their number at approximately
14.5%. See Kindt, National, supra note 23, at 581 n.106.
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Among the externalities commentators associate with problem
gamblers are "the increase in crime, drunk-driving, prostitution [to
support the gambling "habit"], child abuse, broken families, lower la-
bor productivity," alcoholism, drug addiction, overeating, and sui-
cide.3 5 (Gamblers' suicide attempts are higher than for alcoholics or
drug addicts.) "The American Insurance Institute estimates that 40%
of all white-collar crime has its roots in gambling."36 A study of Gam-
blers Anonymous members found that 47% had engaged in insurance
fraud or thefts involving an average of $65,000.37 Increases in both
street and organized crime are associated with casinos, and "legalizing
gambling does not eliminate public corruption but transfers it from
the local law-enforcement level"-bribes to overlook ostensibly-
criminalized aspects of gambling-"to state legislatures and adminis-
trative agencies."3 8 Local law-enforcement organizations are often
major opponents of legalized gambling, while state officials are often
major supporters.3 9 Could these groups wholly or partly be following
their rent seeking opportunities for bribes? The strain on the local
"infrastructure" posed by a casino, traffic congestion and the need for
police services, for example, is admittedly great, and this strain is at-
tenuated at the state level.
35. Thompson & Gazel, supra note 30, at 197.
36. GoODmAN, supra note 2, at 59, 61.
37. See Kindt, Economic Impacts, supra note 34, at 62; The National Impact of Ca-
sino Gambling Proliferation: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Small Bus.,
103d Cong., 71 (1994) (statement of economist Earl L. Grinols) [hereinafter Hear-
ings]; see also 141 CONG. REc. S10914 (daily ed. July 31, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Simon) (citing a South Dakota prosecutor who stated that gambling increases
theft, embezzlement, bad checks, and child abuse and neglect); GoODMAN, supra
note 2, at 60 (citing a study that indicated that the 1991 mean gambling-related
debt of compulsive gamblers was $53,000-92,000, or $514 million in New Jersey).
But see Anders, supra note 2, at 241 (questioning whether gambling increases
social problems, such as crime, drugs, and alcohol).
38. Martz, supra note 15, at 456; id. at 465 (noting that public apathy toward anti-
gambling laws reduces police incentives to enforce them, and reduces the trans-
action costs for police who receive bribes); see also Scorr & RYAN, supra note 18,
at 11 (stating that crime almost doubled in Atlantic City as a result of casinos);
id. at 15 (noting that a few Las Vegas casinos have recurrent problems of"hidden
ownership, systematic crime figures and questionable sources of financing" (cit-
ing William Eadington)); id. (claiming that "the most powerful figures in organ-
ized crime have created a frightening new empire" in Atlantic City (quoting Ovid
Demaris)); Kindt, Economic Impacts, supra note 34, at 82 ("[While] it is virtually
impossible to conduct research in the area .... the landmark United States Com-
mission on ... Gambling reported in 1976 that there was 'some evidence that the
existence of gambling sanctioned... by the various States-and the attendant
publicity-tends to increase citizen participation in illegal as well as legal gam-
bling.'" (quoting U.S. CoM. ON THE REv. OF THE NATL PoL'Y TowARD GAMBLING,
GAMBLING IN AMERICA (Gov't Printing Off. 1976)).
39. See, e.g, Walsh, Both Sides, supra note 14, at A9 (noting that, according to Indi-
ana State Senator Earline S. Rogers and Gary, Indiana, Mayor Scott King, casino
boats give "a fighting chance for a better future").
1999]
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There are positive externalities (social benefits) from gambling
that offset these costs, of course. In the first thirteen years, Atlantic
City casinos invested $6 billion and paid more than $4 billion in fed-
eral, state, and local taxes.40 In 1995, gaming revenues contributed
$130 million a year to the budget of Tunica County, Mississippi, where
$8 million a year funded a school system which the State had placed
on financial probation.4 1 But gambling revenues usually replace
rather than supplement other tax revenues, and school districts often
have trouble passing local bond issues when the public believes that
lottery monies fund education. 4 2 State and local government officials
frequently see Indian casinos as non-taxable competitors for their
"cash cows," but revenue-sharing is the typical outcome of the tribal-
state compacts required under the 1988 federal Indian Gaming Regu-
latory Act.43 Property values frequently increase in proximity to a ca-
sino, unless fears of increased crime drive values down, and property
taxes thus tend to increase. This hurts residents and small businesses
unable to afford the increases and unwilling to sell out to speculators,
and some of the increased homelessness in Atlantic City can be attrib-
uted to the gambling "boom."44
Casinos may increase tourism and accommodations, and the jobs
resulting from casinos and ancillary facilities may mean new residents
or keeping old ones, new income and sales tax revenues, and a mea-
sure of regional development or re-development. But commentators
frequently stress the "cannibalizing" effect of casinos: the growth of
casinos and their jobs, at or just above the minimum wage, may be a
"zero-sum game," a mere reallocation of entertainment and non-en-
tertainment dollars.45 Studies indicate that many local businesses
suffer significantly when a casino opens: "clothing stores, recreation
services, business services, auto dealers,... service stations," and res-
taurants and bars (but not liquor stores), which suffer in competition
40. See GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 59, 145, 150-51.
41. See Ronald J. Rychlak, The Introduction of Casino Gambling: Public Policy and
the Law, 64 Miss. L.J. 291, 314-17 (1995).
42. See CABOT, supra note 2, at 61; cf 141 CONG. REC. S10912 (daily ed. July 31,
1995) (statement of Sen. Simon) ("Cities like East St. Louis, IL, with every possi-
ble urban malady, find themselves with enough revenue to at least take care of
minimal services.").
43. See infra notes 141-73 and accompanying text.
44. See GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 56; Kindt, Economic Impacts, supra note 34, at 78
(stating that gambling negatively affects pre-existing businesses); infra note 89
and accompanying text.
45. See Steven C. Deller & Susan Chen, The Impact of Native American Gaming on
Rural Areas: The Case of Wisconsin, in GAMBLING: PUBLIC POLICIES AND THE So-
CIAI SCIENCES, supra note 2, at 246, 250-51; Kindt, National, supra note 23, at
584; Thompson & Gazel, supra note 30, at 198-99.
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with food and drink subsidized by gambling at the casino. 46 Corpora-
tions may be reluctant to locate activities near a casino, fearing that
personnel problems will arise. The "local multiplier effect" for casinos
is probably lower than for other small businesses because of the many
"leakages" that occur: relatively greater imports of goods and services
from outside of the region, high federal and state taxes paid, and re-
turns to shareholders and to employees at corporate headquarters, for
example.4 7
John Kindt makes an ingenious macroeconomic argument: legal-
ized gambling threatens our economic stability, on which the rest of
the world depends, by generating the estimated equivalent of an addi-
tional recession every eight to fifteen years.4 8 Even if you accept this
argument, definitive policy conclusions are impossible; the social costs
of legalized gambling probably exceed their social benefits, however.4 9
Candace Evart is optimistic that such an excess can be eliminated or
substantially reduced through proper planning,50 but two conclusions
are pretty clear: most of the social costs from gambling are not being
internalized in fact, since additional governmental revenues from
gambling are mostly spent on other, perhaps worthy projects such as
roads and schools; and to the extent that costs are internalized, they
are borne primarily by the people least able to bear them-gambling
addicts and poorer, frequently minority gamblers and bystanders.51
Nonetheless, Mayor Edward Rendell makes a good, special interest
and perhaps developmental, point: "[W]hatever harm [riverboat casi-
46. GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 52-53 (citing a Wall Street Journal and a South Da-
kota study); see also Deller & Chen, supra note 45, at 251-53 (noting that a com-
parison of a gambling and a non-gambling regional economy shows very few
shifts, other than a mild increase in service employment attributed to the casino;
little windfall leaked out of the reservation).
47. See 141 CONG. REC. S10914 (daily ed. July 31, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simon);
Thompson & Gazel, supra note 30, at 197-98; see also GOODmAN, supra note 2, at
50 ("[Gambling] has a negative multiplier effect of decreasing spending on other
forms of recreation and businesses in the area.").
48. See Kindt, National, supra note 23, at 569, 573, 584 (citing testimony by Earl L.
Grinols); Kindt, Economic Impacts, supra note 34, at 81.
49. See GooDmAN, supra note 2, at 64; Parris Glendening, A Deal from the Bottom of
the Deck, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1998, at C8 ("Communities as diverse as Ledyard,
Conn., Deadwood, S.D., and Gulfport, Miss., have found that gains from slots rev-
enue are largely offset by the increased costs associated with the rise in crime and
in gambling addictions.").
50. See Candace Evart, Casino Gaming and the Unwary Host Community - Lessons
Learned, in GAmLaNG: PUBLIC POLICIES AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 2,
at 319, 320-21 (discussing the need to plan for factors such as parking, traffic
congestion, loss of non-gaming businesses, inflation of house prices, and the pirat-
ing of employees).
51. See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
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nos] do, is harm that is going to be done regardless of whether they
exist in Philadelphia."52
B. Rent-Seeking
Figure 153 illustrates why legalized, but regulated, gambling is so
popular among incumbent gambling enterprises: they are given the
opportunity to obtain rents,5 4 at least for a time, for those who get in
early enough. Competition in a wholly liberalized or unregulated
gambling market would yield Qe and Pc, at the intersection of supply
and demand. Regulation can be modeled in several ways, but its chief
effect is to restrict the quantity of gambling-from Qc to Qr, for exam-
ple. This quantity restriction yields a higher price for gambling, Pr,
when Qr intersects with the demand curve. (The demand for gam-
bling is assumed to be rather inelastic-the demand curve is rela-
tively vertical-because of the appeal to addicts and other relatively
price-insensitive consumers, of a product which has few substitutes.)
This price (Pr) enables incumbent gambling enterprises to earn more
than they would under competitive conditions (Pc), in the form of mo-
nopoly rents55 -the diagonally-hatched rectangle in Figure 1-and
52. GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 26.
53. See ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 19, at 288.
54. See id. at 75 (defining an "economic rent" as a "price unnecessary to keeping the
good in existence, but necessary for allocation to highest-valuing users"); CHins-
TINE AMMER & DEAN S. AMMER, DICTIONARY OF BusmNEss AND ECONOMICS 385
(1984) (defining quasi-rent or economic rent as a return on a resource whose sup-
ply is temporarily or permanently fixed); ROGER LEROY MILLER, INTERMEDIATE
Mi ICOEcONOmics 407 (1978) ("Economic rent is... any payment over and above
what is necessary to maintain a factor of production in its current activity."); id.
at 408-09 (noting that the shorter the period, the more fixed is the supply of re-
sources, and this short-term phenomenon is called "quasi-rent"); WILLIAISON,
supra note 10, at 61 (stating that where the winning bidder makes durable in-
vestments in transaction-specific assets, her rivals are no longer presumed to be
at parity); id. at 62 (explaining that a contractual asymmetry thus emerges, and
the buyer cannot turn to an alternate supplier at favorable terms); R.H. Coase,
Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRm, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw,
supra note 5, at 157, 165 [hereinafter Coase, Notes] ("Rent consists of the differ-
ence between what a factor of production earns in a given activity and what it
could earn in the best alternative activity"); John Warren Kindt, Legalized Gam-
bling Activities as Subsidized by Taxpayers, 48 ARK. L. REV. 889, 916 (1995)
[hereinafter Kindt, Taxpayers] ("In their efforts to exploit the 'cream market'
without competing with each other, various legalized gambling interests request
and receive guaranteed markets.").
55. See ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 19, at 293 (explaining that it is called "monop-
oly" because it derives from restricted access to the market, and "rent" because it
does not automatically induce an increase in supply); id. at 295 ("[It is] essen-
tially a wealth transfer of some of the consumer's surplus to the supplier through
a higher price."); see also Thompson & Gazel, supra note 30, at 193-94 (noting
that while Resorts International had a gambling monopoly in Atlantic City in
1978-79, its share price increased a hundred fold).
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FIGURE 1-GAMBLING REGULATION
PRICE Monopoly Rents
DEMAND
Ricardian Rents
Qr Qc QUANTITY
Ricardian rents56 -the horizontally-hatched triangle in Figure 1. The
social loss-the vertically-hatched triangle in Figure 1-is the eco-
nomic welfare (or market-based efficiency) lost to gambling consumers
through regulation, a loss which is not recouped by the gambling en-
terprises. Policymakers may see little harm in punishing gamblers in
this fashion, but it reflects a leakage of wealth away from gamblers
and everyone else; a reallocation of resources would increase society's
gambling and non-gambling wealth.57
56. See ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 19, at 189 (distinguishing "Ricardian rents"
from monopoly rents, as differential earnings because the recipient has not neces-
sarily prevented others from competing); id. at 230 (explaining that "Ricardian
rents" are higher incomes enjoyed by superior inputs-if other, equally compe-
tent surgeons get $500 for an appendectomy, so do you-even if you do it in half
of the time and could charge $250; the increase in your supply does not affect the
market enough to decrease the price); MLLER, supra note 54, at 408 (noting that
Ricardo assumed the supply of land as fixed, and as thus yielding Ricardian
rents-a surplus of revenue over the opportunity costs of production).
57. See ALcHLA & ALLEN, supra note 19, at 295 ("[The resulting smaller output
destroys some of the potentially higher-valued use of some resources that must be
used in less-valuable ways because they are prohibited from competing with the
protected seller [which result in a net social loss]"); John C. Mohawk, Indian Eco-
nomic Development: An Evolving Concept of Sovereignty, 39 BuFF. L. REV. 495,
501-02 (1991) (stating, "[uin the jargon of Indian economic development, 'rent-
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All or nearly all of the rents obtained by incumbent gambling en-
terprises are dissipated in one of two ways: through Coasian "bribes"
paid to acquire and then maintain a privileged position in a regulated
market,5 8 and through the all-but-inevitable emergence of rival gam-
bling enterprises in the same or adjoining markets. The latter eventu-
ality, "saturation5 9 of regulated markets, moves the quantity of
seeking' occurs when a public official uses the powers of his office for personal
gain"--thereby discouraging on-reservation investment, unless curbed by an in-
dependent judiciary or an effective Indian sovereignty). But see infra note 123
and accompanying text.
58. See Alchian & Allen, supra note 19, at 294-95 ("Bribes, political contributions,
payment of higher taxes, and the costs of public relations counsel and lawyers to
obtain rights" tend to absorb all monopoly rents, and are a net social loss because
they distort resource use); see also ASMIER & AmImER, supra note 54, at 385 (not-
ing that economic rents enable producers to command higher prices, until compe-
tition drives prices down to levels yielding only normal profits); DOUGLAS
NEEDHAM, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF REGTLArION: A BEHAVIORAL AP-
PROACH 211-12 (1983) (stating that entry barriers in a regulated industry are a
function of established producers' expected behavior); In Louisiana, the Chips
Fall, supra note 18, at 26 (reporting that Edward de Bartolo allegedly bribed
former Governor Edwards with $400,000 in pursuit of a coveted Louisiana casino
license); Obituary: Mancur Olson, EcONoImsT, Mar. 7, 1998, at 91 ("Subsidies,
trade protections and other economic distortions accumulate, and resources in-
creasingly flow to a specialized class of lawyers, bureaucrats and lobbyists who
know how to work the system. Redistributive struggles displace productive ones.
The result, if medicine is not taken, is a pattern of economic decline."); Safire,
supra note 4 (reporting that gambling-rich tribes contributed large sums to the
Democratic National Committee, allegedly to stop poorer tribes from opening a
casino in Hudson, Wisconsin).
59. See 141 CONG. REC. S10913 (daily ed. July 31, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simon)
(estimating that three-quarters of Americans live within 300 miles of a casino);
GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 12 (claiming that a legalized gambling in New Orle-
ans, Chicago, etc. could create a market saturation nationally); id. at 100-02 (not-
ing that when lottery revenues flattened or decreased in the 1980s, states looked
for such new enticements as keno and video slot machines); Anders, supra note 2,
at 242 (noting that there is a limited absorptive capacity for new gambling facili-
ties with established competitors); Evart, supra note 50, at 319 (stating that after
Nevada legalized casinos in 1942, New Jersey legalized them in 1978 and South
Dakota was next in 1989-territorial monopolies-but seven states followed in
the 1990s, and there are Indian casinos in an additional 18 states); Kindt, Na-
tional, supra note 23, at 578 (noting that one major effect of saturation is in-
creases in laxity of regulation and public subsidies); Kindt, Saturation, supra
note 20, at 292-93 (stating that the President of Circus, Circus predicted that
riverboat casinos will have saturated their market in five years); id. at 293 (stat-
ing that five years is the predicted period when gambling enterprises generate
their largest revenues, and the time frame for which tax waivers and concessions
are traditionally sought); Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice?
How IGRA Shapes the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and
Identity, 4 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 381, 405 (1997) ("With the rise in Indian gam-
ing, market saturation... may remove gaming as an option for some tribes.");
Thompson & Gazel, supra note 30, at 187 (stating that pari-mutuel racing and
lotteries are now tapped to the limit in most places); id. at 193 (claiming that the
spread of legalized gambling increases its legitimacy, and leads officials to argue
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gambling activity from Qr toward (and perhaps as far as) Qc over
time. The rectangle and triangles in Figure 1 thus shrink and may
eventually disappear. Jonathan Macey reminds us that this is the
regulatory outcome expected by neoclassical economists: "Politicians
... supply rent-creating regulation to the groups best able to pay for
it," until deregulation demands, "technical factors [Internet gambling,
for example] or general economic forces-such as other enterprises
and localities bribing their way into additional casino licenses-erode
the rents earned by investments which cannot easily be converted to
non-gambling uses.60
Is the regulation of gambling thus inefficient and ultimately futile
as well? Increasingly forced to compete with other casinos and other
forms of gambling, a casino will advertise more, eliminate parking and
entry fees, and improve the games, the odds, and the value of food,
that new enterprises should have an equality of opportunity); Truitt, supra note
13, at 127 (many state and local officials see gambling as inevitable, so they aim
to get in early and reap benefits prior to saturation-a strategy which hastens
saturation, of course); Martz, supra note 15, at 485 (discussing what Kindt calls
the "black hole" effect: "as marketing techniques become increasingly seductive
and more addictive forms of gambling are introduced, the market for gambling
bottoms out").
60. See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic
Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA.
L. Ruv. 265, 269-79 (1990), reprinted in PUBLiC CHOICE AND PuBLIc LAW, 877, 880
(Maxwell Stearns ed., 1998) (citing Fred McChesney in part); see also NICHOLAS
MERCURO & STmmN G. MEDEMLA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAw: FROM POSNER TO
POST-MODERNISM 96-97 (1997) (explaining that the Virginia public choice school
emphasizes rent-seeking through monopoly positions, resource misallocations,
and especially resource wastage in obtaining and maintaining these positions);
id. at 148 (stating that neo-institutional economics focuses on the hold-up, or ex
post opportunistic behavior in extracting the quasi-rents made possible by long-
term relationships and contract-specific investments); NEEDHAI, supra note 58,
at 104 (claiming that the ideas of William Niskanan have been refined, but they
remain "the paradigm of bureaucratic behavior in the economics literature"); Cro-
ley, supra note 10, at 35 (describing a "public choice" theory of regulation, which
stresses bargaining over cash subsidies, barriers to entry, making substitutes
more expensive and complements cheaper, and price controls); Farber, Parody,
supra note 6, at 415 (discussing Coase's analyses of broadcast regulations and
noting that distortions are caused not by brute fact but by social arrangements
controlling resource use); Heckman, supra note 9, at 331 (noting that Chicago
School scholars like Stigler and Director were political conservatives, whose mis-
trust of regulation was largely empirical and largely vindicated by subsequent
events); Mohawk, supra note 57, at 497 (stating that Indian activism, rather than
federal policy, created deregulation, which unravels an official dependency);
Martz, supra note 15, at 483 ("Licensing structures that reduce the value of any
given, individual license should deter bribery by lessening its returns."). But see
MARGARET JANE RADiN, CONTESTED COiAeODrrixs 5 (1996) (explaining that for
Chicago School economists "[plolitics reduces to 'rent-seeking' by logrolling selfish
individuals or groups"); id. at 220 (stating that this is part of a desire to "imple-
ment laissez faire markets, and even.., to bring back Lochner").
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drink, and other amenities.6 1 More "marginal" customers will be at-
tracted by this improved product, and the higher social costs of their
increased demand for gambling may not be offset by the (slightly)
higher revenues collected by governments. In the meantime, regula-
tion creates its own transaction (negotiation, monitoring and enforce-
ment) costs, keeps gambling prices above competitive levels for
awhile, suppresses some of the information gamblers need for compar-
ison-shopping, and even handicaps the field of potential competitors.
Nevertheless, the regulation of gambling is said to be an "important
model in which privately-run businesses share fixed percentages of
their gross income with the public."62 (This sharing is really with fed-
eral, tribal, state, and local governments, which is by no means the
same thing for economists as a sharing with "the public").
As a nonmarket means of organizing production and consumption,
an ideal regulation internalizes all social costs (externalities) 63 by
forcing gambling enterprises to bear them. But a real-world regula-
tion takes on a life of its own, creating anomalies which are known as
"bureaucratic failures."64 Most of these failures attempt to counteract
supposed "market failures" which, like bureaucratic failures, are mat-
61. See Kindt, Economic Impacts, supra note 34, at 78 ("Casinos compete too well in a
capitalistic society." (quoting Vicki Abt)); Kindt, Saturation, supra note 20, at 274
(stating Nevada Casinos "entrap the garners in a total gaming ambience," involv-
ing a "full range of complimentary services" such as "a free and unlimited flow of
alcoholic beverages" and extensive credit).
62. GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 8. But see Eadington, supra note 11, at 5 (discussing
the facts that there are many regulatory models of varying rationality, and that
these models make it difficult to separate the public interest from special
interests).
63. See supra notes 27-52 and accompanying text.
64. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 148-49, 392; see also NEEDHAM, supra note 58,
at 218 ("[I]t is not surprising that many existing regulated firms and industries
do not exhibit the characteristics that economists consider necessary for justify-
ing regulation."); id. at 442-43 ("Because externalities are associated with almost
every action by any person, the existence of regulation cannot be explained solely
by reference to ... externalities."); WILLIAMSON, supra, at 23 ("What purposes are
served by supplanting classical market exchange.., by more complex forms of
contracting (including nonmarket modes of economic organization?")); id. at 347
(explaining that in a "living administration," regulation is not self-executing or
self-enforcing); id. at 405 ("[S]ociety... is prior to and regulates utilitarian con-
tracts between individuals." (quoting Leon Mayhew)); Croley, supra note 10, at 3
(stating that regulation perfects the legislative corrections of market failures, in-
cluding "concentrated market power, imperfect information, externalities, unde-
lineated property rights, collective-action problems, and high transactions costs"
(citing Steven Breyer)); id. at 4-5, 105, 164 (distinguishing and critiquing public
choice, neopluralist, public interest, and civic republican theories of regulation);
Martz, supra note 15, at 468 (discussing the "incompatibility of cost-benefit anal-
ysis and majority rule" (quoting Susan Rose-Ackerman)); id. at 475 (discussing
the need to maintain a normative boundary between market and non-market
forces (quoting Susan Rose-Ackerman in part)); infra note 132 and accompanying
text.
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ters of definition: of what we want economic organizations to do that
they are not doing. All social arrangements are more or less failures,
so we must choose among organizational mixes in light of goals which
are imperfectly defined by imperfect democratic politics ("government
failures").
Like the commerce in alcohol and tobacco, gambling is not wholly
organized by markets because a "public interest" is perceived as even
more important than the virtues of unrestrained competition. Neo-
classical law and economics has delegitimated this public interest the-
ory of administration in many areas, a theory which was popularized
by James M. Landis to justify the New Deal.65 The deregulation (re-
ally a re-regulation) of airlines, telecommunications, etc. has been the
result, but this public interest theory remains triumphantly afloat in
areas such as gambling. Marketplace transactions in Indian country
have always been intensively regulated, and the political consensus is
that non-Indian gaming must also be controlled somewhat: so that
gambling's opponents are not antagonized more than is necessary or
possible, to retard a growth in social costs, to reduce infiltration by
organized crime and an excessive cheating of the punters, and to
maintain the revenues of state and local governments and politically-
influential gambling enterprises. 6 6
Federalism is a frequently-cited public interest in gambling regula-
tion. Gambling has always been a states' rights issue, and as the
Commission on the Review of National Policy Toward Gambling put it
in 1976, states "can be flexible and responsive to local demands"; there
65. See JAtzs M. LANDIS, THE ADMNISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938); see also Eadington,
supra note 11, at 4. But see ALCHiAN & ALLEN, supra note 19, at 270 (discussing
regulation in the public interest as an alternative to forming a cartel).
66. See Goodman, supra note 2, at 9-10; Tsosie, supra note 12, at 44; see also NEED-
HAm, supra note 58, at 13 (stating that few of these responses are Pareto-optimal,
so "public interest" is a value judgment about whose interests and analyses a
decision maker should take into account); id. at 256 (noting that regulation may
implement certain normative criteria of behavior); Croley, supra note 10, at 67-70
(describing a new public interest theory of regulation, by Michael Levine and Jen-
nifer Forrence, which argues that the public interest is achieved "more frequently
than not"-especially by correcting market failures); Joseph Farrell, Information
and the Coase Theorem, 1 J. EcoN. PERSPEC. 113, 119 (1987) ("analysis of central-
ized authority," such as in the public interest theory of regulation, "is optimistic
about what a wise and benevolent central planner can do with suitably cunning
schemes"); Cindy Skrzycki, Fingers Point to Congress for Regulatory Fixes, WASH.
POST, Apr. 10, 1998, at F1 (stating that recommendations by the pro-business
Committee for Economic Development "weren't viewed... charitably by the pub-
lic interest community, which has been waging a defensive battle against regula-
tory 'reform' legislation and attempts by the business community to roll back
enforcement efforts and new rule making at some agencies"); id. (reporting that
some commentators see "a shift in the thinking of all the parties involved in the
regulatory policy debate to one where cost is no longer a four-letter word"). But
see RADN, quoted supra note 60.
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is "no public interest in preempting this authority by the imposition of
binding national standards."6 7 The federal gambling role is chiefly to
keep states from interfering with each other, while they are learning-
by-doing and copying from each other. This is a conventional Inter-
state Commerce Clause power, one which could contrast sharply with
federal power under the Indian Commerce Clause.68 The feds should
be seen as regulatory "free riders" in part, reaping the benefits of dis-
parate but detailed state and Indian gambling regulations without
paying anything like their full political and bureaucratic costs. 6 9
There are also stochastic elements in this scheme, driven by the play-
ers' (including governments') ability to keep their true preferences
hidden, and by paternalistic and partly irrational fears of what would
happen in a gambling world without regulation.7O
Whether this melange serves the public interest is in the eyes of
analysts and politicians, but the public interest case is strengthened
by the notion that regulation seeks to ameliorate market failures. The
externalities discussed earlier7i should be treated as market failures
in gambling, since it is (virtually) impossible for competitive markets
to force gambling enterprises and punters to bear most or even much
67. Martz, supra note 15, at 454; see SCOTT & RYAN, supra note 18, at 3-4 (noting that
Nevada and New Jersey handle the criminal aspects of gambling in very different
ways); Michael Donovan Cox, American Bar Ass'n Ctr. For CLE & Criminal Jus-
tice Section, Gaming Enforcement Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
available in Westlaw N97GENB ABA-LGLED D-1 (reporting that tribal-state
compacts have substantial regulations in Washington, Arizona, and Connecticut,
but not in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan). But see Farrell, supra note 66,
at 124 ("Freedom to choose, which is an important safeguard against abuses by
central authority, is also a barrier to efficiency."); C. Matthew Snipp, Public Pol-
icy Impacts and American Indian Economic Development, in PuBLIc POLICY Im-
PACTS ON AMERICAN INDIAN EcONOMIc DEVELOPMENT, 1, 2 (C. Matthew Snipp ed.,
1988) ("Contrary to the claims of some laissez-faire economic theorists," public
policies play a role in economic development.).
68. See Eadington, supra note 11, at 8. But see Thompson & Gazel, supra note 30, at
205 ("[A] nation-wide policy of controlled growth" is needed to overcome "mutu-
ally negative effects of multiple legalizations" in gambling.); Farrell, supra note
66, at 124, quoted supra note 67.
69. See Cox, supra note 67 ("Congress purposefully emasculated the agency" regulat-
ing Indian gaming "out of respect for tribal sovereignty and a congressional policy
that the tribes should be the primary regulators.").
70. See NEEDHAM, supra note 58, at 218; Eadington, Preface, supra note 2, at xix-xx;
Kindt, Economic Impacts, supra note 34, at 61-62; see also Kindt, Taxpayers,
supra note 54, at 909 (arguing that legalized gambling interests misdirect public
debate by stressing only a positivist economic information); Timothy Egan, New
Prosperity Brings New Conflict to Indian Country, N.Y. Tnvms, Mar. 8, 1988, at 22
("Congress has been sending conflicting signals over Indian gaming-on the one
hand pushing for greater autonomy and self-determination, on the other warning
that assertive tribal governments are going too far.").
71. See supra notes 27-52 and accompanying text.
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of the social costs.72 Another, arguably important market failure is
informational: 73 ignorance of the odds of winning, or of the income ef-
fects of playing against such odds. (Perhaps this is an ignorance of a
rudimentary probability theory.) Informational failures may be why
gambling appeals to teenagers and others with less of a diversity of
life experiences, experiences which bolster the (economists') conclu-
sion that "you can't get something for nothing." Curiously, we have
not seen regulations requiring warnings like those on cigarette
packs-"Gambling is Hazardous to your Wealth"-or requiring that
the odds be prominently posted and explained in casinos. Rather, ad-
vertising by casinos and lotteries adds to the misinformation by
stressing a glamorous "something for (almost) nothing" lifestyle.
We can easily imagine why such mandatory disclosures do not ex-
ist: they would decrease the revenues of gambling enterprises, and
thus the tax revenues to which many state and local governments
have become addicted. Additional governmental revenues are pre-
sumably in the public interest, if the "opportunity costs" of raising rev-
enue in this way are not too high: the social costs of gambling,
foregone opportunities for supporting other local businesses in other
ways, and lost opportunities for raising tax revenues in other ways.
Americans are notoriously tax-sensitive, and non-gamblers welcome
(and will vote for) the taxation of gambling and gamblers.74 These
non-gambling taxpayers hope to be "free riders" in part, since govern-
mental revenues will be spent on many projects (especially roads and
schools) other than ameliorating the social costs of gambling. Such
free ridership is particularly pronounced when the non-gambling tax-
72. See NEEDHAM, supra note 58, at 271; WILLIAmsON, supra note 10, at 17; see also
Croley, supra note 10, at 3, quoted supra note 64. But see NEEDHAM, supra note
58, at 442-43 ("Because externalities are associated with almost every action by
any person, the existence of regulation cannot be explained solely by reference to
... externalities.").
73. See NEEDHAM, supra note 58, at 273-75 (noting that restricted information flows
are transaction failures-less information is produced than is socially optimal,
leading to, for example, quality-standard regulations that protect consumers).
74. See 141 CONG. REC. S10913 (daily ed. July 31, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simon)
(stating that apart from Israel, no nation besides the United States spends so
much on defense and interest-expenditures with no direct benefit to citizens;
the tax sensitivity that results makes alternative revenue sources popular, since
there is no parliamentary system to make tough political decisions easier); Kindt,
Taxpayers, supra note 54, at 892 (recognizing that an argument widely used by
gambling interests is that "legalized gambling constitutes a painless tax");
Thompson & Gazel, supra note 30, at 191 (stating that the economic downturn of
the late 1980s created state budget problems that were almost as bad as those of
the 1930s); id. at 191-92 (noting the tax protest movement of the late 1970s and
1980s, espoused by various politicians, resulted in withdrawals of federal pro-
grams and "unfunded mandates" for the states); Martz, supra note 15, at 468
(noting the "incompatibility of cost-benefit analysis and majority rule" in politics
(quoting Susan Rose-Ackerman)).
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payer does not live near a casino: the Not in My Backyard (NIMBY)
Syndrome governs the siting of casinos as well as toxic waste dumps.
Governments frequently have revenue expectations from gambling
which are unrealistically high. Especially when markets become satu-
rated,75 governments often find themselves relaxing regulations and
even subsidizing gambling enterprises to save jobs.7 6 Minnesota and
Wisconsin have gambling extension services for Indian tribes, services
akin to those for agriculture!77
For Oliver Williamson, "the incentive to invest private resources to
influence political decisions varies directly with the degree to which
the resulting advantages can be privately appropriated."7 8 We have
seen that gambling rents are substantial and appropriable by one or
several of the seven players sketched in the introduction, even if these
benefits to special interest groups are less than the costs to a public
interest.7 9 Some of the investments or bets made during intense com-
petition among these players will be discussed later, as Coasian
bribes,80 but the examples offered in the footnote give the flavor and
range of these competitions. 8 ' In one case, an Independent Counsel
75. See GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 9-10, 21, 117-19; see also Kindt, National, supra
note 23, at 578; (stating that governments do not consider all social and economic
consequences of gambling); New Wheels for Motor City, supra note 30, at 23 (not-
ing Missouri casinos recently laid off 1000 employees).
76. See Kindt, Saturation, supra note 20, at 296 (stating that dog track owners in
Wisconsin responded to increased competition from Indian casinos with demands
for "harder" forms of gambling such as unlimited simulcasting, blackjack, slots
and video betting machines); Kindt, Taxpayers, supra note 54, at 891 (claiming
that increased social welfare and criminal justice costs mean that legalized gam-
bling "almost invariably" creates pressures for tax increases).
77. See Harris, supra note 3, at 389.
78. WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 338, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY,
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 33-37, 67 (1991); WILLIA-
SON, supra note 10, at 257 (noting that this would be Albert Hirshman's "voice,"
the relatively neglected political means for influencing outcomes).
79. See supra text following note 7; supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 58 and accompanying text; infra notes 131, 158, 173 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Coasian bribes).
81. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S10915 (daily ed. July 31, 1995) (statement of Sen. Si-
mon) (noting that a bill to prohibit the cashing of welfare checks at gambling
establishments died quietly in the Illinois legislature); id. (explaining that a few
enterprises formed the American Gaming Association, with the former Republi-
can National Committee Chair as the chief executive); GOODMAN, supra note 2, at
18 ("Gambling creates an instant constituency" from among those groups benefit-
ing from earmarked revenues.); id. at 28 (roughly $2.3 million was spent in 1993
on lobbyists' salaries, public relations firms, and trips, meals, and materials for
Connecticut legislators, in a futile attempt to promote casinos that would com-
pete with the Pequot Tribe's successful one); id. at 31, 34 (public relations consul-
tants for would-be Chicago casinos tried to enlist the support of black and
Hispanic media and churches and stressed business rationales to distance their
efforts from "the mob"); id. at 35 (casino supporters outspent opponents 60:1 in a
1976 Atlantic City gambling referendum); id. at 134 (the California Lottery was
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investigated whether the $220,000 - $350,000 contributed to the Dem-
ocratic National Committee by a wealthy group of tribes influenced
the Interior Department's decision about an Indian casino in Hudson,
Wisconsin.8 2
the largest buyer of advertising in Los Angeles County in 1990); id. at 155-56
(many governors lobby Congress to curb Indian casinos); Thompson & Gazel,
supra note 30, at 194-95 (Nevada regulations prohibiting enterprises from lobby-
ing for new casino licenses were repealed in 1993); Martz, supra note 15, at 464-
65 n.61 (describing a "sampling of recent corruption cases involving gambling ex-
ecutives or their agents," from Arizona, California, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, South Carolina, and West Virginia); id. (not-
ing that the Arizona governor fired the State's lottery director, after hearing that
he threatened to revoke the performance bond of an operator whose chief lobbyist
is the governor's friend, fund-raiser, and former chief-of-staff); Tony Hillerman,
Who Has Sovereignty Over Mother Earth?, N.Y. Tnzs, Sept. 18, 1997, at A23
("[Wihen it comes to defending water ownership, treaty promises, fishing rights,
gambling casinos and the rest.., from encroaching white neighbors, the tribes
may be forced to rely on lobbyists and lawyers, if they can find ones they can
trust."); In Louisiana, the Chips Fall, supra note 18, at 26 ("[The gambling] in-
dustry still enjoys hefty influence and is still flush with cash; and what else could
put so much easy money into the eager mitts of politicians?").
82. In a 1996 letter to Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), Secretary of the Interior Bruce
Babbitt denied invoking a White House official's (Icke's) name to a lobbyist-friend
(Eckstein), who was seeking Interior's approval for converting a dog track into an
Indian casino. Testifying before a Senate Committee in October 1997, Babbitt
admitted that he may have mentioned Icke's name to Eckstein. Tribes with casi-
nos already in the area, tribes which were opposed to the new casino, had contrib-
uted to the Democratic National Committee, and allegedly lobbied the President,
Ickes, and others, who pressured the Interior Department into a quick rejection
of the new casino. Carol Elder Bruce has been appointed Independent Counsel to
investigate the matter. See George Lardner, Jr., Crux of the Babbitt Probe: Recol-
lections in Conflict, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1998, at AS; Robert Suro & George
Lardner, Jr., Counsel Probe of Babbitt is Likely, Officials Say, WASH. POST, Nov.
17, 1997, at Al.
The White House is claiming executive and other privileges, but internal
memos apparently show that the Interior Department was contacted three times
about this casino. See George Lardner, Jr., White House Seeks to Keep Indian
Casino Memos Secret, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1997, at A2; James Rowley, White
House Aides Made Inquiries on Indian Casino, Memos Show, WASH. POST, Oct.
23, 1997, at A19. Interior Spokesman Michael G. Gauldin called it "the right
decision... faithful to our policy not to force off-reservation gaming on to any
community that is opposed to it." George Lardner, Jr., & Robert Suro, Reno Ex-
tends Investigation of Casino Rejection, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1997, at A22. Op-
ponents reportedly included the City Council of Hudson, Wisconsin, other local
politicians and business people, the Wisconsin and Minnesota congressional dele-
gations, and tribes with established casinos, of course. See Rosenbaum, supra
note 8, at Al; Walsh, Old Friends, supra note 8.
For an unfriendly interpretation, see William Safire, Bribes From Tribes, N.Y.
TAms, Dec. 31, 1997, at A6 ("Here we have a blatant example of the purchase of
government policy. A lobbyist goes to Clinton, who gave the assignment to Lind-
say, who took it to Ickes, who leaned on Babbitt, who was surrounded by top staff
eyeing the lucrative revolving door."). Prior to these events, a court had found
that Interior's refusal to acquire a dog track for the Indian casino in question was
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FIGURE 2 -INCIDENCE OF GAMBLING TAXES
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C. Distributive Effects
We have seen that the social costs (externalities) of gambling are
likely greater than one of its social benefits, revenues collected by
state and local governments from gambling enterprises. These exter-
nalities are clearly not internalized in full by governmental actions
because these revenues are spent for many purposes besides amelio-
rating the social costs of gambling.8 3 Enterprises regard these reve-
nue payments to governments as an additional cost of production, as
taxes on gambling-including the revenue-sharing arrangements cre-
ated by a "compact" between an Indian tribe and a state.8 4
Figure 2 shows that consumers (punters), rather than gambling
enterprises, bear most of the consequences of these taxes because the
demand for gambling is fairly inelastic-as illustrated by the rela-
tainted by improper congressional and presidential contacts. See Sokaogon Chip-
pewa Community v. Babbitt, 929 F. Supp. 1165 (W.D. Wis. 1996). The court later
found that the plaintiffs made so strong a "showing of bad faith or improper influ-
ence" that they were entitled to extra-record discovery and to examine agency
personnel. See Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Babbitt, 961 F. Supp. 1276,
1279 (W.D. Wis. 1997).
83. See supra notes 30-51, 74 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
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tively vertical demand curve.8 5 Taxes on gambling cause the enter-
prise's marginal costs of production to shift upward and to the left,
from MC-1 to MC-2. The gap between MC-1 and MC-2 reflects taxes
paid by the enterprise, and this gap would get wider at higher quanti-
ties (further to the right on the graph) if a progressive gambling tax
were being modeled. The consequences of the tax borne by consumers,
an increase in the price of gambling from P1 to P2, are relatively
large, while the consequences borne by gambling enterprises, the de-
crease in the quantity of gambling from Q1 to Q2 that occurs at higher
price P2, are relatively small.
Perhaps needless to say, the successful production of gambling re-
quires its consumers to lose money, overall and in the long run. Gam-
bling taxes then require consumers to lose still more money, in the
form of worse odds and amenities adopted by enterprises trying to
make money in the face of taxes-even under the varying, quasi-com-
petitive conditions most enterprises now face. Like alcoholics and
drug addicts, gambling addicts thus bear a large share of the costs
they help to create in theory. Whatever we may think of such people
as human beings, it is clear that they are financially unable to bear
costs of this magnitude. Rather, their attempts to cover these costs of
their habit or addiction spawn criminal and other (second-order) social
costs, in a downward spiral of despair.
All gamblers are not addicts of course, but "[s]tudies indicate that
poor and working people spend a disproportionate part of their in-
comes on gambling."8 6 More specifically, "males, Hispanics, blacks,
the middle-aged, Catholics, laborers,... those with less than a college
education" and, we would add, Indians display a tendency to play lot-
teries heavily.8 7 Punters reportedly gamble against enormous odds in
85. See supra text following note 54; cf Robert J. Samuelson, Smoking Lesson, WASH.
PoST, Apr. 8, 1998, at A23 (reporting that Sen. McCain argues that his tobacco
bill will force the industry to pay $500 billion over 25 years, but most of this will
be paid by smokers in the form of higher prices); id. (noting percentages of to-
bacco taxes paid by income group are: under $10,000, 16%; $10-$20,000, 18%;
$20-$30,000, 19%; $30$40,000, 14%, $40-$50,000, 12%; $50-$100,000, 19%;
$100,000+, 1%); id. ("[Dleterring teen smoking is important," but should we tax
this relatively poor group "without rebating some funds?").
86. GoODMAN, supra note 2, at 8-9; see Peter H. Aranson & Roger LeRoy Miller, Eco-
nomic Aspects of Public Gaming, 12 CoNN. L. REV. 822, 837 (1980) (discussing
data from the Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gam-
bling); Kindt, Economic Impacts, supra note 34, at 77 (discussing studies showing
10% of the population as "problem economic gamblers," 42% as "recreational"
gamblers, and 48% as nongamblers); Kindt, National, supra note 23, at 579 (stat-
ing that legalized gambling activities constitute a "regressive tax" which "make
poor people poorer and intensify many pre-existing social-welfare problems").
But see Heckman, supra note 9, at 328-29 (claiming that using the price system to
redistribute resources is generally not very effective).
87. GOODYmN, supra note 2, at 96 (quoting a study by Charles T. Clotfelder and
Philip J. Cook); Samuelson, quoted and discussed supra note 85.
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order to dream, and they blame themselves rather than the casino or
the state lottery when they lose.88 This apparently irrational taste
can be explained as follows: The higher "opportunity costs" for impov-
erished gamblers, measured in terms of the food, healthcare, and
other necessities not consumed because of gambling, are more than
offset by "opportunity benefits" for the poor, who (by definition) have
fewer alternatives to gambling for acquiring a moderate wealth. Ow-
ing to the NIMBY attitudes that relatively affluent citizens have to-
ward casinos (and toxic waste dumps), casinos are frequently sited in
poor neighborhoods or regions; impoverished residents thus come to
bear most of the localized and uninternalized social costs of casinos-
in Atlantic City, for example.8 9 When we add that gambling revenues
are usually spent by state and local governments on officials' salaries,
roads, schools, and other projects which mostly benefit middle-income
citizens, we see that legalized gambling involves a massive and con-
sistently regressive redistribution of wealth. Regional redistribution
occurs as well. For example, California's gamblers subsidize
Nevadans' economy to the (estimated) tune of $8.8 billion and 196,000
jobs a year.90
88. See GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 134-35 (citing a Kentucky Lottery Director);
Kindt, Economic Impacts, supra note 34, at 80 ("Marketing... by gambling
enterprises sells hope....").
89. Compare Coase, Notes, supra note 54, at 181 (stating that for smoke nuisance, an
"appropriately chosen" Pigovian "tax, levied only on the factory (without payment
of compensation to local residents) is precisely what is needed for optimal re-
source allocation under pure competition" (quoting William Baumol)), with
Coase, Notes, supra note 54, at 181 ("[I]f there is a tax based on damage, it would
also be desirable to tax those whose presence impose costs on the firm responsible
for the harmful effects"). Gambling taxes seem to be a hybrid of these ap-
proaches: they cover less than total "damages," but costs are primarily borne by
punters and local residents. Nothing like pure competition emerges, and the tax
might not be thought appropriately chosen because it is fixed through negotia-
tions among special interest groups. See also 141 CONG. REc. S10915 (daily ed.
July 31, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simon) (stating that Atlantic City went from a
slum by the sea to "a slum by the sea with casinos." (quoting I. Nelson Rose));
GoODMAN, supra note 2, at 34, discussed infra note 92; id. at 59 (noting that de-
spite about $6 billion in private investment, "Atlantic City has become virtually
two cities-one of extravagant casinos.., and the other... of boarded-up build-
ings, of a predominantly minority population that suffers large-scale unemploy-
ment" and rampant speculation); Eadington, supra note 11, at 6 ("Gambling
promises for the poor what property does for the rich: something for nothing."
(quoting George Bernard Shaw)); Joseph Friedman et al., Casino Gambling as a
"Growth Pole" Strategy and Its Effect on Crime, 29 J. REGIONAL Sc. 615, 616
(1989) (stating that there is a significant increase in crime in Atlantic City attrib-
uted to introduction of casinos); Kindt, Economic Impacts, supra note 34, at 81
("Over a seven-year period, the theoretical loss to a population base often million
people"-Illinois, for example-"ranges from $28 to $93 billion-a sum not
spent on "real" consumer goods and services); supra text accompanying notes 44,
75; supra text following note 73.
90. See Kindt, Saturation, supra note 20, at 273.
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III. INDIANS
Another important distributive effect of gambling is the transfer of
wealth from non-Indian gamblers to tribal casinos. This typically in-
volves a transfer from the middle class and the better-off poor (persons
who can afford to travel to a reservation as well as gamble) to a casino
that benefits reservation Indians who, at least until casino revenues
take hold, "are the most economically disadvantaged minority in
America today." Forty-three percent of reservation Indian households
were below the poverty line in 1990.9' The NIMBY Syndrome oper-
ates with a vengeance because reservations are remote from the back-
yards of most people and "[no one cares if you suck [gambling] money
out of tourists."92 These tourists are residents somewhere, and like
Nevadans, Indians may hope that the punters will leave their money
and take most of their social costs home. Many reservation Indians,
who have "low incomes, poor education, inferior housing, and an ex-
tremely high incidence of social problems," see little harm in such a
tactic.93 Even more than our urban ghettos, reservations are segre-
gated from the mainstream economy, usually with too small a popula-
tion to be minimally viable by themselves. Frequently isolated
geographically and possessing poor infrastructures and little in the
way of natural resources, reservations saw meager transfer payments
from the federal government cut throughout the 1980s and 1990s.94
91. Anders, supra note 2, at 233; see also GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 114-15 (noting
that the relative remoteness of Las Vegas is thought to decrease access for those
unable to afford to gamble, and this argues for small and rural casinos-such as
on reservations); Egan, supra note 70, at 22 (reporting that "Indian country" is 56
million acres or 2% of the United States, 314 reservations, and 1.4 million people
or less than 1% of the population; another 500,000 Indians live in urban areas).
92. GOODIAN, supra note 2, at 50 (quoting I. Nelson Rose); see id. at 34-35 (illustrat-
ing the NIMBY Syndrome with a 1992 Harris poll-56% were opposed to a casino
in their community, while 62% favored Indian casinos); Anders, supra note 2, at
233 Deller & Chen, supra note 45, at 253 (stating that Indian casino customers
are typically older and gambling forms the nucleus of a longer trip).
93. Anders, supra note 2, at 234; see P=TER MATTrmSSEN, INDIAN COUNmy xi (1992)
("The desperate struggles of the Indian people for survival in this century" consti-
tute "the New Indian Wars"); Joane Nagel et al., The Politics of American Indian
Economic Development: the Reservation/ Urban Nexus, in PUBLIC POLICY IMPACTS
ON AEiR AN INDIAN EcoNO Ic DEv Am ENT, supra note 67, at 39, 40 ("Ameri-
can Indians are poorer, more unemployed, less educated, less healthy, and
shorter lived than their average American counterparts."); Snipp, supra note 67,
at 1 ("Joblessness and the accoutrements of poverty, such as high infant mortal-
ity rates and alcoholism, have been a traditional plague among Indian people.");
Jason Kalish, Note, Do the States Have an Ace in the Hole or Should the Indians
Call Their Bluff? Tribes Caught in the Power Struggle Between the Federal Gov-
ernment and the States, 38 Am. L. Rav. 1345, 1345 (1996) (stating that Indian
wages are half of those for non-Indians, and 39% of Indians are unemployed);
infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
94. See Paul H. Brietzke, Urban Development and Human Development, 25 IND. L.
REv. 741 (1992) [hereinafter Brietzke, Urban] ("Along with economically disad-
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Felix Cohen gives us a timeless assessment: "Like the miner's ca-
nary, the Indian marks the shift from fresh air to poison gas in our
political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than
our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall of our dem-
ocratic faith."95 The sad and vacillating history of "our treatment" is
readily available elsewhere9 6 and will not be detailed here. Much of
the vacillation and legal uncertainty can be attributed to Chief Justice
John Marshall, who in 1832, declared Indian tribes to be distinct "na-
tions" with independent natural rights and legitimately in possession
of their own territory, which were nonetheless weak and dependent on
federal protection. 97 Our law has been stuck on this oxymoronic char-
acterization of a dependent autonomy ever since, of tribes as sovereign
wards of the federal government, while an ill-defined federal "plenary"
vantaged rural areas, the ghettos ...of our cities form an entrenched Third
World of the United States."); id. at 757-62 (discussing segregated ghetto mar-
kets); Egan, supra note 70, at 22 ("With barely 100 members, the Skull Valley
Band of Goshutes declared what few people outside the reservation had taken
seriously: that they were a sovereign nation" planning to store high-level nuclear
waste); Nagel et al., supra note 93, at 40, 45, 47-48; id. at 42 (noting that "check-
erboarding" of reservation land, with fragmenting land inheritance rules and the
alienation of plots by feds to non-Indians, interferes with development projects
and a coherent tribal jurisdiction).
95. FRANK POMNERSHEim, BRAID OF FEATHERS 51 (1995), quoted in Rand & Light,
supra note 59, at 385; Olivia Quittner Goldman, Panel: Indigenous Peoples and
the Right to Self-Determination, 87 AM. Soc'Y IN'L L. PRoc. 190 (1993)
("[Ilndigenous peoples were the first, and remain the most persistent, victims of
colonialism." (quoting Howard R. Berman)); William Raspberry, The Canary's
Message, WASH. POST, May 15, 1998, at A27 (reporting that the miners' canary is
also a metaphor for race relations, drugs, teen violence, AIDS, and road rage).
96. See, e.g., VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, A'mRicAN INDIANS, AMERicAN
JUSTICE (1983); VINE DELoRis, JR., AMERiCAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (1985); MA'TrHIESSEN, supra note 93; Snipp, supra note 67, at 1-20 (dis-
cussing the history of Indian economic development, from "captive nations" to
"internal colonies," and examining mineral, timber, and water resource use);
Rand & Light, supra note 59, at 385-95 (tracing successive federal policies of relo-
cation to 1830; removal and assimilation to 1871; reorganization from the late
1920s; termination of federal services beginning in 1953; and self-determination
beginning with the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968); Tsosie, supra note 12, at 26-
67 (describing hostilities between the states and the tribes and the nature of tri-
bal governing rights); Kalish, supra note 93, at 1347-59 (discussing treaties, In-
dian rights cases, and Congressional action).
97. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 519, 561 (1832) (involving a non-
Indian living on Indian land, with their consent, who successfully challenged a
Georgia statute prohibiting this). Cherokee Indians had become subsistence
farmers with federal help, but Georgia claimed their land after gold was discov-
ered on it. When President Jackson refused to enforce Worcester, the "trail of
tears" ensued, and more than 4000 Cherokee died during a forced migration
westward. See Tsosie, supra note 12, at 31-32 (describing the consent principle
and its application to federal negotiations with the tribes); Kalish, supra note 93,
at 1350; infra notes 213, 239-56 and accompanying text.
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power over Indians was variously used for an overt repression and
then for cycles of malign and benign neglect.9 s
Little wonder, then, that many Indians see a tribally-owned casino
as the "new buffalo," the main means of nurturing a self-sufficiency
and tribal sovereignty.9 9 Gaming tribes could almost be following the
(loosely-translated) motto of the Florentine Medici (and perhaps of the
public choice economists): Use the wealth to acquire the power, and
use the power to protect the wealth. Reliable data are scarce once
again, but a third of the 554 tribes recognized by the federal govern-
ment operate some form of gambling enterprise, generating $7 billion
a year which is distributed unevenly among gaming tribes. Some com-
mentators believe that all tribes will get into this game eventually.100
98. See MATrHIESSEN, supra note 93, at 111-12 ("[Marshall] did Indians a fatal dis-
service by declaring them 'domestic dependent nations'... at a time when many
... were still uncontacted, far less conquered."); Nagel et al., supra note 93, at 41
(describing the federal government as ambivalent, as both administrators and
trustees of poorly-coordinated Indian programs); Stephanie A. Levin, The Legal
Environment of Indian Gambling, in LEGALIZED GAmBLING AS A STRATEGY FOR
ECONOmIC DEVELOPmENT, supra note 2, at 169, 169 [hereinafter Levin, Environ-
ment] (noting that Indians occupy an "uneasy place" in American law, "at the
boundaries of the law of conquest, treaty, and land purchase," and unresolved
debates grow in complexity and intensity); Snipp, supra note 67, at 2; id. at 2-3
(stating that the federal government often treats its "sovereign wards" to a "be-
nign neglect"); Tsosie, supra note 12, at 26 (discussing not letting states' rights
drown out "our solemn trust obligations" to the Indians, and our acting wiser
than those who sought to remove "Indians to the most remote and desolate parts
of our country with empty promises of prosperity" (quoting Sen. John McCain);
Kalish, supra note 93, at 1351-54 (stating that Marshall never spelled out the
scope of federal authority, and subsequent judges have done little better); infra
note 240 and accompanying text.
99. See Anders, supra note 2, at 241 (stating that there is a close connection between
financial independence through, for example, Indian gaming, and political sover-
eignty); Deller & Chen, supra note 45, at 249; Littman, supra note 2, at 46; Rand
& Light, supra note 59, at 404 (noting that Indian casinos create 140,000 jobs,
about 85% of them for non-Indians); Kalish, supra note 93, at 1359 (stating that
gaming "is the first thing that has come along in 100 years that is giving the
tribes a chance to be economically independent" (quoting Tim Giago)); George
Lardner, Jr., Tribal Plan Foes Draw Parallel, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1998, at A21
(reporting that the Shakopee Sioux of Minnesota each earn $600,000 a year from
their gambling enterprises).
100. See GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 150-51 (citing Charles Keechi of the Delaware
Nation); id. at 165 (stating that in 1992, 13 Indian casinos in gambling's third
largest state, Minnesota, employed 5700 people, approximately 28% of them be-
ing Indian); Cox, supra note 67 (describing 274 gambling facilities owned by 182
tribes); Deller & Chen, supra note 45, at 247 (noting that in 1993, Wisconsin's
40,000 Indians had net gaming revenues of $200 million); Egan, supra note 70, at
22; Joseph M. Kelly, American Indian Gaming Law, in GAMiBLING: PUBLIC POLI-
CES AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 2, at 215, 218 ("Ten years from now
Indian tribes will have gaming in every major city in the country." (quoting a
1992 statement by then-Secretary of the Interior Lujan)); Robinson, supra note 2,
at 10, 16 (stating that most economic studies of Indian casinos are unbalanced, in
part because there is no nationwide data collection or analytical capability);
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For example, the Fort McDowell Reservation Casino, perhaps atypical
because it is usefully located near Phoenix and Scottsdale, Arizona,
paid tribal members $12,800 each in 1993, in addition to offering some
community programs and employment at $8 an hour; "gaming has the
power to completely transform this once isolated reservation into a
luxury resort with riverside hotels and casinos complete with golf
courses, and tennis courts."ioi
Indian casinos create a balance of social benefits and costs (exter-
nalities) which is (perhaps only slightly) better than that for non-In-
dian casinos. 10 2 Tribes are exempt from most federal, state, and local
taxes,1 0 3 except for that portion of gambling revenues paid as tribute
to a state under the relevant "compact."10 4 Tribes thus may make
many more direct investments in local amenities than do owners of
non-Indian casinos: schools and scholarships; roads; community, cul-
tural and health centers; social welfare programs, etc. The relative
isolation of most reservation casinos means that the local multiplier
effect is (much) greater than for non-Indian casinos; there is less leak-
age of casino revenues out of the reservations. Temporarily isolated
punters are more likely to consume tribal food, entertainment, and
Tsosie, supra note 12, at 82; Safire, supra note 4 ("Nowhere is the gambling in-
dustry's evil more blatant than in its use of American Indian tribes as fronts and
in its enrichment of politically adept tribal leaders."); Walsh, Boom, supra note
13, at Al. But see Hillerman, supra note 81, at A23 ("'[Tihe way to make money'
... is what First Man of Navajo mythology called his bundle of evil magic.").
101. Anders, supra note 2, at 235-36, 241; see Deller & Chen, supra note 45, at 247
(noting that gambling enabled the Shakopee Sioux of Minnesota to pay the 150
tribal members $900,000 each in 1993 and 1994); id. at 247-48 (stating that for
the Mille Lac in Minnesota, unemployment decreased from 60% to almost zero);
id. at 319 (noting that the gaming Oneida of Wisconsin saw a 20-fold increase in
their tribal budget as a result of legalized gambling, and unemployment declined
from 70% to 12%). But see Jason D. Kolkema, Comment, Federal Policy of Indian
Gaming on Newly Acquired Lands and the Threat to State Sovereignty: Retaining
Gubernatorial Authority Over the Federal Approval of Gaming on Off-Reservation
Sites, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 361, 369 (1996) (stating that an estimated 78% of
employees at Indian-owned casinos are non-Indian).
102. Compare supra notes 27-52 and accompanying text (externalities from non-In-
dian casinos), with infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text (externalities from
Indian casinos).
103. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (noting that states
cannot tax reservation Indian income derived solely from on-reservation activity);
Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866) (holding that Indian land and prop-
erty is exempt from state law and cannot be taxed); Scott A. Taylor, An Introduc-
tion and Overview of Taxation and Indian Gaming, 29 Amuz. ST. L.J. 251, 253-54
(1997) (noting that tribes pay no federal income tax on casino net revenues as
compared to the 35% maximum rate paid by commercial non-Indian casino corpo-
rations, although IRS interpretations require tribes to pay social security and
unemployment taxes); id. at 260 (holding tribal right to issue tax-exempt bonds
to be narrowly limited by 1988 legislation); id. at 267 (finding that gaming win-
nings of persons living off the reservation are potentially subject to tax).
104. See infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
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lodging, and to compensate the surrounding state in the form of sales
and gasoline taxes paid before and after gambling. Punters seem to be
better-behaved at Indian casinos, and a reduced dependence is condu-
cive to a sense of pride and increased political participation among
Indians. Social costs include the risk of infiltration by organized
crime, apparently much less of a risk than for non-Indian casinos, in-
creased drug use because of the increased availability of money, in-
creased gambling addiction, at an estimated rate of 14.5%, compared
to about 1% for non-Indians, exploitation by the non-Indian casino
management, and a racist backlash against perceived Indian suc-
cesses.1 0 5 On the other hand, "gaming tribes have experienced a de-
crease in crimes of poverty: spousal and child abuse, domestic
violence, small thefts, assaults and batteries, and other violations
which spring from poverty, unemployment and alcoholism."106
Public opinion polls show non-Indians to be remarkably tolerant of
Indian casinos, but there is often an undercurrent represented here by
105. See Indian Economic Development: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcommittee
on Native American Affairs of the House Natural Resources Comm., 103d Cong.
20 (1993) (statement of Caleb Shields, Chairman of the Assiniboine and Sioux
Tribes, Fort Peck Reservation in Montana); Deller & Chen, supra note 45, at 250;
Michael Grant, Seminole Tribe v. Florida-Extinction of the "New Buffalo?" 22
AM. INDIAN L. REv. 171, 172-73 (1997); Kelly, supra note 100, at 226; id. at 220
(noting that the FBI found no evidence of widespread organized crime within In-
dian gaming); see also Kindt, National, supra note 23, at 584 n.106; Kolkema,
supra note 101, at 367-68 (discussing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2) (1994), and the fact
that the Secretary of the Interior can condition approval of a tribal gaming ordi-
nance on revenues being spent in certain ways, including reinvestment in the
tribal community to further economic development); id. (stating that the Sycuan
tribe of California used gaming revenues for a "day-care center, ambulance ser-
vice, library, fire department, and automotive shop"); id. at 369 Rand & Light,
supra note 59, at 406; William Souder, In Minnesota, a Bitter Feud Over Tribal
Rights, Fishing Rites, WASH. POST, May 9, 1998, at A3 (reporting that in Minne-
sota, the Grand Casino Mille Lacs reduced reservation unemployment from 46%
to under 10%, and financed improved housing, a new government center, and
land acquisitions); Walsh, Boom, supra note 13, at A9. But see Deller & Chen,
supra note 45, at 250 (noting that some argue that Indian casinos lead to abusive
behavior, the replacement of a welfare check with a casino check, and resentment
toward those who are trying to re-join the tribe); supra note 32 and accompanying
texts.
Survivors of the Mashantucket Pequot of Connecticut were mostly enslaved
after a massacre in 1637, so that many members today have African-American or
other blood. See Brett D. Fromson, The Pequot Uprising: How a Tiny Tribe Gam-
bled and Won, Reclaiming the American Dream, WASH. PosT, June 21, 1998, at
Fl. Their casino businesses, the most successful in the United States, earn about
$1 million per Pequot. Local Anglos are organizing against this tribe, leading
Chief Hayward to observe: "maybe if we were still getting water from an open
well and going outside to two-hole outhouses . . ., nobody would be paying any
attention to us." Id.
106. Rand & Light, supra note 59, at 403 (quoting Richard Hill, Chair of the National
Gaming Association).
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a bumper sticker seen in Northern Wisconsin: "Save a walleye, spear a
squaw."10 7 (The "lunker" walleye is the totemic fish of Wisconsin.)
Some Native Americans repay such favors by, for example, disrupting
a March 1998 meeting of President Clinton's Race Advisory Commis-
sion because they had been excluded from it.10o One tribal sign said:
"You've Taken Our Land-Now Take Our Ideas."109 But for the most
part, "[1]awyers and lobbyists have replaced warriors and cavalry,"11o
and Indians feel the need of a (Coasian) "fish that knows how to steal
the bait, a clever operator who can use the luck that temporary loop-
holes in the law bring to Indians for higher causes, steady ad-
vances."1 1' Ultimately, the game is for a redistribution of access to
rights and wealth in favor of Indians. 1 2 The competing players also
seek favorable redistribution, of course.
IV. COASIAN GAMES
We are not experts in game theory, but it seems unlikely that a
game which reaches an equilibrium outcome in a finite number of
107. New Indian Wars: Fish and Chips, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 1997, at 27 [hereinafter
Fish and Chips]; see GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 34-35; Glen M. Feldman &
O'Connor Cavanagh, Survey of Public Opinion Regarding Indian Gaming, in RES-
ERVATION-BASED GxNwG, supra note 2, at 1, 1 (stating that a 1992 nationwide
Harris poll reported that 68% of American adults favored gambling on Indian
reservations and 28% were opposed); id. at 2, 5 (noting similar results in State of
Washington and Kansas City Star polls, in 1992); id. at 4 (stating that 62-75% of
Californians approved Indian reservation gambling, compared with a 47-53% ap-
proval of off-reservation gambling); id. at 7 (stating that in 1993, Arizona Gover-
nor Symington's approval rating plummeted by 15%, primarily due to his
opposition to Indian gaming); Rand & Light, supra note 59, at 406-07 (describing
a "racist" attitude that Indians will spoil whatever resources they have); Law-
rence Rosen, Book Review, The Right To Be Different: Indigenous Peoples and the
Quest for a Unified Theory, 107 YALE L.J. 227, 230 (1997) (recognizing that atti-
tudes toward indigenous peoples are "mixed" in the United States-noble sav-
age," "indigenous yeomanry," "unproductive nomad," "beleaguered dependent,"
.sporting mascot or ecological emblem").
108. See Tom Kenworthy, Native Americans Denounce Race Panel, WASH. POST, Mar.
25, 1998, at A3.
109. Id.
110. GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 161; see Hillerman, supra note 81, at A23.
111. Levin, Betting, supra note 1, at 126 (citing LOUISE ERDRICH, THE BINGO PALACE
221 (1994)); see also Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Pursuing Tribal Economic Devel-
opment at The Bingo Palace, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 97 (1997) (noting that for Erdrich,
bingo winnings are an "insulation" from material want and a metaphor for tribes
choosing development through gaming).
112. See Mohawk, supra note 57, at 499; see also Goldman, supra note 95, at 199-200
(quoting Richard A. Falk as stating, in indigenous rights, struggles take prece-
dence over governmental policies). But see Goldman, supra note 95, at 198 (dis-
cussing "teflon' leaders of Indian nations who are willing to give all of it up for
the quick money of casinos" (quoting Owen Lyons)); Nagel et al., supra note 93, at
62 ("All of the divisions cutting across Indian communities and the administra-
tion of Indian affairs have the capacity for immense disruption and dislocation.").
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rounds could ever be modeled from seven-sided competitions over In-
dian casinos. Players and their representatives change from one
round to the next, some may act as (Coasian) free riders or as holdouts
(e.g., sovereigns who refuse to play in some rounds), some play a zero-
sum gamel13 where winners can gain only at the expense of the
losers, while others follow Coase in assuming that everyone can gain
through bargaining. Players often keep their preferences, payoffs, and
other vital information hidden, so that signals (bluffs and bribes) from
past rounds form an unreliable history to guide play in the subsequent
rounds. Players have varying degrees of success in maintaining the
credibility and enforceability of promised rewards and penalties from
round to round.1 14 Institutional arrangements for bargaining are
113. See GoODMN, supra note 2, at 32 (noting that in a Glick and Herring study,
Chicago public opinion saw claimed casino benefits as "redistribution and not net
gain"); id. at 51-52 (stating that entertainment analyst Margo Viguola sees gam-
ing as a "zero-sum game," replacing money not otherwise spent on entertain-
ment); Deller & Chen, supra note 45, at 250 ("[Slome tourism analysts suggest
that from an overall regional economic development perspective the development
of casinos . ..might be a zero-sum game'-a reallocation of entertainment
dollars).
114. See ROBERT GIBBONs, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED EcONOamsS 56 (1992); id. at xii
(discussing four types of equilibria, constructed in a sequence of more restrictive
concepts to eliminate implausible equilibria); id. at 56 (stating that one instruc-
tive dynamic game with complete information is Wassily Leontiefs 1946 model of
wage and employment determination in a unionized firm); id. at 68, 70 (noting
the potentially infinite number of rounds in a sequential bargaining, the last
move always being unknown); id. at 70, 117 (stating that a complete plan of ac-
tion must be known at the outset to yield a Nash equilibrium in dynamic games
of complete information-something not feasible for Indian casinos); id. at 218-19
(stating that in a sequential bargaining model under asymmetric information-
as is arguably the case for Indian casinos-the firm and not the union knows
prospective profits); WILLnAMSON, supra note 10, at 58 n.17 ("[A] measure for all
uncertainty situations... has absolutely no meaning, for it can be obtained only
by an intentionally mutilated representation of reality." (quoting Georgescu-
Roegen)); Coase, Notes, supra note 54, at 178 (stating that only in a zero transac-
tion cost world does everyone have the incentive to discover and disclose all ad-
justments which increase the value of production); id. (explaining that
transaction costs decrease or eliminate incentives to disclose information needed
to devise an optimal liability rule); Farber, Parody, supra note 6, at 407 (stating
that Coase overlooked bargainers' incentives to conceal preferences, thereby cre-
ating a sub-optimal bargain-especially when the parties want the same indivisi-
ble object and when bluffing leads to a breakdown in negotiations (citing Robert
Cooter)); id. at 408 (arguing that game theory problems of bettering oneself by
defecting are not adequately accounted for by Coase); Farrell, supra note 66, at
115-16 (noting that economics models of non-cooperative bargaining yield ineffi-
cient outcomes when information is incomplete); id. at 120 ("Meyerson and Sat-
terthwaite... show that there is no individually-rational, incentive-compatible
scheme that always yields efficient outcomes if... it is unknown who values the
object more."); John Sutton, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduc-
tion, 53 Rav. EcoN. STuD. 709, 711-12, 717, 720 (1986); id. at 709 (explaining that
bargaining processes will vary widely from case to case, where bargaining is se-
quential and information incomplete); id. at 721 (discussing A. Rubinstein's com-
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complex, subject to change during and between rounds, and particu-
larly vulnerable to both strategic and accidental disruptions.115
Thompson and Gazel have thus partly repented their modeling of the
spread of casino gambling as a "prisoner's dilemma."'16 Complex
events cannot be adequately described by this two player/two strategy
model.1 1 7
The Coase Theorem similarly models two players, rancher and
farmer for example, and two strategies at a time: bribe/pay damages
or leave, if you are the player who is liable or who lacks the relevant
property right, for example. Nonetheless, interesting implications can
be drawn from broad Coasian analyses of Indian casinos. An indeter-
minacy from a game theory perspective does not necessarily mean a
sub-optimality in economics and, in a high transaction cost world,
Coase admits that "whether the value of production will be greater
when the ranchers [or Indian casinos] are liable or when they are not
liable depends on the circumstances of the particular case."11 8 In
other words, "law plays a crucial role in determining how [Indian and
plete information but n-person bargaining model, where the advantages of
vetoing shift among the parties during subsequent rounds); see also ALCHAi' &
ALLEN, supra note 19, at 331 (stating that medicine is a better analogy than a
striking union, with the licensing law enforced by public prosecution rather than
a private intimidation of those willing to work for less).
115. See Nagel et al., supra note 93, at 62, quoted supra note 112; infra notes 136-209
and accompanying text (noting different institutional arrangements spawned by
Cabazon, the IGRA, Seminole, and presumably the forthcoming rounds).
116. Thompson & Gazel, supra note 30; see id. at 183-84 ("One state can achieve ad-
vantages if it endorses casinos, while its neighbors do not. However, if both do,
both lose. If neither do, they both maximize their economic standing."). Commu-
nication and trust are bounded because each state is surrounded by several, and
faces a strong gambling industry lobby. See id. Either Chicago or Northwest
Indiana could win by legalizing gambling, but both could lose if both legalize. See
id. at 205. "Instead of a simple prisoner's dilemma, we have a much more com-
plex game of many players who are both non-cooperative and lack information
about one another's activities"-an "open system." id.
117. See GIBBONS, supra note 114, at 3; see also William J. Aceves, Institutionalist
Legal Theory and International Legal Scholarship, 12 Am. U. J. Irr'L L. & PoI'Y
227, 238-39 (1997) (describing a prisoner's dilemma-police have insufficient evi-
dence to convict two criminals unless one confesses, so they are separated and the
one who confesses gets a deal); id. (stating that if play is for one round only, both
will confess); id. at 238-40 (discussing the international system as a prisoner's
dilemma); id. at 239-40 (explaining that the two strategies of cooperate or defect
appear to offer little likelihood of cooperation, yet reciprocity often emerges be-
cause the parties tend to cooperate in the first round and to match opponent's
moves in subsequent rounds). But complexities abound, similar to those concern-
ing Indian casinos-many players and strategies, imperfect information, would-
be free riders, and holdouts, and institutional arrangements in flux and prone to
disruption, for example.
118. Coase, Notes, supra note 54, at 176-77; cf., Coase, Social Cost, supra note 5, at
106 ("With costless market transactions, the decisions of the courts concerning
liability.., would be without effect on the allocation of resources.").
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non-Indian] resources are used," especially as some of the contracts
aimed at correcting errors in legal entitlements will be too costly to
carry out or prohibited by regulation.1 i9 Once Coase's initial assump-
tion of zero transaction costs is dispensed with, regulation contributes
a layer of negotiation, monitoring, enforcement, and legal error
costs-in addition to costs created by the other players.
Daniel Farber offers a useful synopsis of "Coase's thesis":
Pigou's rule was that cost allocations should track physical causation [in a
regulatory taxation scheme much like the one for gambling]. But the problem
is not really one of bringing the economic world in line with predefined notions
of causation and harm. Instead, the problem is how to design institutions that
will maximize the overall well-being of society. The situation is actually a
reciprocal one, in which the interests and actions of each party must be con-
sidered. In a perfect world, the problem would solve itself through voluntary
agreements between all interested parties. In the real world, markets, firms,
and governments each provide imperfect solutions. The Coase Theorem is a
reminder that we will get nowhere in analyzing the problems if we overlook
the inherent imperfection of all human institutions.
12 0
Analyses under this thesis contrast sharply with those under the
economists' model of the ideal capitalist system, one incorporating
Coase's initial assumptions of zero transaction costs and perfect com-
petition, for example. In such a model, government is limited to
"nightwatchman" roles of defining property rights clearly and exhaus-
tively and enforcing the players' contracts that are free from force and
fraud. Under the Farber/Coase thesis, each player will rationally seek
to be a "free rider," who appropriates as many benefits and ducks as
many costs as possible, and a "holdout," who seeks benefits through a
119. See Coase, Notes, supra note 54, at 178; see id. at 160 (demonstrating that the
players may not end up on the "contract curve" because they cannot agree or
estimate their respective gains or how to share them); Coase, Social Cost, supra
note 5, at 117 (explaining regulation as a limitation on the modification of rights
through markets); see also A. MITcHELL PoLINsKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAw AND
EcoNomncs 12, 60 (1983) (demonstrating the efficient correction of initial assign-
ment of rights through market-based contracts).
120. Farber, Parody, supra note 6, at 420-21; see also Coase, Notes, supra note 54, at
157 (stating that the Coase Theorem and its precise formulation is George Stig-
ler's-property law merely determines with whom to contract, and the use of the
property turns on who is willing to pay the most); id. at 174 (discussing Stigler's
Coase Theorem-"under perfect competition, private and social costs will be
equal"); D'Amato, supra note 5, at 761; Farber, Parody, supra note 6, at 397 (indi-
cating that Coase's critics focus on his reductionism and imperialism, but stating
that he never intended his theory as applicable to the real world); id. (explaining
that Coase's supporters tend to treat the Theorem as parody, but it should be
used as a paradigm for pragmatic scholarship); id. at 408 (stating that Hoffman
and Spritzer's "highly artificial" experiments confirmed Coase's predictions). But
see D.A.F., The Coase Theorem and the Eleventh Amendment, 13 CoNsT. COMMEEN-
TARY 141, 142 (1996) [hereinafter D.A.F., Coase] ('The Coase Theorem simply
states that, assuming transaction costs don't prevent contracting around legal
rules,... the parties will always bargain their way to an economically efficient
outcome, regardless of the legal rule."); Farber, Parody, supra note 6.
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(perhaps feigned) reluctance to bargain because, for example, bargain-
ing putatively infringes the player's sovereignty. Such tactics
notwithstanding, the Farber/Coase thesis points to the conclusion that
selfish and decentralized competitions are inevitable and will lead to
efficient outcomes, under appropriate institutional arrangements.
"Regulation" becomes more nuanced and begins to dissolve as a cate-
gory, since the government doing the interfering becomes an umbrella
sheltering several of the players and their disparate, bargainable in-
terests. All of the players share in creating the benefits and costs of
gambling; all should thus share in implementing the remedy. 12 1
As we have seen, reaping the benefits and remedying the costs of
gambling revolve around creating and then dissipating rents.122
Many of Coase's critics argue that his Theorem cannot account for the
effects of such rents. He responds that the rent seeker will pay bribes
up to slightly less than the value of the rents, so that the rent seeking
activity can continue. This leaves the rent seeker better off than does
moving her resources to their best alternative use-especially as
many resources cannot readily be converted to other (non-gambling)
121. See JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAw AND EcoNoMIcs IN A NUTSHELL 58-60 (1995); BAI-
LEY KuxLiN & JEFFREY W. STEmPL, FoUNDATIoNs OF THE LAw: AN INTERDIScIPI-
NARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 31-33 (1994); Coase, Social Cost, supra note
5, at 95 (focusing on "those actions of business firms which have harmful effects
on others"); id. at 101-02 (stating initial assumptions of zero transaction costs
and perfect competition); id. at 135; Croley, supra note 10, at 45 ("The free rider
proposition asserts that in a wide range of situations, individuals will fail to par-
ticipate in collectively profitable activities in the absence of coercion or individu-
ally appropriable inducements." (quoting George Stigler)); Farber, Parody, supra
note 6, at 404 (indicating that some see Coase's zero transaction costs assumption
as a tautology or a "complete counterfactual," and thus immune to criticism); id.
at 413 (noting that Coase is suspicious of government intervening "whenever ex-
ternalities crop up, in order to provide backup for the invisible hand of the mar-
ket"); id. at 417 (noting that both parties-for example, rancher and farmer-
cause the damage-if farmer had no crops, rancher's cattle would do no damage
when they trespass-so both parties should take harmful consequences into ac-
count (quoting Coase in part)); id. at 423-24 (explaining that Coase assumes
humans are inherently cooperative in many ingenious ways); Farrell, supra note
66, at 114 (stating that "absent barriers to contracting, all must be well" for
Coase, who replaces one strong assumption, of perfect competition, with an-
other-no mutually beneficial agreement is missed by the players); Heckman,
supra note 9, at 329 ("[Olnly a vulgar-and incorrect"-and, we would add, all-too-
common "form of the Coase Theorem could support a claim that the same market
outcome results independently of how resources are distributed."). But see Coase,
Social Cost, supra note 5, at 117 (stating that "[tihe government is, in a sense, a
super-firm ... since it is able to influence the use of factors of productions" [sic]
"by administrative decision," and by avoiding the market altogether if it chooses);
Rand & Light, supra note 59, at 393 (noting that self-determination policies
amount to "contracting with tribes, rather than actually transferring power to
them"-in a self-determination rhetoric "preoccupied with appearances" (quoting
Paul Stuart and Russel Barsh, respectively)).
122. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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uses. For Coase, the allocation of resources will thus remain the same
in the face of rents, and the value of production will be maximized
when the underlying rents are maximized.123 This outcome is appar-
ently regardless of effects elsewhere in the economy, a consequence of
Coase's technique of examining isolated, case-by-case bargains. Far-
ber, Farrell, and others dispute Coase's arguments, and the Coase
Theorem begins to lose its decentralizing bite when transaction costs
burgeon, when government thus becomes a more plausible, corpora-
tion-like coordinator of complex activities, and when the public inter-
est in the rents comes to the fore.124
A potentially more serious hindrance to analyzing Indian gaming
under the Coase Theorem is his assumption that property rights (to
gambling rents) and liability rules are or will be defined clearly, so
that the players can readily, cheaply bargain over correcting them.125
Private property rights are not absolute of course, and the institu-
tional arrangements to be described in this Section are, in effect, a
complex zoning of the reservations for gambling purposes. The tribes
reasonably object that this zoning infringes their sovereign land use,
their public (communal rather than private) property rights recog-
nized by Chief Justice John Marshall among others.126 The initial as-
signment of casino property rights governs the distribution of
123. See Coase, Notes, supra note 54, at 163, 165, 170; Coase, Social Cost, supra note
5, at 114 ("The economic problem in all cases of harmful effects is how to maxi-
mize the value of production."). But see Martz, supra note 15, at 468; supra note
57 and accompanying text; infra note 173 and accompanying text.
124. Farrell, supra note 66, at 115; see Coase, Notes, supra note 54, at 164 (stating
that a Coasian critic, Gerald Auten, argues that outcomes will vary with liability,
depending on the Ricardian rents of polluters and receptors); Coase, Social Cost,
supra note 5, at 117; id. at 135, 149 (quoting A.C. Pigou's "elusive" treatment,
"failures and imperfections ... prevent a community's resources from being dis-
tributed... in the most efficient way"); Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of
Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL SUD. 13 (1972), reprinted in ECONOafic FOUYNDA-
TIONS OF PROPERTY LAw 24, 27-30 (Bruce A. Ackerman ed., 1975) (noting that
"extortion," a redistribution of wealth "that may accompany a change in the rule
of liability," is only a problem if a "monopoly" exists). This redistribution fre-
quently occurs in rent-seeking gambling. Farber, Parody, supra note 6, at 407
(noting that Coase's critics have said that if there are rents, the liability rule
effects their extent, and, thus, the allocation of resources); Farrell, supra note 66,
at 113 ("Pareto-efficiency normally requires competitive markets, and since there
is obviously no such market for 'quiet in my house tonight,' inefficiency should be
no surprise."); Heckman, supra note 9, at 331 (stating that as a pragmatist, Coase
didn't deny that Pigouvian taxes-as in gambling-could create efficiency at high
transaction costs); Skrzycki, supra note 66; supra notes 65-73 and accompanying
text; infra notes 289-90 and accompanying text But see MERCU O & MEDEMA,
discussed supra note 60.
125. See Coase, Notes, supra note 54, at 157; Coase, Social Cost, supra note 5, at 119.
But see id. at 114 ("It is always possible to modify by transactions on the market
the initial legal delineation of rights," and a rearrangement of rights always
takes place if it increases the value of production.).
126. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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transaction costs, the burdens of negotiation, and the wealth flowing
from the property use or non-use. If the tribe has a casino right, those
opposed to it must organize bribe-offers for not exercising this right,
offers which the tribe can accept or reject; if the tribe has no casino
right, it must bribe its opponents for what amounts to a zoning vari-
ance; and if, as is the case, the tribe's potentially-valuable casino right
is uncertain, the players do not know who bribes whom and by how
much. 127
A variation on this game is for a tribe to buy non-reservation (usu-
ally urban) land or take title to such land in a settlement of claims the
tribe has made against a state, petition the federal government to
take the land in trust for the tribe, and run a casino on this extension
of "Indian country," perhaps with state as well as federal consent. 128
127. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 5, at 155; Warren J. Samuels, The Coase Theo-
rem and the Study of Law and Economics, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1974); see also
WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 27 (stating that the literature defines property
rights as "the right to use the asset, the right to appropriate returns from the
asset, and the right to change the form and/or substance of an asset"); Aceves,
supra note 117, at 247 (noting that in international relations, ambiguous prop-
erty rights inhibit cooperation); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls:
An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977) (describing the use of
zoning-like devices to control the growth of "elite" suburbs, with many similari-
ties to growth controls on gambling); Jess Green, Economic Development and
Gaming, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 149, 155 (1996) (stating that the uncertainty fol-
lowing Seminole "does not present the marketplace with a stable environment for
investments of venture capital"); Walsh, Boom, supra note 13, at A9 (reporting
that a March 1998 compact between California and the Pala Tribe allots permis-
sion to operate 199 new-style gambling machines to each tribe in the State; those
not wanting to use this allotment could rent it to other tribes at an estimated $1
million a year).
128. The Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 465, gives the Secretary of the Inte-
rior broad authority to take lands into trust for tribes. The Indian Gaming Regu-
latory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2719(a), bans gaming on Indian lands acquired after
October 17, 1988; § 2719(b)(1)(A) provides for a waiver of this ban where waiver
"would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe," is not detrimental to surround-
ing communities, and the governor of the relevant state consents. See also Con-
federated Tribes of Siletz Indians v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 1479 (D. Or.
1994) (holding that §§ 2719(a) and (b)(1)(A) do not violate the 10th Amendment
by, for example, infringing state legislative power, but violate the Appointment
Clause and general separation of powers principles by allowing a governor to veto
a federal agency empowered by Congress to make decisions); GOODMAN, supra
note 2, at 162 (explaining that tribes with remote reservations seek more attrac-
tive parcels by purchase or by claiming against the state, in court); Kelly, supra
note 100, at 220 (stating that the Romapaugh Mountain Tribe tried to play this
game in New Jersey, just outside New York City, arousing the opposition of such
incumbent casino owners as Donald Trump). The Shakopee Sioux are seeking to
have 600 acres in the Minneapolis suburbs taken into trust to develop a shopping
center, light industry, and tribal housing. See Lardner, supra note 99, at A01.
City, state, and county officials object because the land will be taken off the tax
rolls-as has happened to 3,500 acres over the past seven years). See id. The
tribe contributed $129,000 to the Democrats for the 1996 elections. See id.
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This and other interpositions of Anglo property notions create social
costs for tribes accustomed to a communal ownership: a sense of depri-
vation and loss of community identity on the reservation, when land is
commodified and alienated. In Coasian terms, many tribes would pre-
fer to treat land as an externality of a not-so-tragic commons. 12 9
Along with William Safire,'3 0 some Indians are troubled by the moral-
ity of Coase's ostensibly amoral bribes, especially when these bribes
are seen as a substitute for rights that ought to belong to the tribes.1'1
129. See DAviD H. GErcHEs & CHARLES F. Wnju'soN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FED-
ERAL INDIAN LAw 112-120 (1986) (treating federal allotment policy as a cultural
disaster for Indians, because it opens two-thirds of Indian country to non-Indian
settlement); Jose R. Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination
Against Indigenous Populations, at 39 509-10, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/
Add.4 (1987) (stating that land is a natural and cultural patrimony for indige-
nous peoples, who feel a profound sense of deprivation if land is taken away or
used as a commodity); Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 111, at 99; Rosen, supra
note 107, at 251 ("[The native of the Americas, for whom the concept of owning
land is as unthinkable as owning the air around one's head is to the average
American."); Hillerman, supra note 81, at A5 (noting that an absolute dominion
over land is part of Christian creation myths); id. (explaining that in contrast,
Cheyenne myths make humans the guardians rather than the dominators over
land). But see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243
(1968).
130. See Safire, quoted supra note 82; supra note 4 and accompanying text.
131. See S. REP. No. 100-446, at 36 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.CAN. 3071, 3105
("It would be hypocritical indeed to impose on Indian people more stringent moral
standards than those by which the rest of our citizenry chooses to live." (quoting
Sen. Daniel J. Evans)); Kelly, supra note 100, at 218 (discussing Indian litigation
or its threat, for return of long-lost territories and permission to run a casino).
This could arguably be a solicitation for a Coasian bribe, at least in part. See also
D.A.F., Coase, supra note 120, at 143 (notwithstanding under the 11th Amend-
ment Congress can bribe or blackmail states into an efficient outcome, and states
can bribe Congress to leave them immune); Macey, supra note 60, at 879 (noting
that Congress can avoid potentially damaging special interest opposition by rele-
gating matters to state and local governments, and thus foregoing Coasian
bribes-"honoraria, campaign contributions, indirect political support, and, of
course, outright bribes"); id. at 881 (stating that interest groups like tribes prefer
federal regulation since, even if they bribe for desirable state regulation, they
must bribe a second time to avoid federal preemption); Tsosie, supra note 12, at
39 (indicating many Indian leaders seek clout by litigating before negotiation, on
the basis of court-affirmed rights); Martz, supra note 15, at 453 (describing a
bribe of $20 million to acquire an Illinois casino license); id. at 455, quoted supra
text accompanying note 38 ; id. at 464-65 n.61, discussed supra note 81; id. at
467, 474 (discussing corruption as a modification of rights, which subordinates
voter preferences); id. at 468 ("[Bribery is] seldom a surplus-maximizing proce-
dure," and it "neglects distributional objectives and weighs outcomes in favor of
the wealthy." (quoting Susan Rose-Ackerman)); Safire, Bribes, supra note 82 ("If
strong local support is garnered only by filling the out-stretched hand..., then
the IGRA... fails to protect." (quoting the Indian Gaming Management Staff));
supra notes 58, 81-82 and accompanying text; infra note 173 and accompanying
text.
1999]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Rights count, morally and politically as well as in a rent seeking
economy. Rather than simply throwing up our hands at the evidence
of many and substantial rent-seeking bribes over Indian casinos (some
of which are illegal and even criminal), or using this evidence to her-
ald a casino prohibition or deregulation which is not going to happen,
we should focus on the pragmatic side of the Coase Theorem. We
would then work to improve institutional arrangements for Indian
casinos, a certain number of which are now inevitable politically.
Transaction costs limit the ability to contract (bribe) so as to correct
initial assignments of casino rights. It thus behooves us to make ini-
tial assignments as nearly correct (efficient, for Coase) as possible, and
to make institutional arrangements as cheap (simple, for the most
part) as possible, consistent with the developmental and distributive
aims that are imposed politically.13 2 In particular, we should improve
the mechanisms for both the public scrutiny and the enforcement of
threats and commitments-enforcement being a particular problem
since Seminole Tribe v. Florida.133
Coase stresses that attempts to remove deficiencies in existing (ca-
sino) arrangements can create more harm than the original deficien-
cies, especially when special interest groups succeed in bending
reforms to suit themselves. The balance of this Section testifies to
this, and to the need for examining gaming costs and benefits care-
fully. Curbing market failures by improving the flow of information
among the players is a sound way to reduce the transaction costs of
correcting entitlements, admittedly by incurring other, hopefully mod-
erate costs. More information would make everyone's preferences and
incentives clearer during the bargaining process, foster a more cooper-
ative sharing of the costs and benefits by reducing the incentives and
opportunities to cheat, and thereby build trust-a particularly scarce
resource which reduces transaction costs, the value of having a good
bargaining reputation, and more realistic evaluations of the efficiency
and fairness of various economic and political processes.134
132. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 5, at 119; Coase, Notes, supra note 54, at 170-
71; Farber, Parody, supra note 6, at 425; id. at 427 (indicating that the Coase
Theorem as parody shows that some economists' failure to consider transaction
costs constitute the main reason for their failure to account for real-world con-
straints on the operation of the economy); Farrell, supra note 66, at 113-14 ("]t
is a tautology that if people negotiate efficiently then every outcome will be effi-
cient [or] else people would negotiate something better," with the implication that
government should not intervene.).
133. 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see infra notes 179-203, 273-77 and accompanying text.
134. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 5, at 153, 155; NEEDHAM, supra note 58, at 399;
Tsosie, supra note 12, at 72; see also MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 60, at 148
(noting that neoinstitutional economics emphasizes the hold-up and the ex-post
opportunistic behavior in extracting quasi-rents that are made possible by long-
term relationships and contract-specific investments); Farber, Parody, supra note
6, at 424; Farrell, supra note 66, at 117 (indicating that mechanism design is like
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A. Cabazon (1987)
For Ronald Coase,
it is conceivable that a change in the criteria for assigning ownership to previ-
ously unrecognized rights may lead to changes in demand which in turn lead
to a difference in the allocation of resources, but, apart from such cataclysmic
events as the abolition of slavery, these effects will normally be so insignifi-
cant that they can be safely neglected. 1 3 5
Either Coase is wrong or California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians13 6 is an abnormal or cataclysmic event in the world of casinos.
Prior to Cabazon, a few tribes ran gambling enterprises under tribal
ordinances approved by the Secretary of the Interior.137 These enter-
prises were vulnerable to a veto or regulatory harassment by the state
where the reservation was located. But Cabazon held that, if a state
permits any form of legalized gambling, legitimate but speculative
state interests in forestalling the infiltration of organized crime onto
the reservation are overborne by federal and tribal interests-espe-
Solomon's offer to divide the baby, and the need is to establish willingness to pay
for particular outcomes without losing incentives to tell the truth); id. at 122
("Property rights and voluntary private negotiations fail to achieve Trst-best' effi-
cient outcomes when there is important private information."); Macey, supra note
60, at 880 (indicating that under high information costs, the regulatory wealth-
maximizing strategy is not always apparent to politicians, who thus hold exten-
sive committee hearings, in hopes that special interest groups will reveal their
true preferences); John 0. McGinnis, The Human Constitution and Constitutive
Law: A Prolegomenon, 8 J. CorTrEsp. LEGAL IssuEs 211, 217-18 (1997) (stating
that cooperation in societies with imperfectly centralized enforcement of obliga-
tions is a reciprocal altruism, rather than a blind trust or indiscriminate fellow-
feeling); Tsosie, supra note 12, at 66 (stating that while "courts have vindicated
the states' right to be free of coercion," the "consent requirements of the IGRA
[are] premised more upon coercion than the arms'-length bargaining between
equal parties that is found in the early treaty period" between tribes and the
feds); infra notes 161, 273-77 and accompanying text.
135. Coase, Notes, supra note 54, at 174.
136. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). In Cabazon, a 25-member Tribe, whose sole source of in-
come was gaming approved by the Secretary of the Interior, sought declaratory
and injunctive relief against a county-level regulation of bingo and prohibition of
card games. The state intervened, and the district court granted the Tribe's mo-
tion for summary judgment. See id. at 206. This was affirmed by the 9th Circuit,
and 6-3 by the Supreme Court. See id. at 203. In Cabazon, tribal bingo limits
were 200 times higher than permitted under California statutory limits. The
Court held that California was thus a "civil/regulatory" rather than "criminal/
prohibitory" state in gambling matters. id. at 209, 212 (adopting a distinction in
Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d
1185 (9th Cir. 1982)). Justice Stevens, dissenting, felt that the State's economic
and protective interests were and should be attained by permitting some forms of
gambling and prohibiting others. See id. at 224, 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
We would add that the Cabazon/Barona (false) dichotomy ignores the fact that
much of modern criminal law is regulatory rather than merely prohibitory. This
makes "criminalregulatory" into a plausible characterization of at least some
gambling rules. See Kelly, supra note 100, at 215.
137. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 218.
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cially "its 'overriding goal' of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and
economic development."1 38 In other words, if a state chooses to license
the earning of rents from gambling, it cannot prevent tribes from do-
ing the same thing on reservations located within the state. Legally, a
state's regulation of tribal gaming would "impermissibly infringe on
tribal government," where "tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and
subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States."1 3 9
Cabazon did more than remove a racist and/or quasi-sovereign, state-
level restraint on the rents tribes earn from gambling. Compared to
non-Indian casinos, tribes were given preferred access to a fairly clear
property right to a reservation casino in most states: in locations that
were usually remote, and subject to federal consent which was usually
forthcoming. Recognition of this right would reduce the tribes' trans-
action costs and increase their opportunities to receive Coasian bribes;
the states' transaction costs would increase and their bribe-opportuni-
ties would decline accordingly. Cabazon showed that the relative co-
hesiveness and quasi-sovereign status of Indian tribes enabled them
to use the federal courts more effectively than did other minority
groups, to strengthen their bargaining power in Coasian ways. States
and non-Indian casino owners thus chose to take Cabazon realloca-
tions of rights, costs, and bribe-opportunities to a Congress growing
more conservative, friendly toward non-Indian business, and receptive
to states' rights arguments.1 40
138. Id. at 216, 221; see Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Res-
ervation, 447 U.S. 134, 156-57 (1980) (noting that the state has a compelling in-
terest in taxing non-Indian cigarette customers, which outweighs the Tribe's
limited interest in selling tax-free cigarettes); Christiansen & Brinkerhoff-Jacobs,
supra note 27, at 215; Levin, Environment, supra note 98, at 172; Tsosie, supra
note 12, at 45, 83 (stating that Cabazon distinguished Colville on the basis that
the state did not have sufficiently important interests to justify gambling
regulation).
139. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 221; see United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886)
("[Tribes] owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection.");
Deller & Chen, supra note 45, at 248 ("[Cabazon held] that federally recognized
tribes were sovereign nations with a right to govern themselves and offer their
own high-stakes version of whatever gaming is allowed in the state.").
140. See Mary B. Olson, The Legal Road to Economic Development: Fishing Rights in
Western Washington, in PUBLIC POLICY IMPACTS ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 67, at 77, 95; Thompson & Gazel, supra note 30, at
192-93 (noting that non-Indian gambling interests, especially in Nevada, feared
Indian competition, and an infiltration of tribal casinos by organized crime that
would prompt a federal regulation of all gambling); see also Levin, Betting, supra
note 1, at 127 ("[Under Cabazon] tribes . .. could initiate or expand gambling
operations in any state where gambling operations were not flatly prohibited,
without fearing state interference."); Kalish, supra note 93, at 1362 (stating that
Cabazon "both cited and strongly mirrored" a case trend of reducing state regula-
tory authority on reservations).
[Vol. 78:263
NATIVE AMERICAN CASINOS
B. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988
Following hard on Cabazon's heels, the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act (IGRA) of 1988141 tried to ensure that Congress and not the courts
would be the final arbiter of Indian gaming. For Senator Harry Reid
of Nevada, Cabazon created the potential "for rapid and uncontrolled
expansion of unregulated casino-type gambling on Indian lands."142
In addition to this accelerated dissipation of their rents, Nevada gam-
bling interests feared that an infiltration of organized crime into tribal
casinos would lead to a federal regulation of all casinos.14 3
Congress responded to these special interest pressures (Coasian
bribes) by creating states' rights where none had existed before, under
statute, case law or the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
These limited, IGRA regulatory rights were less than the states and
non-Indian casinos wanted: the outright banning of tribal casinos or
the full enforcement of state gaming laws on the reservation. The
IGRA was also more than the tribes wanted: rather than being able to
rely on their quasi-sovereign "Cabazon rights," the tribes got more
limited and less certain property rights to run casinos-rights
designed to reduce the financial burden reservations posed to the fed-
eral government. Like other legislative compromises, the IGRA
pleased none of the players. But the IGRA apparently got the congres-
sional balance of power among the players about right, since several
attempts to amend the IGRA, attempts nicknamed "Donald Trump
Protection Acts," failed.1 44
141. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994); see Grant, supra note 105, at 173 (arguing that
Nixon's Indian policy of greater self-governance and self-sufficiency was reaf-
firmed under Reagan); Macey, supra note 60, at 877-78 (questioning why federal
lawmakers defer, when they have shown an interest in such local matters as
bank chartering and educating the handicapped).
142. Cabot, supra note 2, at 8; see Kalish, supra note 93, at 1362.
143. See S. REP. No. 100-446, at 33, 36 (1988) reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C-.AN. 3013-
3015 (stating that the strongest lobbying against Indian gaming comes not from
states worried about organized crime, but from states where many forms of gam-
bling were already legal); Rand & Light, supra note 59, at 385 (stating that the
"real" purpose of the IGRA is to limit competition within a state by Indian casi-
nos); Thompson & Gazel, supra note 30, at 192-93.
144. See Kelly, supra note 100, at 224 (stating that almost everyone admits that the
IGRA should be amended, but attempts go nowhere); id. at 225 ("IGRA is one of
the few federal pieces of legislation which actually works."); Levin, Betting, supra
note 1, at 127; Levin, Environment, supra note 98, at 184; Tsosie, supra note 12,
at 49; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (1994) (extending to states authority over In-
dian gaming withheld from them by the Constitution); Levin, Betting, supra note
1, at 128 (stating that the IGRA produced sharp conflict between pro and anti-
gambling factions on reservations); Levin, Environment, supra note 98, at 178
(stating that the IGRA responded to arguments by the Cabazon dissenters that
congressional intent is unclear, with a "delicately balanced federal, state, and
tribal involvement"); Harold A. Monteau, Summary of Tribal-State Gambling
Compacts for Class III Gaming, in RESERVATION-BAsED GANG, supra note 2, at
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The ostensible legislative purpose of the IGRA is to enhance tribal
development and self-sufficiency, while at the same time advancing
interests which were heavily discounted by the Cabazon majority: pro-
tecting tribes and their punters against unscrupulous persons, and
protecting the states' interest in avoiding severe economic injury.
Many in Congress believed that the IGRA would allow tribes to con-
duct gaming only on the same basis as non-Native Americans in a par-
ticular state. For example, if blackjack is illegal under state law, it
would also be illegal on the reservation, where the state's betting lim-
its on other games would have to be observed. Courts have not fol-
lowed this logic, which appears to be inconsistent with that in
Cabazon.145 In Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut,1 46 casino
24, 32 ("[The 'irony' of state 10th and 11th amendment arguments] is that Con-
gress inserted the compacting provisions into the Act to give the states a right
they never previously had, the right to inject state interest into the right of tribes
to govern without the interference of the state."); Rand & Light, supra note 59, at
382 (noting that the IGRA circumvents Cabazon's conclusion that tribal gaming
is free from state regulation); Walsh, Both Sides, supra note 14, at A9 (describing
the National Gambling Impact Study Commission holding May 1998 hearings, in
anticipation of further legislation). But see S. REP. No. 100-446, at 1 (1988), re-
printed in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3071 ("[The IGRA is] the outgrowth of several
years of discussions and negotiations between gaming tribes, States, the gaming
industry, the administration, and the Congress. .. ").
For an example of failed attempts to amend the IGRA, see S. 962, 105th Cong.
(1997) (changing gaming practices on tribal trust lands); H.R. 3289, 104th Cong.
(1996) (granting states jurisdiction over new Indian casinos); H.R. 1364, 104th
Cong., (1995) (requiring community approval of Indian casinos); Kelly, supra note
100, at 224 (discussing the Gaming Integrity and State Law Enforcement Bill of
1994, which would eliminate tribal suits against states, and compacts without
the governor's consent); Sen. John McCain, Forward, 29 Ariz. ST. L.J. 1 (1997)
(supporting congressional legislation, enacted in 1996, requiring a two-year study
by a National Gambling Impact Study Commission); Timothy Egan, Debate
About Tribal Rights Turns Rancorous, N.Y. Tnms, Apr. 8, 1998, at A12 (report-
ing that there was a Senate Indian Affairs Committee meeting in Seattle to con-
sider Senator Gorton's bill to abolish tribal sovereign immunity, and that Senator
Evans called the bill a "blunt instrument to ravage tribal independence" and "a
solution seeking a problem").
145. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994); Tsosie, supra note 12, at 50, 83; see also 141 Cong.
Rec. S10914 (daily ed. July 31, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simon) ("[Tribes] seize
what some view as a legal loophole. .. ."); Kelly, supra note 100, at 216 (stating
that an "unforeseen result" of IGRA was Indian casinos in states with no prior
casinos or slots); Thompson & Gazel, supra note 30, at 193 (noting the IGRA's
"unanticipated loopholes" permit Indian gaming, which leads some politicians to
argue that non-Indian casinos should have similar opportunities); Rand & Light,
supra note 59, at 385, discussed supra note 133; Tsosie, supra note 12, at 32-33
(arguing that the IGRA is a continuation of President Nixon's "self-determina-
tion" policy towards tribes).
146. 737 F. Supp. 169, 176 (D. Conn. 1990), affd, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990); see
Kelly, supra note 100, at 216 (finding a similar result under statutes permitting
"Las Vegas nights" in Arizona and New York); Fromson, supra note 105. But see
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Green, 995 F.2d 179, 181 (10th Cir.
1993) (stating "Congress must have meant that gambling devices be legal" under
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gambling was illegal in Connecticut, except for a few low-stakes
"Monte Carlo nights" run by charities. In effect, the court held that
this exception licensed the Tribe to run a high-stakes, for-profit ca-
sino. In Lac du Flambeau Band v. Wisconsin,147 the court held that
the Tribe did not have to abide by the five dollar betting limit placed
on casino games by Wisconsin law.
The IGRA created a three-person National Indian Gaming Com-
mission, to approve tribal gaming ordinances, to monitor tribal com-
pacts with states and tribal expenditures of gaming revenues, and to
accomplish a balancing act among the three sovereigns: tribes, states,
and other parts of the federal government concerned about potential
dilutions of federal sovereignty.148 Federal attempts to be a regula-
tory "free rider" over Indian gaming are illustrated by the fact that
this Commission has a staff of 36 and an annual budget of $3 mil-
lion.149 Congress cannot intend serious supervision and enforcement
at these funding and staffing levels; Commission enforcement orders
are regularly ignored by tribes without penalty, and the Commission
almost closed in 1996 for lack of fimds.150 The Commission Chair in
1996, Leonard Prescott, sees the IGRA as a dilution of tribal rights to
self-government, and sees the Commission's role as one of preventing
further erosions of tribal sovereignty.' 5 '
state law "absent the Tribal-State compact; otherwise it would not have been nec-
essary to require both that gambling devices be legal, see 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d)(6)(A), and that the compact be in effect, id. § 2710(d)(6)(B)").
147. 770 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (explaining that a state lottery is enough like a
casino in prizes, chances, and consideration as to require a state to negotiate a
compact with a Tribe); see also Kelly, supra note 100, at 222 (stating that recent
decisions have not followed an "expansive" Flambeau).
148. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(b)(1)(B), 2210(d)(1)(A)(iii) (1994).
149. See Cox, supra note 67.
150. See Kelly, supra note 100, at 218 (quoting the first Commission Chair, Tony
Hope, in part).
151. See Bill McAllister, Idaho Tribe Hopes to Net New Income, WAsH. PosT, Nov. 17,
1997, at A21; see also Cox, supra note 67 and accompanying text (noting that the
Chair exercises "virtually all" of Commission powers, with the Commission as a
whole in effect hearing appeals from the Chair's decisions). But see United States
v. Santee Sioux Tribe, 135 F.3d 558, 566 (8th Cir. 1998) (indicating that the attor-
ney general is empowered to enforce the Commission Chair's order closing Tribe's
casino because a valid tribal-state compact was lacking).
The Secretary of the Interior also has substantial regulatory powers, but cur-
rent Secretary Bruce Babbitt consults with a variety of players because he has
been made aware of the political dangers of intervention. See Levin, Betting,
supra note 1, at 130. President Clinton has sought to avoid a showdown, and has
instructed Babbitt to reach the compromises also sought by Hawaii Senator
Daniel Inouye. See GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 159-60. The Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) has been unable to document $2 billion in non-gambling transac-
tions with the tribes over the past 20 years, and Secretary Babbitt is seeking to
settle a variety of tribal claims. See Administration Offers Settlement to Tribes,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 16, 1997, at A23. For Indians, the BIA "is always the key in-
strument whenever the government wants to swindle us," you get no help unless
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Structurally, the IGRA creates a three-tier regulatory scheme: cer-
emonial or customary tribal games in Class I, which remain free from
all non-tribal regulation; bingo, lotto, and non-banking card games
such as poker in Class II, games which must be played under state law
but with federal rather than state oversight; and Class III casino
games-slots, roulette, blackjack, etc.-which must be run under both
a tribal ordinance approved by the Interior Department and a "com-
pact" negotiated with the state which encompasses the reservation.152
As of 1997, 107 tribes had signed such Class III compacts with 32
states, and in 1995, 37 Indian gaming operations were being run with-
out such a compact in place. 153 The (Coasian) compacting process in-
volves negotiating the split of gaming revenues between the tribe and
a state otherwise unable to tax them, dividing criminal and civil regu-
latory authority between the parties, and describing how the games
are to be conducted. The IGRA does not establish minimur regula-
tory standards; it merely lists topics that may be in the compact.1 54
Tribes in Arizona, Connecticut and Washington could only negotiate
compacts with substantial state regulatory and enforcement powers
on the reservation, while tribal compacts in Michigan, Minnesota and
Wisconsin are relatively regulation-free. Tribal-state relations may be
cooperative (as in eleven Minnesota compacts) or adversarial (as in
Connecticut's compact), or the state may delay or refuse to negotiate
in good faith: Florida, for example. Some tribes are responsive to state
requests to temper their gambling operations, perhaps in exchange for
state promises to forestall competition from other casinos.' 55
you organize the way the BIA wants. MAWrHIESSEN, supra note 93, at 254-55
(quoting Raymond Lego). Nevertheless, the BIA offers access to the tribes, and
"in carefully selected cases, had made a certain effort to live up to its trust re-
sponsibilities." Id. at 254.
152. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(6)-(8), 2710(d)(1) (1994); see Kelly, supra note 100, at 215-
16.
153. See Anders, supra note 2, at 234; Kelly, supra note 100, at 216 ("By May 1994, 19
states had negotiated 107 compacts with 90 tribes, with the approval of the Sec-
retary of the Interior.").
154. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C); S. REP. No. 100-446, AT 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N 3071, 3088 (the application of 18 U.S.C. § 1175, which makes cer-
tain gambling devices illegal in Indian country, is waived by the IGRA when a
compact is in place and such devices are legal); Levin, Environment, supra note
98, at 181, 187; id. at 181-82 (describing the compacting process at the heart of
the IGRA as a delicate compromise which at least forces the parties to talk to
each other); Tsosie, supra note 12, at 89 (indicating that under 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d)(5), a state cannot tax Indian gaming revenues, as opposed to sharing
them, and tribal regulations can be no less stringent than those in the compact);
Cox, supra note 67.
155. See GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 151-52. But see Walsh, Boom, supra note 13; Fish
and Chips, supra note 107 (revealing that Wisconsin Indian casinos yield net rev-
enues of $425 million a year, and the State "currently takes a paltry $350,000 to
cover regulatory costs" while Governor Thompson would like to obtain more than
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The constitutional model for the IGRA compact seems to be the
interstate compact that, with congressional consent, functions as a
treaty-substitute.1 5 6 Such compacts help to govern the Great Lakes
and hazardous waste disposal, and the IGRA forms part of a trend
which began in the late 1980s: using alternative dispute resolution
techniques to develop federal environmental and natural resource
laws. This "contractarian federalism," as we might call it, furthers
federal desires to be a regulatory free rider over gambling. It would
presumably please the contractarian 'Virginia School" of law and eco-
nomics, as a decentralized alternative to a deregulation which is not
going to happen.'57
Ronald Coase and the IGRA drafters would expect tribes and
states to negotiate compacts for mutual benefit, but the reality is a
simple purchase of state consent through a Coasian bribe from the
tribe: paying a tribute from gaming revenues to the state and acqui-
escing in state regulatory strictures, with little or no corresponding
benefit for the tribe. By altering the Cabazon balance of power and
"conditioning the exercise of tribal sovereignty upon state consent, the
IGRA changed the dynamics of the historical consent principle for In-
dian tribes."l58 Vine Deloria, Jr. and Frank Pommersheim define this
$25 million from new compacts, as well as set reservation air and water quality
standards, and fishing and hunting regulations).
156. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104
(1938); Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 949 F. Supp. 882 (D.D.C. 1996) (discuss-
ing the six state Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact and the nondelagation doc-
trine's application to it); Monteau, supra note 144, at 26 (stating that prior to the
IGRA, states and tribes entered into "government-to-government agreements"
concerning cigarette and gas taxes, social services, extradition, and child support
enforcement); Tsosie, supra note 12, at 57, 59, 62.
157. See Tsosie, supra note 12, at 62, 67-68; see also Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 932
F. Supp. 1284, 1296 (D.N.M. 1996) (stating that the potential negatives of Indian
gambling casinos are so important that the Secretary of the Interior's approval
does not override a compact's deficiencies under state law); JAmas M. BUcHANAN,
ExPLORATIONS nro CoNsrrToNAL EcoNotiucs (1989); Paul H. Brietzke, New
Wrinkles in Law... and Economics, 32 VAL. U. L. Rav. 105, 111-12 (1997) (dis-
cussing the Virginia School of Buchanan, Tollison, Tulloch, et al.); James M.
Buchanan, The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State, 13 NAT. REsOURCES J.
579 (1973); James M. Buchanan, The Contractarian Logic of Classical Liberalism
(Bowling Green Conference, Oct. 1988); Farrell, supra note 66, at 122; Macey,
supra note 60, at 879 (describing a "franchise theory of federalism"); Tsosie, supra
note 12, at 28 (discussing treaty federalism or treaty constitutionalism); id. at 59
("[As a treaty substitute, compacting] would apparently be more amenable to
analysis under contract principles than federal law."); id. at 89-90 (stating that
negotiations between the Northern Cheyenne and Montana Power over the ex-
pansion of a power plant show that "this type of negotiation will likely result in a
failure to reach settlement"). But see Fish and Chips, supra note 107.
158. Tsosie, supra note 12, at 49-50; see Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v.
Green, 995 F.2d 179, 181 (10th Cir. 1993); Coase, Social Cost, supra note 5, at 99;
Walsh, Boom, supra note 13, at A9 ("I]he New Mexico legislature, over tribal
objections, required a 16 percent share of revenue in new gaming compacts.");
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principle as a negotiated balance of power, a balance which respects
each other's sovereignty, responds to each other's needs and authority,
and accommodates a cultural pluralism.159 Consent is hollow when
the tribes' bargaining power is weakened and their remedies are lim-
ited by the IGRA-especially after Seminole.160 The IGRA has not
served to build a long-term trust between the parties because states
do not perceive value in the continuation of a tribal sovereignty, and
because tribes see the IGRA-inspired activities of state bureaucrats,
police, and judges as further encroachments on a tribal sovereignty.16 1
Over time, non-Indian casinos and state politicians have become
more successful in blocking tribal casinos, 162 especially under Semi-
nole163 and while dealing with the Coasian variation described ear-
lier:164 the tribe acquires non-reservation land, asks the Interior
Department to take the land in trust for the tribe, and attempts to run
a casino there. While the Supreme Court draws no distinction be-
tween such trust land and reservation land for purposes of tribal sov-
Safire, Bribes, supra note 82 ("If strong local support is garnered only by filling
the outstretched hand.. ., then IGRA fails to protect." (quoting Interior's Gaming
Management staff)); supra notes 58, 80, 131 and accompanying text But see
Kelly, supra note 100, at 216 (noting that while states are prohibited from taxing
casinos, the Pequot agreed to pay Connecticut $100 million or 25% of slot reve-
nues, for the exclusive right to non-"Las Vegas night" slot machines in the state).
159. See Tsosie, supra note 12, at 28, 73; infra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 174-203, 276-77 and accompanying text.
161. See GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 166; id. at 156-57 ("Our ancestors were told to
surrender their weapons and now we are being asked to surrender again, not our
bows and arrows but our bonds and assets." (quoting Charles Kecchi's 1992 testi-
mony before House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs)); Tsosie, supra
note 12, at 66 ("The consent requirement of the IGRA... is premised more upon
coercion than the type of arms-length bargaining between equal parties that is
found in the early treaty period."); id. at 72, 84 (stating that a central goal of the
IGRA is to build trust and "long-term stable relationships" but "there is little
common ground between states and tribes upon which to build"); supra note 134
and accompanying text.
162. See GoODMAN, supra note 2, at 155-56 (stating that in 1993, the National Gover-
nor's Association adopted a policy similar to the Congressional understanding of
the IGRA); Kelly, supra note 100, at 220 (discussing a failed attempt by the
Ramapaugh Mountain Tribe in New Jersey, near New York City); Levin, Betting,
supra note 1, at 129 (stating that while tribes seek freedom from gaming regula-
tions, they "prefer to deal with the federal government rather than the states,
whom they regard as more hostile to their interests"); id. at 130 ("What happens
within a state ought to be decided by that state's citizens." (quoting Colorado Gov-
ernor Roy Romer)); Kalish, supra note 93, at 1346, 1357, 1364 ("Public Law 280
gives certain states [, including California,] complete criminal and limited civil
jurisdiction on reservations."); McAllister, supra note 151, at A21 (noting that
Missouri and Wisconsin sued the Coeur d'Alene tribe of Idaho on the basis that
its Internet gambling facility is not conducted "on Indian lands"). But see Tsosie,
supra note 12, at 71 (stating that Montana broadly allows gaming outside the
reservation, while Arizona carefully circumscribes it).
163. See infra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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ereignty and immunities, 65 Confederated Tribe of Siletz Indians v.
United States held that the state governor's concurrence in a tribal
casino on trust lands is mandatory. 6 6 Since IGRA § 2719(b)(1)(A)
makes this gubernatorial concurrence mandatory, it is unconstitu-
tional: it violates the Appointments Clause and a general separation
of powers because it "encroached upon and undermined the authority
of the [federal] Executive Branch."167 The district court opinion in Si-
letz notwithstanding, tribes have continued to press for off-reservation
casinos-with mixed results. Tribes hope that the Interior Secretary
will ignore or preempt the states and their concurrence. 68
From a Coasian perspective, the history of the IGRA is one of fo-
rum-shopping against the backdrop of muddy institutions and murky
tribal property rights to run a casino. The tribes having won a rela-
tively clear right from the Cabazon Court, the states and non-Indian
casinos went to Congress. Their higher Coasian bribes there operated
to limit tribal rights by creating new states' rights. The tribes went
back to the courts and had some initial success in narrowing the
IGRA's limitations on tribal rights.i69 Many tribes thus adopted a
strategy of litigation-before-negotiation with the states.170 The tribes
also had limited success with the Commission and the Interior De-
165. See Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (recog-
nizing that tribes enjoy sovereign immunity from civil suits on contracts made on
or off a reservation or concerning trust lands).
166. See Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 1479,
1484 (D. Or. 1994) (citing plain language of 25 U.S.C. §2719(b)(1)(A)). The Siletz
Tribe sought to acquire a 16-acre parcel for a high-stakes casino in Salem. The
Interior Secretary initially approved, but refused final approval when the Gover-
nor refused to concur, and the tribe sued. See id. at 1482-83.
167. Siletz, 841 U.S. at 1489. The Appointments Clause states:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall appoint... all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by law vest the Ap-
pointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the Presi-
dent alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
168. But see South Dakota v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir.
1995), rev'd, 519 U.S. 286 (1996) (holding illegal the Secretary's approval of off-
reservation casino, regardless of state opposition, because Secretary's Indian land
trust powers under 25 U.S.C. § 465 are an unconstitutional, unintelligible delega-
tion of legislative power to the Secretary). This is the only decision in 60 years to
hold a delegation of congressional power unconstitutional. But see 25 C.F.R.
§ C151.12 (1999) (responding to the 8th Circuit's objections and requiring publi-
cation of notice of determination to take land in trust 30 days prior to title trans-
fer to the United States).
169. See supra notes 125-27, 145-47, 166-67 and accompanying text.
170. See Ron M. Rosenberg, When Sovereigns Negotiate in the Shadow of the Law: The
1998 Arizona-Pima Maricopa Gaming Compact, 4 HA v. NEGOTIATION L. Rv.
283, 285 (1999).
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partment. 17 1 But Reagan/Bush appointees slowly made the courts'
approach more like that of Congress: a conservative solicitude for non-
Indian casinos and for states' rights. The states made strategic use of
this judicial conservatism, by having IGRA provisions beneficial to the
tribes declared unconstitutional.172 These decisions are double-edged,
since they tempt the tribes to win Cabazon back by bribing for
favorable and even preemptive exercises of a federal regulatory discre-
tion, and because these decisions impose fairly strict limits on a con-
tractarian federalism.
This federalism is now seen to be devoid of substantive content,
other than attempting to appease players with strong and conflicting
preferences. While minimizing federal regulatory costs, the IGRA
seeks to deflect complaints by delegating key decisions to the states
and preserving the appearance of a federal responsiveness to the
tribes. Native Americans are arguably justified in seeing this as an
abdication of federal trust obligations to the tribes. The compacting
process seems to be a negative-sum game, in which players bribe to
retard rather than reverse perceived erosions of sovereignty and other
measures of their discretion. Instead of "internalizing the externali-
ties" of Indian gaming, the IGRA "externalizes the internalities" by
permitting states to increase tribal transaction costs and to siphon off
tribal gaming revenues-while leaving most social costs to be dealt
with (if at all) by the tribes. The IGRA may also have the effect (if not
the purpose) of maximizing the Coasian bribes paid by the players: to
the feds, to gain or avoid a federal preemption and to obtain exercises
of regulatory discretion in your favor; and to the states and local offi-
cials, to gain or repel consent for a tribal casino and to obtain regula-
tory decisions in your favor. Contra Coase, this process seems to be
wealth maximizing only for the officials receiving the bribes.173
171. See Tsosie, supra note 12, at 39; supra note 151 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
173. See Macey, supra note 60, at 877 (stating that conservatives and liberals both
praise federalism when it suits their immediate political needs); id. at 880 (dis-
cussing how the maximizing strategy is not always apparent to politicians in a
world of high information and other transaction costs); id. at 881, 884, 890 (quot-
ing Morris Fiorina in part: delegation to states thus becomes an important risk
avoidance strategy); Maxwell Stearns, Notes and Questions, in PUBLIC CHOICE
AND PUBLIC LAW, supra note 60, at 895 (stating that there is no independent
political content in Macey's federalism-a label for outcomes reached to appease
constituents); see also SusAN RoSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLrr-
icAL ECONOMY 9 (1978) quoted in Martz, supra note 15, at 468 ("Not only is brib-
ery seldom a surplus-maximizing procedure, but also the maximization of the
dollar value of surplus is not a self-evidently appealing maxim: It neglects distri-
butional objectives and weighs outcomes in favor of the wealthy."); Rand & Light,
supra note 59, at 393-94; Tsosie, supra note 12, at 71, 84; Martz, supra note 15, at
472 (noting that when the bureaucracy is organized sequentially, "illegal benefits
must be provided at each stage," and the initial bribe will succeed only if all offi-
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C. Seminole (1996) and After
The chief stumbling-block of the IGRA is something Coase takes
for granted: good faith in negotiating Class III compacts. States in-
creasingly delay the negotiating process as much as possible, make
extravagant demands for Coasian bribes (extortion), or refuse to nego-
tiate at all.174 Such tactics arguably violate customary international
law'7 5 and, under the IGRA, the tribe could sue the state prior to
Seminole. If a federal district court finds that the state refused to ne-
gotiate in "good faith," within 180 days from the tribe's request for a
compact, the court will order the parties to negotiate a compact within
sixty days.17 6 If this deadline is not met, the court will order media-
tion. 177 The mediator then creates an enforceable compact, on the ba-
sis of the last best offers from the state (if any) and the tribe.178
(Game theory predicts a great deal of strategic behavior in structuring
these offers for subsequent advantage.)
State politicians complained that the IGRA thus placed an unfair
burden of proof on them, to show that they were not acting in bad
faith, and that this enabled tribes to take a hard-line position: demand
full casino gambling, even at the expense of the state's public policy
responsibilities. Matters came to a head in Seminole when, by a 5-4
vote, the Supreme Court held that the Tribe's IGRA remedy in federal
court violated the State's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment.' 79 Seminole is a complex case with implications far be-
cials are corrupt (quoting Susan Rose-Ackerman)); supra notes 51, 58, 80-82, 114,
123, 131 and accompanying text.
174. See GoODMAN, supra note 2, at 152-53; Levin, Environment, supra note 98, at
187; see also Coase, Social Cost, supra note 5, at 114, quoted supra note 125;
supra notes 121, 125, 133-134 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Fourth Russell Tribunal on the Rights of the Indians in the Americas, El
CN.4/Sub. 21476/Add. 5, Annex VII, § IV. p. 43 (1980) [hereinafler Russel Tribu-
nal] (stating that states must negotiate peacefully and in good faith any dispute
about "autonomous and cultural rights," and refrain from procedures "not mutu-
ally agreed upon"); infra notes 220-26 and accompanying text.
176. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) (1994).
177. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv) (1994).
178. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) & (iv) (1994) (giving federal district court juris-
diction over tribal suit as described in the text if, after 180 days, state is not
acting in "good faith"); GmBONS, supra note 114, at 64; Kelly, supra note 100, at
216; Levin, Environment, supra note 98, at 183; Henry Paul Monaghan, The
Supreme Court 1995 Term: The Sovereign Immunity "Exception", 110 HARv. L.
REv. 102, 109-10 (1996); Tsosie, supra note 12, at 54.
179. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996). The Tribe filed suit to
compel IGRA Class III compact negotiations, and the district court denied the
State's motion to dismiss. See id. The 11th Circuit reversed, and the Supreme
Court affirmed 5-4. Overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989),
the Court held that the Indian Commerce Clause does not give Congress the
power to grant federal court jurisdiction over a non-consenting state under 25
U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) and that Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), cannot be used
to enforce an implied obligation against state officials under § 2710(d)(3). See
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yond the world of tribal casinos,l 8 0 since the Court strains to make an
Indian Commerce Clause case fit the states' rights direction it intends
for the Interstate Commerce Clause. This doctrinal tack appears to
contradict the intention of the Constitution's Framers: to exclude
states from regulation of the tribes under the Indian Commerce
Clause, since states were already enriching themselves at the tribes'
expense. In any event, by treating Seminole as a private individual
suing a state, the Court neglected the Tribe's collective and sovereign
status.1 8 1
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47-49, 53, 63-65, 73 (1996). But see id. at
100-01 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court today holds for the first time since
the founding of the Republic that Congress has no authority to subject a State to
the jurisdiction of a federal court at the behest of an individual asserting a fed-
eral right."); MATTHIESSEN, supra note 93, at 22 (quoting Chief Osceola's 1836
statement to Gen. Douglas Clinch: "You have guns-so have we .... Your men
will fight, so will ours, till the last drop of Seminole blood has moistened the dust
of his hunting ground.").
180. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[The majority] prevents Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad
range of actions against States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law,
to those concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation of our
vast national economy.").
181. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the In-
dian Tribes."); Seminole, 517 U.S. at 62 ("If anything, the Indian Commerce
Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States... than does the
Interstate Commerce Clause."); id. at 69 (discussing the dissent's "blind reliance
on the text of the Eleventh Amendment") id. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing congressional creation of a "private" cause of action against a state for
violation of a federal right); id. at 101 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Congress has no
authority to subject a state to the jurisdiction of a federal court at the behest of an
individual asserting a federal right."); Martha A. Field, The Seminole Case, Fed-
eralism and the Indian Commerce Clause, 29 Amiz. ST. L.J. 3, 18 (1997) (stating,
"Seminole is probably not of major significance in regard to federal-Indian-state
relations," since it is really about the 11th Amendment; and subsequent events
and schemes may favor tribes); id. at 4 (calling Seminole "a radical departure
from prior Eleventh Amendment rules articulated since 1964"); id. at 11 (noting
that a narrower Seminole holding could have been crafted under the 10th Amend-
ment); id. at 18 (noting that while seemingly a "belittling of Indian interests,"
Seminole contains some language more favorable to Indians than other recent
decisions); id. at 20 (discussing how Seminole is the first time congressional ac-
tion concerning structural relations with Indians was held unconstitutional);
Grant, supra note 105, at 182 (noting that Seminole does not respect the history
or language of the 11th Amendment); id. at 189 (arguing that the Seminole Court
should have upheld the IGRA if it wanted to uphold states' rights, and that with
the extinction of the "New Buffalo," Indians are a casualty of the Seminole
Court's "outcome determinative decisionmaking"); Green, supra note 127, at 149
(noting that the Commerce Clause puts tribes on the same footing as states and
foreign nations); Monaghan, supra note 178, at 111 (noting that Seminole is
treated as a replay of a "constitutional aberration"); id. at 113 (noting that the
Seminole Court found no distinction between the Indian and Interstate Com-
merce Clauses, and addressed "laconically" the tribe argument that the Indian
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From a Coasian perspective, the significance of Seminole is that it
licenses states to act as holdouts over Class III compacts-as players
who rationally defect from a process akin to a complex prisoners' di-
lemma game. More accurately, states are permitted to be free riders,
who accept the benefits of regulatory rights over tribes (conferred by
Congress) while ducking many of the correlative duties and costs
these rights entail. A state's non-participation will bar a collectively-
profitable outcome from the compacting process, absent coercion from
an IGRA judicial remedy or Coasian bribes that are higher than tribes
are willing or able to pay, unless the federal government decides to be
less of a regulatory free rider and preempts (withdraws or narrows)
the states' role in tribal gaming. The tribes no longer have the mili-
tary power that was once an inducement for their enemies to engage
in arms-length negotiations, and an often-slender protection against
bad faith and fraud during these negotiations. There has been a
marked reduction in compacts negotiated since Seminole, and states
like California, New Mexico, and Wisconsin are taking a much
tougher line with "their" tribes.'8 2
Some other means of prompting states to bargain honestly over
compacts thus seem desirable, although Daniel Farber poses an in-
triguing alternative: "It follows from the Coase Theorem that, if Con-
Commerce Clause offers a stronger, plenary congressional power which reflects a
special federal responsibility); id. at 116-17 (stating that the Court didn't men-
tion the "persuasive" tribal argument that Seminole is distinguishable, as a case
of "sovereigns v. sovereigns"); Kalish, supra note 93, at 1358 (describing how
Seminole is a part of a pattern of permitting state infringements on tribal sover-
eignty (citing Rice v. Rebner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983) (allowing California to require
a federally-licensed Indian trader to obtain State liquor license) and Moe v. Sa-
lish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (allowing Montana to collect cigarette
tax on reservation sales to non-Indians)); id. at 1370 (arguing that Seminole is
wrong because Congress has power over tribes it lacks over states). But see Idaho
v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997) (stating that sovereign immunity
includes "suits ... by sovereigns against sovereigns" (citing Blatchford v. Native
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991))).
182. See Fish and Chips, supra note 107, at 29; Walsh, Boom, supra note 13, at A9; see
also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903) (applying conclusive pre-
sumption of congressional good faith in United States treaty acquiring a million
acres at less than $1 an acre from tribes, even though it was tainted by fraud and
repudiated by tribes); Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1556 (10th
Cir. 1997) (noting the IGRA "suggests Congressional concern to permit state in-
volvement if a state so desires," and a state's refusal to negotiate "in no way mini-
mizes the importance of the compacting process"); Aceves, supra note 117, at 238-
40 (recognizing that without a mechanism for enforcing threats or commitments,
defection will occur in the Prisoner's Dilemma game); id. at 254 (stating that in
international relations, sanctions are needed to eliminate free riders who don't
cooperate); Croley, supra note 10, at 45; Farber, Parody, supra note 6, at 408
(discussing the game theory problem of bettering oneself by defecting); Grant,
supra note 105, at 188 ("[Ihe states themselves were a principal protagonist and
beneficiary of the IGRA, which gave them a measure of control ... that the Indian
Commerce Clause would clearly deny them."); Tsosie, supra note 12, at 60.
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gress wants to eliminate immunity more than the state wants to keep
it, then it will be eliminated-regardless of whether the Constitution
recognizes sovereign immunity or gives Congress the power to abro-
gate immunity."' 8 3 For Farber, Congress can bribe (or blackmail)
states into an efficient outcome, or states can bribe to remain immune,
but this would be a hard bargain to strike since transaction costs are
very high. This is especially so after Seminole, which Farber describes
as a defensible decision nonetheless: Congress is the "best briber" be-
cause its transaction costs are lower than those of organizing the in-
terested states and making a counter-bribe.' 8 4
With respect, Farber seems to play down the uncertainties of such
a process, uncertainties that would create inefficient resource alloca-
tions and unstable expectations. For example, the players would re-
main able to hide their preferences and payoffs, so that it remains
hard to determine who bribes whom and by how much. We cannot
assume that the regulatory wealth-maximizing strategy over tribal
casinos will ever be discovered by the players. But we can plausibly
imagine that it would be cheaper for Congress to preempt the states'
role and bear the regulatory costs now borne by the states, rather than
bribe the states to waive their sovereign immunity. Farber concludes
that Congress should preempt those states that refuse to waive their
sovereign immunity, as the cheapest way to reconstruct a post-Semi-
nole IGRA.85
Farber's solutions are ingenious, but there are presumably cheaper
and more transparent institutional solutions, which respect the tribal
183. D.A.F., Coase, supra note 120, at 142; see Coase, Social Cost, supra note 5, at 106,
quoted supra note 120; Farber, Parody, supra note 6, at 402 (discussing how
states might make Coasian, voluntary waivers of sovereign immunity); id. at 403
(noting that although Coase is not used much in constitutional law, bargaining,
rather than text and history, is the "true significance" of the l1th Amendment);
id. at 402 n.18, quoted infra note 185; Martz, supra note 15, at 468, quoted supra
note 131.
184. See Aceves, supra note 117, at 254; D.A.F., Coase, supra note 120, at 142-43. But
see infra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
185. See Farber, Parody, supra note 6, at 407, discussed supra note 114; see also
Aceves, supra note 117, at 247-48; Macey, supra note 60, at 269-71; supra notes
80, 127, 131-32, 134, 158, 173 and accompanying text; infra notes 230, 268-71
and accompanying text. Farber states:
[Iun the Seminole Tribe case itself, Congress could preempt state laws
governing Indian casinos except in states waiving sovereign immunity.
116 S. Ct. at 1131. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07
(1987) (Congress has broad power to attach conditions to spending);
Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (Congress can re-
quire waiver of Eleventh Amendment rights as condition for state's oper-
ation in interstate commerce). Congress must express its intent to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in unmistakable language in
the statute itself. Welch v. Texas [Dep't] of [Highways] and Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
Farber, Parody, supra note 6, at 428 n.18.
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sovereignty that gets cut out of both Farber's scheme and the one in
Seminole.'8 6 (Congress is unlikely to feel its trust responsibilities to
the tribes keenly enough to pay the bribes that states would require.)
Commentators argue that Seminole struck down the IGRA's detailed
judicial remedy, but left intact the states' IGRA duty to show good
faith. This duty could presumably form the basis for an ordinary
breach of contract action, brought by a tribe against a state'8 7 and in
state court, so as to avoid sovereign immunity problems. Unconscio-
nability, Restatement (Second) of Contracts §90, and quasi contract
(with the IGRA good faith obligation defining the pubic policy to be
implemented) could also be argued, and a § 1983 suit could be at-
tempted in state court.' 8 8 While a tribe is understandably reluctant
186. See Aceves, supra note 117, at 254; infra notes 268-71 and accompanying text
(suggested reforms).
187. See S. REP. No. 100-446, at 14-15 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071,
3084 (noting the federal regulation includes a good faith requirement); Pueblo of
Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1556 ("[IGRA] compact is a form of contract."); Tsosie,
supra note 12, at 54 n.167 ("[Tihe compact requirement survived Seminole, even
though this particular enforcement mechanism did not."); id. at 64 (noting that
the Seminole Court expressly declined to comment on whether a state can be
forced to negotiate with a tribe, by means other than the IGRA remedy); see also
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 16, 1969, art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf. 39/27 ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
light of its object and purpose."); Reprosystem B.V. v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp.
1257, 1280 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[Under New York law, every contract carries with
it an implied obligation of good faith."); Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in
Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1401 (1958) (discussing statutory duty in labor con-
tracts where, as with casinos, the parties are expected to get along over time);
Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673, 727
(1969) (stating that courts will punish bad faith where it is clearly present);
Ralph A. Newman, The Renaissance of Good Faith in Contracting in Anglo-Amer-
lean Law, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 553 (1969).
Closely related to good faith, especially for IGRA purposes, is Charles Knapp's
"duty to go forward," to bargain in good faith for as long as can be reasonably
required under the circumstances. See Knapp, supra, at 679, 681, 684-85, 720.
This duty has proved influential, but far from decisive. For Thomas Crandall and
Douglas Whaley, "[c]oncepts of good faith, cooperation, and prevention are closely
related .... Mhe court may find a material breach of an implied promise (cove-
nant): (a) not to prevent the other party from performing; (b) to cooperate in en-
suring performance is achieved; or (c) to act in good faith." CAsEs, PROBLEMS &
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 945 (Thomas D. Crandall and Douglas J. Whaley eds.,
2d ed. 1993).
188. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(finding both procedural unconscionability, based on the lack of negotiations, and
substantive unconscionability, based on the contents of a consumer credit agree-
ment); Gold Seal Productions v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 286 P.2d 954, 962-63 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1955) (finding breach of an express contract, a quasi-con-
tract, and promissory estoppel, in a scattergun approach to liability); In re
Crisan's Estate, 109 N.W.2d 907 (Mich. 1961) (indicating that on policy grounds,
a hospital is entitled to quasi-contractual recovery even though a patient re-
mained unconscious and was thus incapable of voluntary assent); Ellsworth
1999]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
to sue a state in state court, competent judges willing to follow the law
would presumably treat the tribe fairly. But damages (e.g., lost profits
from a tribal casino that was never built) would likely be difficult to
prove, and it would be difficult to devise an extraordinary remedy like
mandamus and convince a state court to apply it-as an end-run
around Seminole.1 8 9 Nevertheless, tribes could make strategic use of
such a suit by filing it and hoping that the state will negotiate a com-
pact in good faith and at a less-than-extortionate Coasian bribe, in
exchange for dismissing the suit.
The constitutionality of the IGRA as a whole was upheld by a dis-
trict court in Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Swimmer,i9 0
as lying within Congress's plenary power over the tribes and as
reasonably related to congressional trust responsibilities.19 - In
passing, the paternalistic Swimmer judge, citing precedent, was
willing to infringe tribal sovereignty if this was in the tribes' best
interest. This is contrary to the Cabazon Court's approach. 192
Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 857 (N.J. 1967) ("Although courts continue
to recognize that persons should not be unnecessarily restricted in their freedom
of contract, there is an increasing willingness to invalidate unconscionable provi-
sions which clearly tend to injure the public in some way."); Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965) (reimbursing plaintiffs under RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1934), virtually unchanged in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1979), for most of their injuries resulting from the collapse
of franchise negotiations prior to an agreement); Knapp, supra note 187, at 687
("Promissory estoppel is now employed with increasing frequency... to justify
the awarding of a remedy.., where a bargain was under negotiation but no final
agreement has been reached."). In Seminole, the tribe's attempt to sue state offi-
cials in a federal court under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), was held to be
barred by the detailed IGRA remedial scheme that was struck down. See Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene, 521
U.S. 261, 262 (1997) (noting that an ongoing violation of federal law is ordinarily
sufficient to invoke Young, but not for the "far-reaching and invasive relief' the
tribe seeks here-that a vast reach of "public" land be declared beyond the state's
regulatory jurisdiction). An inability to rely on Ex Parte Young would seem to
preclude a § 1983 action in federal court for a tribe denied a casino compact, but a
§ 1983 action, relatively rare, in a state court should remain viable. But see infra
note 189.
189. Compare Tsosie, supra note 12, at 64 (noting that in Seminole the Court ex-
pressly declined to comment on a state being forced to negotiate with a tribe),
with Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73-74 (1996) (hinting that the de-
tailed IGRA remedial scheme is the exhaustive means of implementing a con-
gressionally-created tribal right by denying the tribe protection under Ex Parte
Young).
190. 740 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1990).
191. See id.; Douglas B.L. Endreson, A Summary of the Caselaw Interpreting the In-
dian Gaming Regulatory Act, in RESERvATION-BASED GAMING, supra note 2, at 35,
35; Tsosie, supra note 12, at 66.
192. See Swimmer, 740 F. Supp. at 12-14 (arguing that it is in Indians' best interest
for Congress to decrease tribes' and enhance states' sovereignty, to prevent com-
petition with non-Indian gaming); Levin, Environment, supra note 98, at 184;
Tsosie, supra note 12, at 66 (stating that "[i]ronically .... the courts have vindi-
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Seminole19 3 and Siletz194 then held key portions of the IGRA uncon-
stitutional, raising the question of whether enough of the IGRA re-
mains to constitute a coherent regulatory scheme. The federalism
'jurisprudence" of the Supreme Court is clearly at an experimental
stage in Seminole and in United States v. Lopez. 19 5 The IGRA argua-
bly imposes an "unfunded mandate" on the states similar to the one
struck down in Prinz v. United States.19 6 Compared to these rather
ad hoc uses of the Indian and Interstate Commerce Clauses and the
Eleventh Amendment, the Tenth Amendment offers a more secure
foundation for the Court's federalism concerns, if these revolve around
Congress superseding or commandeering state laws and officials. But
Tenth Amendment challenges to the IGRA have failed to date,19 7 and
cated the states' right to be free of coercion," while Swimmer erodes tribal
sovereignty).
193. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text; see also South Dakota v. United
States Dep't of the Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995); State ex rel Clark v.
Johnson, 904 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1995) (holding that a state-tribal compact requires
legislative approval).
195. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Lopez struck down congressional regulation of guns near
schools, in the first curtailment of Commerce Clause powers to interfere in state
affairs for almost 60 years. See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992) (narrowing federal regulatory power over state and local government);
United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe, 135 F.3d 558, 565 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 272, 279 (8th Cir. 1993) as a
basis for refusing to address the tribe's argument that Seminole makes unconsti-
tutional all IGRA provisions relating to compacting process)); Field, supra note
181, at 12-13, 20 (explaining that Seminole didn't decide if the inoffensive por-
tions of the IGRA could continue to be enforced); Grant, supra note 105, at 189
(noting that Seminole Court should have upheld the IGRA if it wanted to uphold
states' rights); Monteau, supra note 144, at 32 (noting the "irony" of state 10th
and 11th Amendment claims used to defeat the intent of the compacting provi-
sions "is that Congress inserted the compacting provisions into the Act to give the
states a right they never previously had"); Tsosie, supra note 12, at 64. But see
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 3 F.3d at 273 (expressing that, contra Seminole, the
congressional provision for federal court jurisdiction in IGRA is sufficient to abro-
gate states' 11th Amendment sovereign immunity).
196. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down portions of Brady Bill which required states to
implement gun registration rules). Printz jeopardizes many federal programs
that rely on state implementation.
197. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X ('The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution... are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."); Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 60 (1996) (indicating that because the IGRA
involves an exercise of federal power under the Indian Commerce Clause, it does
not constitute an exercise of a 10th Amendment power reserved to the states);
Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1434 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding no 10th
Amendment violation because the IGRA encourages, but does not mandate, state
involvement); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 3 F.3d at 273 (using an argument like
the one used in Ponca); Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians v. United States,
841 F. Supp. 1479, 1486 (D. Or. 1994) (finding no 10th Amendment violation be-
cause the IGRA demands nothing of a governor and imposes all burdens on the
Department of the Interior); Field, supra note 181, at 11 (recognizing that the
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the Court's experiments seem to reflect the desire to curb, by any con-
venient means, congressional expediency as a regulatory free rider.
The Court seems no less expedient in its relatively unprincipled exper-iments that command no judicial or scholarly consensus, experiments
that strip tribes of a sovereignty which federalism ought to respect,
and that leave a grand Coasian mess that Congress is in no great
hurry to fix.198
The clearest example of this Coasian mess is United States v. San-
tee Sioux Tribe,199 where the United States Attorney General is al-
lowed to enforce the Commission Chair's order to close the Tribe's
casino because a valid Tribal-State compact is not in place. Judge
Pascoe Bowman concludes that "we must assume that Congress in-
tended" this because "[wie cannot imagine" the IGRA any other way,
even though §2713(a) authorizes the Commission to levy fines for
IGRA violations.20 0 Assumption, imagination, and very little else are
Court possibly could have crafted a narrower Seminole holding under the 10th
Amendment); Monaghan, supra note 178, at 118-19; Tsosie, supra note 12, at 65.
198. See Stearns, supra note 173, at 898; see also Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104
F.3d 1546, 1556 (dismissing the "inequity" of giving the state a veto power over
Indian gaming by arguing that the compact was "a form of contract" where each
player must assure itself that others have the authority to contract); GoODNMN,
supra note 2, at 156-57, quoted supra note 166; Grant, supra note 105, at 189
(noting that with the extinction of the "New Buffalo," Indians are a casualty of
the Court's "outcome determinative decisionmaking"); Kelly, supra note 100, at
225 ("[I]fthe citizens of a state permit others to engage in certain specified gam-
ing activities, they should not object to tribal governments engaging in the same
activities." (quoting Sen. Daniel Inouye)); Monaghan, supra note 178, at 118
(describing modern state sovereignty as largely a judge-made doctrine, which
"sweep[s] away arguments based on the special nature of Indian tribes"); Tsosie,
supra note 12, at 27 (arguing that contemporary removals are not of Indians, but
of tribal sovereignty and jurisdictional authority); id. at 55 ("The challenge of
federalism ... is to preserve the respective sovereignty of each entity while still
promoting the unity of the nation as a whole."); supra notes 69, 131, 151, 157 and
accompanying text (describing Congress as regulatory free rider); supra note 172
and accompanying text (discussing state victories over tribes). But see Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (describing the 11th Amendment as "evidenc-
ing and exemplifying" a broader immunity "implicit in the Constitution" and re-
flecting "the dignity and respect accorded a state"); id. at 275 (indicating that
Indian law decisions interpret federal law and that federal courts play an impor-
tant role in maintaining the "structural integrity of the constitutional design");
id. (recognizing that federalism is endangered by arguments of the "inherent in-
adequacy of state forums," and state administrative law develops to reflect that
state's rules and traditions).
199. 135 F.3d 558 (8th Cir. 1998).
200. See Santee Sioux Tribe, 135 F.3d at 562-63. While the district court found that
the United States could mount only a criminal prosecution under the IGRA, 28
U.S.C. § 516 is broad enough to empower the Attorney General here. See id. at
561. On a rather strained interpretation, 25 U.S.C. § 2713(a) "indicates that the
Chairman's authority to levy fines was not intended as a means of enforcing clo-
sure orders." Santee Sioux Tribe, 135 F.3d at 563. Injunction is appropriate be-
cause it is a remedy available under a Nebraska law "made applicable in Indian
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thus used to remodel the IGRA in Santee, when the meager funding
and staffing of the Commission clearly indicate that a free-riding Con-
gress did not intend to take IGRA supervision and enforcement seri-
ously-probably out of respect for tribal sovereignty.20 1 A detailed
and apparently exclusive IGRA remedy is thus circumvented in San-
tee, where this is to the tribes disadvantage, while a detailed and pos-
sibly exclusive remedy is struck down in Seminole, where that is to
the tribes' disadvantage.
Before and even after Santee and Pueblo of Santa Ana,2 0 2 tribes
and commentators pressed the Department of the Interior to preempt
the states' regulatory role or to devise the necessary compact where
the state refuses to negotiate in good faith-without recourse to the
judicial procedure struck down in Seminole.20 3 Secretary of the Inte-
rior Babbitt knows that such action would provoke lawsuits and polit-
ical flack from states and non-Indian gambling interests, and he has
provided little leadership to date. Santee has so far proved the excep-
country through the IGRA." id. The maxim relied upon by the district court,
"that equity generally will not enjoin the Commission of a crime," is inappropri-
ate because Nebraska caselaw puts the case facts into one of three exceptions to
the maxim: video gambling machines are a "continuing and flagrant" public nui-
sance. id. at 565; see Cox, supra note 67, at D7 (indicating that Congress emascu-
lated the Commission out of respect for Indian sovereignty); id. at Dl (stating
that the district court opinion in Santee was flawed and renders the Commis-
sion's enforcement powers ineffective). We could also apply this characterization
to the Eight Circuit opinion on appeal.
201. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
202. In a strained interpretation, contra some case law, Congress implicitly intended a
compact's validity under state law to be a requirement separate from the Interior
Secretary's approval.
203. See Endreson, supra note 191, at 43 (noting that while United States v. Cook, 992
F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1991), "allowed state gambling laws to be enforced by United
States Attorneys in federal courts, the courts have uniformly held that the IGRA
bars states from themselves enforcing state laws against tribal gaming"); Field,
supra note 181, at 20 (noting that during Seminole oral arguments, several Jus-
tices assumed tribes could seek direct regulation by the Interior Secretary);
Kelly, supra note 100, at 224 (discussing reluctance of United States Attorneys to
move against an illegal tribal gaming which can be made legitimate by a com-
pact, change in state law, or Commission ruling); Levin, Betting, supra note 1, at
129 (quoting newspaper accounts of Seminole oral arguments, in which Justices
Ginsberg and Stevens asked the Tribe's lawyer if they were better offifthe Tribe
lost and the states had no role in Indian gambling).
Alex Tallchief Skibine argues that:
Although after Seminole the Secretary's authority to issue gaming regu-
lations solely under IGRA's clause (vii) is suspect, a convincing case can
be made for finding such authority under 25 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 9 as supple-
mented by IGRA. If the Secretary is unwilling .... the tribes should be
able to force him. An even better solution is for the Attorney General of
the United States to sue the states on behalf of the tribes to enforce the
good faith requirement of IGRA.
Alex Tallchief Skibine, Gaming on Indian Reservations: Defining the Trustee's
Duty in the Wake of Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 21 ARiz. ST. L.J. 121, 168 (1997).
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tion, however: the Commission and the Attorney General have not
moved to close many of the tribal casinos operating without a compact,
although enforcement is threatened against several California
tribes.204 While they lack standing to close tribal casinos, operating
without a compact, states have devised clever countermoves to fore-
stall tribal casinos. 205
From Cabazon to the present, the players' moves, countermoves,
and forum-shopping over a tribal gaming have spawned increasingly
complex and incoherent institutional matrices. Coasian bribes and
transaction costs have burgeoned, as have opportunities to cheat, for
free riders and holdouts, and for other manifestations of a lack of trust
and cooperation. The externalities of tribal gaming are thus not being
internalized, and a rough contemporary standoff over outcomes re-
flects random breakdowns in the process, as well as the slow erosion of
tribal bargaining power and of the related sovereign tribal right to use
property for gaming purposes.206 Uncertainty over this right (and
much else) "does not present the marketplace with a stable environ-
ment for investments of venture capital" in Indian gaming207 or, in-
deed, a stable environment for anything else. It is difficult to tell
whether Coase failed the players or the players failed Coase over In-
dian gaming, 208 but the need seems clear for reforms which break
204. See George Lardner, Jr., Reno to Meet With Tribes Seeking to Defend California
Gaming, WASH. POST, June 7, 1998, at A2 (reporting that Governor Wilson en-
tered into a "model" compact with the Pala, a non-gaming Tribe, and was trying
to coerce other tribes into signing it; the Justice Department, apparently siding
with Wilson, filed an enforcement action in May 1998 against gaming tribes in
California that operate without a compact); Brett Pulley, Seeing Threat to Casi-
nos, Tribes March on the Capitol, N.Y. Tnems, June 10, 1998, at A16 (reporting
that California Governor Wilson refused to negotiate until "illegal" tribal casinos
were shut down and that citizens would vote on a ballot initiative, to supersede
the Pala compact and give the tribes a better compact).
205. See e.g., Fish and Chips, supra note 107, at 29-30 (noting that Wisconsin voters
passed a constitutional amendment strengthening the Governor's hand in court
and against the Interior Department).
206. See Aceves, supra note 117, at 246 (arguing that in international relations, pat-
terns of behavior based on a principle or rule create a path dependence, which in
turn reinforces the behavior); Mohawk, supra note 57, at 495 (stating that Indian
development begins as a struggle for sovereignty over property); Sutton, supra
note 114, at 715 (explaining how in game theory, random events lead to a break-
down that terminates bargaining); Tsosie, supra note 12, at 59 (stating that com-
pacts depend upon voluntary compliance and mutual forbearance, but with a
federal intervention); supra notes 127, 134, 162, 168, 172-73 and accompanying
text.
207. Green, supra note 127, at 155; see supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text
(discussing Seminole); supra notes 198, 202 and accompanying text (discussing
Pueblo of Santa Ana); supra notes 195, 199-201 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Santee Sioux Tribe).
208. See Croley, supra note 10, at 165 ("[Ilt is difficult to know whether agencies are
ultimately viewed as facilitators of rent-seeking, as coalition builders among com-
peting groups, or as something else entirely."); Farber, Parody, supra note 6, at
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through this expensive logjam and which minimize both market and
governmental failures over gambling. Such reforms will be sketched,
after a detour to introduce another set of players who in effect think
that Cabazon adopted the correct approach all along.20 9
V. INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS
A diffuse international human rights community consists of spe-
cialized organs of the United Nations and the Organization of Ameri-
can States, bands of indigenous people from the Americas, Australia,
and Asia, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Amnesty
International, representatives of "progressive" governments such as
Sweden and Norway, and other government officials and activists who
sympathize with the plight of the disadvantaged. Along with similar
communities pursuing development, environmental protections, and
peace and disarmament, these "insurgents" do battle with "establish-
ment" international lawyers-those interested in improving the eco-
nomic law of the WTO, the I1F, etc.-over the future of international
law and the role of countries like the United States. These insurgents
have made substantial progress around the theme that we know bet-
ter and can do better, chiefly through guerrilla legal tactics and by
defining disparate aims in terms of each other, so as to strengthen a
consensus over pursuing the human right to a sustainable develop-
ment, for example. Insurgents are quickly creating an international
civil society, a counterweight to the undemocratic processes of an in-
ternational law and politicS.2 10
404 ("[The Coase] Theorem is novel, counterintuitive, and a source of fertile in-
sights, but is it true?"). At the least, Indian gaming casts a serious doubt on three
Coasian precepts: 1) that resource allocations will remain the same in the face of
(gaming) rents, and the value of production will be maximized when the rents are
maximized, 2) that changing the criteria for assigning ownership to previously
unrecognized rights does not matter much, and 3) that the parties will negotiate
to adjust rights in good faith, to maximize the value of production. See Coase,
Social Cost, supra note 5, at 114.
209. See Deller & Chen, supra note 45, at 248 ("[Cabazon held] that federally-recog-
nized tribes were sovereign nations with a right to govern themselves and offer
their own high-stakes version of whatever gaming is allowed in the state."); Far-
ber, Parody, supra note 6, at 400 (stating that the belief that market processes
come closer to ideal performance than actual government processes "can not be
proven by analyzing models of the market and of government intervention that
both give efficient outcomes. Instead, the imperfections of each system must be
analyzed"); Farrell, supra note 66, at 116.
210. See Paul H. Brietzke, Insurgents in the ?Vew' International Law, 13 Wis. INT'L
L.J. 1, 2-3, 10, 55-56 (1994) [hereinafter Brietzke, Insurgents]; Paul H. Brietzke,
Self-Determination, or Jurisprudential Confusion Exacerbating Political Conflict,
14 Wis. INT'L L.J. 69, 117 (1995) [hereinafter Brietzke, Self-Determination]; see
also Jos R. Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against In-
digenous Populations: Volume V Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations,
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, at
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A major concern of this international human rights community is
that indigenous peoples so frequently lose out to the larger society
they inhabit, often in more extreme ways than over Native American
casinos but usually by legalistic means like those described in the last
Section. Speaking globally, Jos6 Martinez Cobo also characterizes
American Indian law nicely, as a near-perpetual tutelage inconsistent
with a Coasian bargaining:
Some countries have created a special legal status which seeks to protect the
indigenous inhabitants and absolve them of a number of obligations, but at
the same time restricts their exercise of certain rights [such as running a ca-
sino, under the IGRA] until they attain what is considered to be a necessary
level of development which could place them on an equal footing with the rest
of the population.2 1
1
3-4, 1, 3, 5, 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4Sub.211986/7/Add.4 (1987) [hereinafter Cobo,
Volume 1] (indicating that none of the basic United Nation texts refer to indige-
nous peoples explicitly, but the framework for their incorporation is found in the
United Nations Charter, Preamble and art. §§ 1(3), 1(4), 13(1)(b), 55-56, 62, 68);
id. at 33, 37-123, 128-42 (describing activities concerning indigenous peoples by
the FAO, ILO, UNESCO, WHO, and the OAS); id. at 1 I f (noting that a majority
of world's indigenous peoples face "oppression" and "exploitation," at "the bottom
of the socio-economic scale" and with few employment, healthcare, justice, and
religious opportunities); id. at 4, 17 (discussing "the emergence of non-govern-
mental organizations constituted by indigenous peoples and their international
conferences"); id. at 5, 21 (discussing objective and subjective criteria, in defin-
ing "indigenous populations"); Aceves, supra note 117, at 238-48 (understanding
the international system as a Prisoner's Dilemma and discussing how a limited
cooperation nonetheless emerges over time); Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization,
International Institutions, and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democ-
racy, 95 MICH. L. Rav. 1944, 1957-58 (1997) (describing international law as "a
cosmopolitan enterprise," attending to non-Western traditions and cultures and
seeking an effective counterweight to "laissez faire globalism").
211. See Cobo, Volume V, supra note 210, at 5, I 29; see also California v. Cabazon,
480 U.S. 202. 216-17 n.19 ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress...
to help develop and utilize Indian resources.., to a point where the Indians will
fully exercise responsibility for the utilization and management of their own re-
sources" and enjoy "a standard of living... comparable to that enjoyed by non-
Indians." (quoting Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of
1975, 25 U.S.C. § 4551)); Cobo, Volume V, supra note 210, at 6, 30 (this is a
special legal status, a capitis diminutio persisting "until they achieve a given
level of integration in the national community"-which is tantamount to an In-
dian leaving the reservation in the United States); Deller & Chen, supra note 45,
at 248 (stating that until about 30 years ago, Indians were wards of the federal
government, but the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of
1975 extended self-government to commercial activity, and the Indian Mineral
Development Act of 1982 permitted joint ventures for developmental purposes);
Egan, supra note 70, at 22 (noting that Congress sends conflicting signals, "push-
ing for greater autonomy and self-determination" while "warning that assertive
tribal governments are going too far"). Compare Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49 (1978) (permitting the tribe to control its membership practices, even
though it amounts to sex discrimination under United States law), with Rand &
Light, supra note 59, at 414 ("[In] a triumph of materialism over family, kinship,
tribe, and tradition," an "Indian tribe is genuine and accordingly entitled to self-
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In other words, the American legal message to Indians is: "You can't
develop until you develop, but (until the 1980s) trust us to maintain
you in the meantime."
Following the American Revolution and as reflected in the Com-
merce and Treaty Clauses of a Constitution designed to curb fissipa-
rous tendencies among tribes as well as States, federal relations with
the tribes were based on international law.2 12 European notions of a
tribal sovereignty and the acquisition of Indian lands by consensual
treaty were especially prominent, but there were ugly, colonial fea-
tures as well. 2 13 These features were not fully repudiated until a 1975
International Court of Justice case, Western Sahara:2 14 the "right of
discovery," "terra nullius" (Indian lands belonged to no one), and the
"standard of civilization" and the related "Christian" right to dominate
"pagans and heathens." The international political movement that led
to a decolonization after World War II also operated to decolonize and
modernize this international law. The effects of these innovations are
all but lost on an American legal culture, which grew increasingly pro-
vincial after about 1845.215
government only ifa panel of federal anthropologists and historians certify that it
is sufficiently Indian." (quoting Russel Barsh)).
212. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (Commerce Clause); U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2
(Treaty Clause, which in practice encompassed tribes as foreign nations).
213. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-18 (1831) (describing a tribe as both a "state" and a "domes-
tic dependent nation," a separate political entity fully able to govern and other-
wise manage its affairs); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 587 (1823)
(finding Indians incapable of transferring absolute title to land because they have
a "right to such a degree of sovereignty, as the circumstances of the people would
allow them to exercise"); FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, 50,
207-08, 232 (1982); John Howard Clineball & Jim Thompson, Sovereignty and
Self-Determination: The Rights of Native Americans Under International Law,
27 BUFF. L. REv. 669, 680 (1978); McGinnis, supra note 134, at 212 (stating that
the Constitution's Framers were motivated by the same passions they sought to
harness and release); Kalish, supra note 93, at 1347 (noting that in Johnson,
Chief Justice Marshall purports to rely on the liberal international law philoso-
phy of Francisco de Vittoria, but ignored one of de Vittoria's most important prin-
ciples, that Indians must consent to a land transfer); id. at 1347-51 (discussing
the "Marshall trilogy" of Johnson, Cherokee Nation, and Worcester).
214. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16) (advisory opinion) (rejecting Spain's
claim that the Western Sahara was terra nullius when colonized); see Goldman,
supra note 95, at 190.
215. See Goldman, supra note 95, at 197; see also MATTHIESSEN, supra note 93, at 245
("[The] doctrine of discovery under international law of that period protected na-
tive title to inhabited land and gave to the 'discovering' nation only the exclusive
right of acquiring the land.., by consent or after a just war." (quoting the Indian
Legal Resource Center to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights); id.
(indicating that the Supreme Court applied existing international law until about
1845, but there was no body of law to replace it thereafter, and no protection for
Indians other than a limited ban on purely arbitrary actions); Trimble, supra
note 210, at 1957.
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The international law innovation of concern to us here, one arising
from decolonization and the related, insurgent, international human
rights movement, is the right to self-determination-even for peoples
like Indian tribes, whose nations do not amount to states or nation-
states under international law. The principle of self-determination is
embodied in Article 1 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,2 16
signed by President Carter in 1979 and ratified (after some 135 coun-
tries had done so) by the Senate in 1992. Ratification gives the Cove-
nant full American legal effect and, in legal theory at least, the
Covenant overrides inconsistent prior statutes-such as the IGRA. In
contrast to the lip-service the IGRA paid self-determination, the Cove-
nant obliges states parties like the United States-actively to promote
an expansive self-determination. It describes the free determination
of the nation's (or state's) membership and political status, and the
free pursuit of the nation's economic, social, and cultural development,
as indispensable preconditions to the realization of other human
rights. (Control over tribal membership criteria is essential to self-
determination, a control which is widely held to be compromised by
the IGRA.)217
216. See GA. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) [hereinafter Covenant] (Article I(1) states that [aill peoples have the right
of self-determination .... [Tihey freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social, and cultural development."); id. at art. 1(3) ('The
States Parties ... shall promote the realization of the right."); id. art. 27; Cobo,
Volume V, supra note 210, at 5, 21 (noting the importance to self-determination
of "self-identification" in tribal membership criteria); id. at 28, 1 369 ( The right
of indigenous peoples themselves to define what and who is indigenous must be
recognized."); Goldman, supra note 95, at 190-91 ('The counterpart to colonialism
has always been self-determination." (quoting Howard R. Berman)); Tsosie, supra
note 12, at 34 (discussing ideas of Robert A. Williams and S. James Anaya).
217. See Brietzke, Self-Determination, supra note 210, at 71 (noting that poets sing of
and patriots die for self-determination, which floats on the rising tide of national-
ism characteristic of our New World Disorder); id. at 126 (stating that American
isolationism leans against an international proactivism); id. at 130 (arguing that
like Kurds or Bosnians, Native Americans have a right to equal respect for them-
selves and their way of life, even though they live among dominant groups that
see things differently); Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 111, at 103 (stating that
complete autonomy is not needed to advance tribal culture, which the IGRA tends
to negate); id. at 112 ("Culture gives richness and meaning to people's lives and
effectively defines who they are."); Goldman, supra note 95, at 200 (describing
self-determination as a movement away from an "integrationist, assimilationist
paternalism" (quoting Richard A. Falk)); Hillerman, supra note 81, at A23 (re-
porting that the Osage count about 17,000 members, but under a 1906 tribal law
recently upheld in federal court, there are only 26 members, all in their 90s);
Kolkema, supra note 101, at 366-67 (stating that a tribe's "status as a quasi-
sovereign nation" amounts to the self-government that has little meaning with-
out self-sufficiency); Nagel et al., supra note 93, at 47 ("[American] rhetoric of
tribal self-determination might just as well ... mask the decline of federal trust
responsibilities."); Rosen, supra note 107, at 241 (stating that sovereignty of a
group not rising to the level of a state was thought unworthy of full recognition
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Self-determination is the most actively resisted of human rights
because it poses the greatest potential threat to order as well as sover-
eignty-that of the states as well as the feds in the United States. In
Coasian terms, the right to self-determination is an externality or
public good: particular individuals cannot reap most of the benefits or
bear most of the costs. Once a Palestinian (or Sioux), always a Pales-
tinian, and no one can achieve this (collective) right of self-determina-
tion as a Palestinian by herself. Much like the Constitution, the
Declaration of Independence, and newly emerging rights in our public
law jurisprudence, this Covenant right to self-determination is vague.
Many of the duties correlating to this right are not spelled out, and
questions of standing and appropriate fora remain unsettled. In other
words, an organic, programmatic, and lex imperfecta self-determina-
tion is like, and clearly reinforces, the tribal casino right sketched in
Cabazon.21i Weaker minority rights are also recognized in the Cove-
nant and elsewhere in international law.219 These rights can serve
until after World War II (quoting S. James Anaya)); id at 246 (describing the
plain meaning of self-determination "not as proliferation of mutually exclusive
entities but as ... increasingly interconnected and interdependent spheres of
power" sensitive to organization, negotiation, and revision (citing S. James
Anaya)); Tsosie, supra note 12, at 34-35 (compared to the self-determination
right, our Supreme Court uses a narrower consent principle, and litigation often
results in "paper victories" for tribes). Compare supra notes 216-17 and accompa-
nying text, with Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-26 (1994) (In-
dian self-government recognized- in a limited fashion, and subjected to restraints
in the Bill of Rights).
218. See Brietzke, Insurgents, supra note 210, at 6, 37-38, 55; Brietzke, Self-Determi-
nation, supra note 210, at 71, 79, 85, 85 n.46, 99, 107-08; id. at 121 (stating that
states are opposed to self-determination because it is long identified with the
most extreme remedies, secession and an independence from colonialism, but
there is increasing international recognition that such extreme remedies are
worse than the disease of denials of self-determination); Goldman, supra note 95,
at 192 (noting that a new Draft Declaration on Self-Determination reflects the
fact that self-determination is an evolving concept, but it does not encourage for-
mation of independent states (citing Howard R. Berman)); John Whitesides, Tri-
bal Leaders Argue to Retain Immunity, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1998, at A13 ("[We
will fight for] our right to self-determination... and no one can restrict it." (quot-
ing Phillip Martin, Chief of the Mississippi Choctaws)). But see Egan, supra note
70, at 22 ("Something is dead wrong when a small group of people can ignore the
will of 90 percent of our state." (quoting Utah Rep. Cook)); id. (doubting that par-
allel nations will work because they are "a hodgepodge of economically and per-
haps politically inviable states whose role ... is glaringly undefined in the U.S.
Constitution" (quoting Fergus Bordewich)). Self-determination can and is being
made more concrete through customary international law. See infra notes 220-26
and accompanying text.
219. See Covenant, supra note 216, at art. 27 ("In those states in which ethnic, reli-
gious or linguistic minorities exist, [they] ... shall not be denied the right, in
community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to pro-
fess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language."); Russell Tri-
bunal, supra note 175, at § IV, at 43 ("The Indian Peoples of the Americas must
be recognized according to their own understanding of themselves, rather than
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some tribal purposes-especially asserting control over land use, to
run a casino for example-if the legal routes to a more expansive self-
determination seem blocked.
The customary international legal means by which self-determina-
tion and minority rights are made more concrete and enforceable are
unfamiliar to many American domestic lawyers. United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly Declarations of 1960 and 1970,220 International Labour
Organization Conventions,221 and the Draft Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples 222 have proved quite influential, as have nu-
being defined by the perception of the value-systems of alien dominant socie-
ties."); Cobo, Volume V, supra note 210, at 28 374 (describing their "right to
continue to exist, to defend their lands, to keep and to transmit their culture,
their language, their social and legal institutions . . . and their way of life");
Brietzke, Self-Determination, supra note 210, at 123-24 (noting that for indige-
nous peoples, "communal land rights often have a spiritual quality essential to a
sense of identity, social stability, self-management, and the protection of sacred
sites," but it is unlikely that there will be sovereignty over enough land to be self-
sufficient under traditional modes of production); id. at 125 (describing minority
rights as individualistic protections, special measures like the affirmative action
that are increasingly disdained in the United States); Mohawk, supra note 57, at
499 (discussing Indians' demands for "redistribution of access to rights within
American society"). We see these demands as encompassed by minority rights
concepts. Minority rights under international law may offer bases for autonomy
less infirm than constitutional protections. Compare Covenant, supra note 216,
at art 27, with Board ofEduc. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (indicating that the
First Amendment offers insufficient protection for community autonomy of a mi-
nority group).
220. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples, adopted Dec. 14, 1960, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No.
16, U.N. Doc. A/14684, put self-determination at center stage and shook up inter-
national relations. See Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES 2625 (XXV)
24 Oct. 1970 (noting that states have duties to represent everyone "without dis-
tinction as to race, creed or colour" and to "respect" self-determination, in pursuit
of which "peoples are entitled to seek and receive support in accordance with the
purposes ... of the Charter"); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra
note 187; Brietzke, Self-Determination, supra note 210, at 86-87.
221. The ILO's Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, No. 107 of 1957, was
ineffective and assimilationist, and indigenous peoples' pressure led to the pro-
mulgation of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, No. 169 of 1989. It
enables indigenous peoples "to maintain their ways of life without forced assimi-
lation, protects them from discrimination, cultural and religious oppression, and
mandates environmental and social impact statements for development to begin
on their lands." Ingrid Washinawatok, Internal Emergence: Twenty Years at the
United Nations, NATIVE AMERicAs-AKwE-KoN's J. INDIGENOUS ISSUES 13, at 17,
available in 1997 WL 15895063; see Goldman, supra note 95, at 199, 201.
222. The Declaration was drafted by the Working Group on Indigenous Populations in
1993, and indigenous delegates walked out of a 1996 joint drafting session with
the United Nations Human Rights Commission to show their concern that the
final Declaration would not adequately reflect the indigenous populations' partic-
ipation. See Washinawatok, supra note 221, at 19-20. The United States has not
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merous conference declarations 223 and statements of international
"process" values: promoting equity and fairness, cooperation, consulta-
tion, education, and the sharing of information.224 Despite sporadic
opposition from the United States Government, this custom becomes a
kind of law in a surprisingly short time. It stabilizes expectations and
reduces transaction costs, through a "natural law" which seems incon-
sistent with an amoral Coase Theorem. Customary international law
thus legitimates and delegitimates particular actions for the many
countries keen to improve their standing in the law and politics of an
increasingly interdependent world. The United States is extremely
sensitive to international legal criticisms of its dealings with Indians,
and even insensitive regimes like those in Burma and Nigeria can be
made to feel the force of law over their human rights performances.225
The role of this customary international law in the United States is
rather uncertain, but it should at least serve to educate judges and
provide a useful interpretive gloss for statutes like the IGRA.226
formally objected to this Declaration, which is said to be consistent with domestic
self-determination policies, but the United States reportedly works behind the
scenes to soften the Declaration. See Rosen, supra note 107, at 243.
223. The excellent article by Washinawatok, supra note 221, at 13-19, documents the
1977 International NGO Conference on the Discrimination Against the Indians of
the Americas; the evolution of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations,
supported by the United Nations beginning in 1982; the 1981-84 activities of the
United Nations Subcommittee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities, including the commissioning of CoBo; the International NGO
Conference on Indigenous People and the Land; the indigenous presence at the
1992 Earth Summit; and the 1993 International Year of the World's Indigenous
Peoples. See also Russell Tribunal, supra note 175.
224. See Brietzke, Insurgents, supra note 210, at 12; see also THozNs FRANcx, FAIR-
NESS IN INTERNATONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 47-80 (1995) (describing how inter-
national law promotes justice and fairness through equitable principles);
Brietzke, Insurgents, supra note 210, at 14 (stating that these values illustrate an
evolution away from positivist glosses on, and top-heavy doctrinal approaches to,
narrow international law topics, and toward law as a means of social control);
Croley, supra note 10, at 142 ("[Pirocess rules do not seem very well designed to
facilitate regulatory rent-seeking by special interest groups.").
225. See Aceves, supra note 117, at 256, 259; Paul H. Brietzke, Consorting with the
Chameleon, or Realizing the Right to Development, 15 CAL. W. IhgL L.J. 560, 595-
96 (1985) [hereinafter Brietzke, Chameleon] (stating that perceptions have huge
effects on international law and politics, and these can be changed over time
through education); Brietzke, Insurgents, supra note 210, at 27 (describing the
process by which many non-binding declarations and platitudes become law after
a time); id. at 36-37 (stating that customary human rights law is a strong, new
natural law that horrifies legal positivists); Rosen, supra note 107, at 232 (noting
that many countries find it in their interests to observe customary international
law, to preserve and improve international links and reputations); Trimble, supra
note 210, at 1945 (stating that the United States is particularly sensitive to inter-
national criticisms that are backed by domestic constituencies).
226. Compare Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. Rav. 815
(1997) (describing customary international law as being on a par with United
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Another barrier to the recognition of the right to self-determination
(or to development) is jurisprudential, especially in the United States.
The methodological liberalism of our law is so inherently individualis-
tic that it is all but impossible to imagine the collective rights of a
group as a group. Just as a corporation can be dealt with only through
the legal fiction that it is a "person," so the Seminole Tribe is treated
as a private individual.227 This undermines the Tribe's constitutive
and self-constitutive capacities, and overstates the extent to which the
federal government is a proper master in its own house. But interna-
tional law can function as an avant gardisme, by putting the pressure
of moral authority and international public opinion on laggards like
the United States, to acknowledge the victimization of indigenous peo-
ples and the entitlements that flow from this victimization. 22 8 Devel-
opment is one such entitlement, an explicit part of the right to self-
determination; tribal self-government has little meaning without a
self-sufficiency. It is difficult to maintain a cultural integrity in the
face of poverty, alcoholism, and malnutrition. Native Americans have
States statutes; the most recent in time prevails and binds the President), with
Michael J. Glennon, Process Versus Policy in Foreign Relations: Foreign Affairs
and the U.S. Constitution, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1542, 1551-52 (1997) (arguing that
Bradley and Goldsmith misread some caselaw, and there is no single modern po-
sition), and Trimble, supra note 210, at 1959 (noting that customary interna-
tional law is not in accord with American notions of a popular sovereignty).
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) adopts the arch-traditional view of custom-
ary international law as longstanding and of virtually consistent recognition.
The Court more recently rejected an established rule of customary international
law-kidnapping a criminal suspect in a foreign country is prohibited. See
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 666-68 (1992). Recognition of
the rapidly developing "new custom" of the insurgents is merely a recognition of
new power relations, the reality of new communications technologies, and the
rush of events in an increasingly interdependent world. See Brietzke, Insurgents,
supra note 210, at 30, 32 ("[A] sophisticated cynicism provides not so much a
penetrating insight . . . , but merely a refusal to investigate . . . ." (quoting
Amartya, Sen.)); Rosen, supra note 107, at 231 (noting the American "hypocrisy"
in refusing to ratify many international conventions that would convert a custom-
ary international law into a firmer treaty law); id. at 248 (discussing the problem
of appropriate fora for resolving indigenous peoples' disputes).
227. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100 (1996); Brietzke, Insurgents,
supra note 210, at 54-55; Brietzke, Self-Determination, supra note 210, at 88, 90-
93; see also Rosen, supra note 107, at 227 (claiming that "Americans genuinely
seem perplexed by the issue of group rights," and favor a utilitarian nationhood
defined in terms of individual rights "without relinquishing their romance of com-
munity"); id. at 242 (describing American philosophical biases in favor of both the
individual and the state).
228. See Brietzke, Insurgents, supra note 210, at 38, 41, 45; Brietzke, Self-Determina-
tion, supra note 210, at 79, 96; Croley, supra note 10, at 159; Goldman, supra
note 95, at 198; see also Cobo, Volume V, supra note 210, at 23, 1309 (stating that
"continuous reciprocal involvement" of the relevant agencies and indigenous
groups would be worthwhile); Brietzke, Chameleon, supra note 225, at 595-96;
Brietzke, Insurgents, supra note 210, at 45 (describing distinctions between inter-
national and domestic laws as increasingly irrelevant).
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a "firm... commitment to the reservation as the centerpiece of Indian
life,"2 29 in a "promodern traditionalism" which seeks "an improved
standard of living as measured by quality of life... [and] maximum
powers of self-government."23 0
Beginning in the 1950s, Gunnar Myrdal, Raul Prebisch, and others
showed that an article of faith in the Coase Theorem and neoclassical
economics generally-everyone gains from trade-lacks empirical
support and frequently adds to the misery of the poor and powerless.
A major reason for the slow erosion of the tribes' Coasian (or
Cabazonian) bargaining power over casinos is the history of past "bar-
gains" with Anglos. That history, which includes broken treaties,
forced relocations, various economic exploitations, and destitution,
has left the tribes without many of the material means-ownership
over assets and the authority to mobilize them-and the psychological
preconditions to bargain effectively.2 3 1 As Oliver Williamson puts it,
"[capitalism is prone to undervalue dignity and.., institutional safe-
guards can sometimes be forged" that incorporate the lawyers' "digni-
tary values."23 2 This is what the federal trust obligation to the tribes
so conspicuously failed to attain, and what a right to development 2 33
could now achieve.
229. FRANK PommuasHEmi, BRAm op FEATIRs 7 (1995), quoted in Rand & Light,
supra note 59, at 394-95.
230. Rand & Light, supra note 59, at 394-95 (quoting Donald Fixico, and Cornell &
Kalt respectively); see Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 111, at 113; Kolkema, supra
note 101, at 366-67.
231. See Brietzke, Insurgents, supra note 210, at 8-9. Compare supra notes 93-94 and
accompanying text, with Cobo, Volume V, supra note 210, at 1 f("In many coun-
tries [indigenous peoples] were at the bottom of the socio-economic scale. They
did not have the same opportunities for employment and the same access as other
groups to public services and/or protection in the fields of health, living condi-
tions, culture, religion and the administration of justice."); see also Mohawk,
supra note 57, at 495 (noting that prior to civil rights-linked protests in 1968,
"Indians had practically no real power of ownership over their assets and no au-
thority or ability to mobilize capital and labor"); Snipp, supra note 67, at 3 (stat-
ing that in a history of Indian law and economic underdevelopment, "political
domination is translated into economic exploitation").
232. WnLUAmsoN, supra note 10, at 271,405; see Cobo, Volume V, supra note 210, at 1
f, Snipp, supra note 67, at 2-19 (tracing history of Indian underdevelopment as
that of captive nations and internal colonies, and documenting shortcomings of
non-casino development opportunities-the timber, mineral, and water resources
most reservations lack); see also Brietzke, Urban, supra note 94, at 755 (stating
that "R[there must be losers as well as winners in the zero-sum game," the Social
Darwinism, "of neoclassical microeconomics that Chicagoans play"); id. at 756
(noting that more charitable Chicagoans assume the poor face different but un-
specified constraints that usually get lost in the analytical shuffle); id. at 757-58
(stating that the poor face market surrogates, designed for survival rather than
wealth maximization); id. at 760 (considering and modifying notions of the "cul-
ture of poverty"); id. at 763-67 (discussing poverty as a market failure).
233. The most widely-quoted definition of the right to development comes from the
United Nations Secretary General:
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The partly-collective nature of this right, and its calls for the broad
enhancement of life's possibilities and for equitable redistribution of
resources at the international and domestic levels, have made it un-
popular with some governments of affluent countries like the United
States. Nevertheless, Jesse Jackson argues that development (not
charity) should begin at home, if for no other reason than our influ-
ence and control is greatest there.23 4 In this vein, a development
strategy based on casinos is very weak, but it is also the best strategy
most tribes have. Gaming spawns social costs, many of which the
tribe will have to bear as best it can; it is inconsistent with many In-
dian religious or other values, and it often forments intra- and inter-
tribal disputes; and it does not offer a stable base for other economic
activities, given a growing saturation of gaming markets and a ten-
dency to move in "boom and bust" cycles. But there is frequently no
alternative to gaming for ameliorating misery on the reservations, for
generating jobs and tribal government revenues, and for reacquiring
traditional lands. Most tribes lack the mineral, timber, and water re-
sources, or the industrial or waste disposal facilities that cause more
(i) The realization of the potentialities of the human person in har-
mony with the community should be seen as the central purpose of
development.
(ii) The human person should be seen as the subject and not the object
of the development process; ...
(iv) Respect for human rights is fundamental to the development
process,
(v) The human person must be able to participate fully in shaping his
own reality....
(vii) [A] degree of individual and collective self-reliance must be an inte-
gral part of the process.
The International Dimensions of the Right to Development as a Human Right in
Relation With Other Human Rights Based on International Cooperation, Includ-
ing the Right to Peace, Taking into Account the Requirements of the New Interna-
tional Economic Order and Fundamental Human Needs, Report by the Secretary-
General, U.N. EscoR, 4th Comm'n at I 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1334 (1979). In the
Secretary-General's Report, the right to development is explained as rising from:
(1) the international duty of solidarity; (2) the moral duty of reparation for colo-
nial and neo-colonial exploitation; (3) an increased moral and economic interde-
pendence; and (4) world peace. See Jack Donnelly, The "Right to Development:
How Note to Link Human Rights and Development, in HumAN RIGHTS AND DEVEL-
oPMENr IN AFRICA 261, 262 (C. Welch & R. Meltzer eds., 1984) (citing The Inter-
national Dimensions of the Right to Development, supra, $$ 42, 54, 47-48, 50-51).
Development forms part of the customary international law, but the United
States has never accepted treaty obligations concerning it-other than Article 1
of the Political Covenant.
234. See Jesse Jackson, Measuring Human Rights and Development by One Yardstick,
15 CAL. W. Ir'L L.J. 453 (1985); see also Brietzke, Chameleon, supra note 225, at
566 (discussing the right to development as defined to bolster critiques of the
ways resources are distributed, and to empower the poor to organize for their own
protection); Brietzke, Insurgents, supra note 210, at 55 (describing development
as a collective right correlating with self-determination, just as personal success
correlates with self-realization).
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environmental degradation than do casinos. Off-reservation gambling
is frequently the only revenue source for geographically isolated
tribes, but gaming must not be confused with what really matters to a
tribe-sovereignty.2 35
A heavy reliance on gambling is emblematic of the paucity of devel-
opment opportunities for poor and powerless groups in America, tribes
and ghetto residents for example. Atlantic City is a prominent model
to be avoided. 23 6 Indian gaming revenues often do little more than
replace federal transfer payments, but tribes have a greater freedom
of allocation and a pride in increased self-reliance. Corporations that
dominate Las Vegas and Atlantic City gambling increasingly invest in
and manage tribal operations, often in ways that are not to the tribes'
advantage. Legal uncertainty creates an unstable environment for in-
vesting in tribal casinos, and a growing market saturation means that
235. See 141 CONG. REC. S10912 (daily ed. July 31, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simon);
GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 19; Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 111, at 112;
Kolkema, supra note 101, at 369; Rand & Light, supra note 59, at 383; Snipp,
supra note 67, at 4-19; Tsosie, supra note 12, at 79; see also Anders, supra note 2,
at 241 (describing the close connection between financial independence and polit-
ical sovereignty-the "ability to fund independent development projects helps re-
duce the controlling influence of the federal government"); Friedman, supra note
89, at 622 (arguing that the use of gaming as a "growth pole" is justified but "the
social cost of crime may be high enough to outweigh the economic gain," and dif-
ferent persons may realize different benefits and costs); Kelly, supra note 100, at
226 ("[Ilndian gaming is by far one of the most successful economic development
ventures ... for tribes today." (quoting Eddie F. Brown)); Kindt, National, supra
note 23, at 568 ("Legalized gambling-as a strategy for economic development-
was thoroughly discredited."); Mohawk, supra note 57, at 502 ("Doing nothing,
increasingly is not a choice at all, and culturally is a choice toward extinction.");
Snipp, supra note 67, at 4 (stating that poverty and economic dependence leave
tribes with few alternatives to gambling); id. at 12 (noting that only 15% of tribes
had sufficient resources to merit membership in the Council of Energy Resource
Tribes); id at 18 ("[Elnergy resources are not going to be the economic salvation
of Indian people."); Tsosie, supra note 12, at 80 (stating that cultural survival
depends on a rich notion of self-determination, and the finances to carry it out).
William Claiborne, Tribes' Big Step: From Casinos to Conglomerates, WAsH.
PosT, Aug. 14, 1998, at Al, illustrates developmental possibilities. "A new gener-
ation of Native American entrepreneurs ... regards gambling not as a bonanza,
but as a means to an end ... land ownership and business enterprises, from
industrial parks to golf courses .... " Id. The 1500 member Coeur d'Alene of
Idaho receive only $1000 each, in annual dividends; the balance is invested in
businesses, conventional loan housing, education, law enforcement, elder care,
cultural programs and land purchases. See id. The largest employer in the area,
the Coeur d'Alene annually contribute $30 million to the areas Anglo economy.
See id. Their hospital and Wellness Center are models for rural healthcare, and
they have filed suit against miners who pollute the local watershed. See id. Simi-
lar stories can be told about the Mississippi Choctaws, the Nevada Paiute, the
Arizona Maricopas and Pimas, and the ecotourism business of Pacific Northwest
tribes. See id.
236. See GOODNMN, supra note 2, at 14; Snipp, supra note 67, at 10; supra note 89 and
accompanying text.
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the tribes' window of opportunity is quite small, for generating the
cash flows to fund other economic opportunities. This window may be
open for only three to five years, so that none of the wastage of rents
seen in the Arab oil states can be tolerated by Indians. While the suc-
cess of a casino frequently dispels the myth that Indians cannot be
entrepreneurial, an inexperienced and perhaps self-seeking tribal
management can frustrate limited development opportunities. If a
tribal government lacks legitimacy or is poorly institutionalized, it
will be unable to cope with inevitable conflicts over allocations of gam-
ing revenues. On the other hand, part of these revenues can be used
to fund political development to give them the ability to deal creatively
with tribal members' demands. This would lead to the enhanced sta-
bility, solidarity, and protection of sacred sites that are hallmarks of a
self-determination. 23 7
237. See GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 167-68; Brietzke, Self-Determination, supra note
210, at 123; Green, supra note 127, at 155; Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 111, at
104 (citing Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt); Rand & Light, supra note 59, at
435; see also Brietzke, Insurgents, supra note 210, at 47 (discussing the danger
that ineffective insurgent groups will get a "bone" thrown to them just often
enough to keep them playing the game); Deller & Chen, supra note 45, at 249-50
(stating that many tribes think about life "after the casino"-market saturation,
the novelty wearing off, and changes in federal or state laws); Goldberg-Ambrose,
supra note 111, at 114 (noting that gambling can foster cultural development);
Levin, Betting, supra note 1, at 26 (quoting Louise Erdich); Mohawk, supra note
57, at 499 (stating that tribal economic activities include electronics manufactur-
ing by the Oklahoma Cherokee, fish canneries by Northwest Alaska tribes, writ-
ing instruments by the Montana Blackfeet, industrial parks by Wisconsin
Oneidas and Arizona Gilas, a sawmill and large resort by the Oregon Warm
Springs, auto wire harnesses by the Mississippi Choctaw, and diversified busi-
nesses by the Mescalero and White Mountain Apache and the Conchiti Pueblo);
id. at 502 (describing reservation options for economic growth and economic plu-
ralism as limited); Nagel et al., supra note 93, at 39 (noting that reservation de-
velopment involves "an interesting set of paradoxes"); id. at 47 (describing the
dangers of tribal factionalism-"of kin and clan, of politics and ideology, of reli-
gion and philosophy"); Taylor, supra note 103, at 270-71 (discussing tribal taxa-
tion of gaming as a means of creating a permanent fund through transitory
revenues); William Claiborne, Protecting Sacred Ground, WASH. PosT, May 12,
1998, at A12 (stating that Quechon Tribe and environmentalists opposed a pro-
posed gold mine on federal lands that would destroy a sacred site); id. ("Just be-
cause our people did not build a giant cathedral like the Europeans doesn't mean
the land isn't just as important to our religion."); Egan, supra note 70, at 22
("We're using that tribal sovereignty to attract the only business you can get to
come here" - nuclear waste storage); Fromson, supra note 105 (stating that the
Mashantucket Pequot casino is so profitable in part because the tribe hires ex-
perts but retains overall control); id. ("We want our people to become managers
instead of staying home on glorified welfare checks."); Tom Kenworthy, Tiny
Tribe Clicks on Gray Area Looking for Green in Web-Based Lottey, WASH. POST,
Feb. 10, 1998, at A5 (stating that Coeur d'Alene's Internet lottery funds educa-
tion, elder care, infrastructure, and buying land the Tribe feels was improperly
taken away); Lardner, supra note 99, at A21 (discussing Minnesota State and
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VI. SOVEREIGN DILEMMAS
The international dimensions of tribal casinos make clear the nec-
essary interdependence of self-determination (or weaker minority
rights), opportunities for development, and an effective sovereignty.
For Native Americans, international human rights serve as vehicles
for education and a pragmatic lawyering, and as benchmarks for tri-
bal membership and participation, the tribes' effective relations with
others, and ultimately the survival of individuals and the group.
Human rights offer a potent critique of the Coasian games described
earlier:238 just enough benefits are accorded tribes to keep them play-
ing the games, and the resulting inequality gains legitimacy from an
air of legal fairness. These international dimensions also offer many
of the means for shifting Coasian games away from the expensive
gridlock that currently exists over tribal casinos, by demonstrating
that the problem in law is the same as it is in economics: confusion
over sovereignty, as in the oxymoronic characterization of tribes as
sovereign wards. Hefty Coasian bribes are necessary but not suffi-
cient under the current scheme; the balance of sovereignty among the
players determines how and by whom property rights to run a casino
get defined, and much of how the rents get distributed.239
Tribes remain in the middle of perennial sovereignty (power)
struggles among the feds, the states, and non-Indian casinos, strug-
gles for the command-and-control over assets that furthers political
and even economic ("state capitalism") development. The legal insti-
tutions deployed-those of the IGRA, or Glass-Steagall or Robinson-
Patman in other areas-are allocatively inefficient in a neoclassical
economics, but they regulate conflicting preferences in politically ac-
local opposition to a tribe using casino revenues for acquiring a 600 acre subur-
ban plot, for a tax-exempt shopping center, light industry, and tribal housing).
238. See Brietzke, Insurgents, supra note 210, at 49-50; see also EDWARD LAzARus,
CLOSED CHAIMERS 143 (1998) ("[The time has come] to get out of the shadow of
states' rights and walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human rights."
(quoting Minneapolis Mayor Hubert Humphrey)); SoUTm CoAU'N, CHALLNGE TO
= Sour 1-2 (1990) (stating that absent development, Third World economies
are "weak and defenseless" and "lack... a functional sovereignty"); Egan, supra
note 70, at 22 (noting "a convergence of economic strength, legal muscle and polit-
ical will" in the current "civil rights movement for Native Americans"); Goldman,
supra note 95, at 198 (discussing "the quest at the global level for an adequate
normative acknowledgement of the victimization of indigenous peoples, and the
entitlements drawn from that victimization" (quoting Richard A. Falk)).
239. See Tsosie, supra note 12, at 86-87; see also GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 161; An-
ders, supra note 2, at 241 (noting a "close connection between inancial indepen-
dence and political sovereignty"); Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 111, at 101
(stating that the greater the effective sovereignty, the greater the gains from de-
velopment); id. at 101-02 (noting that the cultural advantage of sovereignty is to
fashion a distinctive way of life, as a channel for activities); Mohawk, supra note
57, at 495.
1999] 333
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ceptable, command-and-control ways-even as the players constantly
push to change the institutions. There is an obvious connection be-
tween wealth and power-the capacity to exercise power being an ef-
fective sovereignty, but there is no one-for-one correspondence
between these outcomes. Sovereignty includes the uncompetitive abil-
ity to alter markets, by curbing failures and/or creating new ones, for
example, and thus to alter the market outcomes that neoclassical
economists use to measure a wealth maximization. Change the rights
and you change the transaction costs and who bears them, thereby
changing what counts: as an efficient solution, as Coase's wealth max-
imization, and as an effective sovereignty. Perhaps these changes in-
corporate a public interest, in the distribution of wealth and
developmental opportunities for example; perhaps special interest
groups derogate from the sovereignty of (relatively-underdeveloped)
governments and acquire a measure of their own sovereignty by brib-
ing for favorable outcomes; and perhaps a federal free-ridership over
regulating Indian casinos is a self-derogation from sovereignty and
political development.2 40 Sovereignty arguably winds up as the tail
that wags the Coasian dog.
The courts loom large in the law and economics of sovereignty, a
subject even more confused and confusing than the property right to
run a tribal casino. Chief Justice Marshall inaugurated this confusion
in Cherokee Nation, when he characterized tribes both as "states,"
fully able to govern and manage their affairs, and as "domestic depen-
dent nations."24 1 Chief Justice Taney exploited this confusion in Rod-
gers when, citing no authority, he rejected the notions that tribes were
independent nations and owners of their own territories. 2 42 This
240. See Kalish, supra note 93, at 1370; see also ALcHiAN & ALLEN, supra note 19, at
91 (stating that the law worries about, and people sue over, "who gets the entitle-
ment," which has nothing to do with the economists' utilization of resources to
create wealth); Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 111, at 108 (arguing that Indian
gaming enhances sovereignty, to the extent that revenues are used to bargain
with other governments for its protection through a politics of principle, rather
than behaving as just another interest group); Levin, Betting, supra note 1, at
125 (stating that against a backdrop of violent struggles for sovereignty, gam-
bling means that "the issue of Native American sovereignty is changing from an
obscure and esoteric topic to one with a new and concrete immediacy"); Mohawk,
supra note 57, at 499 (noting that the political power to control the land evolves
into economic power, contra American policymakers' assumption of failures due
to "backward" cultures); Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 229, 239-
41 (1998); Rosen, supra note 107, at 258 ("[W]ithout the concurrence of those non-
native peoples who hold most power, little will be expected to change.").
241. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 12, 16-18 (1831).
242. See United States v. Rodgers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846); see also United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886) (recognizing Indians' "possessory
right" in land that cannot be sold or transferred without federal consent); id. at
383-84 (stating "[t]hese Indian tribes are the wards of the nation" and dependent
on the federal government for food and political rights); Comment, Toward Con-
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sanctioned a pattern of federal intrusion into Indian autonomy,
through plenary-absolute and unqualified-federal powers that are
inconsistent with even a modest degree of tribal sovereignty. For ex-
ample, the General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887 divided (commu-
nal) tribal lands into the individual parcels that facilitated non-Indian
settlements and severely disrupted tribal ways of liffe.2 43 The Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 was predicated on tribal self-government
being within the grace and favor of the feds, rather than an inherent
aspect of tribal sovereignty.244 In the 1950s, termination policies
sought to end this self-government, as well as terminate federal trans-
fer payments and sell off tribal lands, in an attempt to assimilate Indi-
ans into Anglo society.24 5
Since the late 1960s, federal policies have been based on a tribal
self-determination that continues to be based on federal plenary pow-
ers. For example, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 again recognizes
tribal self-government, but under constraints found in the Bill of
Rights.246 In 1978 and 1987, the Court held that this tribal self-gov-
ernment could be altered, limited or dissolved under the plenary pow-
ers of Congress. 24 7 As we have seen, the IGRA defines the legitimate
interests of the states, and the extent to which tribal sovereignty is
sent and Cooperation: Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507, 524 (1987) [hereinafter Toward Consent] (discussing
Taney's reinterpretation); Kalish, supra note 93, at 1351-52 (stating that as in
Kagama, the Court upholds almost all congressional legislation concerning
tribes, and applies the political question doctrine).
243. Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341-342, 349, 381); see BLAcies LAw DicroNARY
1154 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "plenary" as "[flull, entire, complete, absolute, per-
fect, and unqualified"); Toward Consent, supra note 242, at 530 (finding commu-
nal tribal lands decreased from 140 million acres in 1887 to 50 million acres in
the 1930s).
244. See Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461 to 479 (1994)); Toward Consent, supra note 242, at 531-32.
245. See H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953) (enacted), repealed by 25
U.S.C. § 2502 (1988); Toward Consent, supra note 242, at 533. This policy state-
ment (rather than law) also destroyed Indian art and sacred sites, prohibited the
speaking of Indian languages, separated children from their families in Bureau of
Indian Affairs schools, and terminated 109 nations or elements of nations. See
Ward Churchill & Glenn T. Morris, Key Indian Laws and Cases, in THE STATE OF
NATIVE A_ imIC: GENOCIDE, CoLoNiZArioN AND RESISTANCE 13, 14-15 (M. An-
nette Jones ed., 1992).
246. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1326 (1994); see also Toward Consent, supra note 242, at
535 (discussing self-determination under federal plenary powers).
247. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. La Plante, 480 U. S. 9, 18 (1987) (quoting Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978)); Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs.
Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998) (stating that in Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991), "we distinguished state sovereign immunity from
tribal sovereign immunity, as tribes were not at the Constitutional Convention"
and thus "not parties to the 'mutuality of ... concession'"); id. at 759 ("Like
foreign sovereign immunity, tribal immunity is a matter of federal law.").
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balanced against, and often subordinated to, state interests. 248 Cer-
tain applications of state law to the tribes have also been upheld by
the Court, in an apparent misreading of Worcester.249 As in Seminole
and its aftermath, 250 such Court-sponsored erosions of tribal sover-
eignty foster an ad hoc approach to disputes concerning tribes: stat-
utes are interpreted strictly or liberally, depending on the outcome the
Court desires. 25 '
A claim by the Cabazon court should thus be treated skeptically:
"The Court has consistently recognized that Indian tribes retain 'at-
tributes of sovereignty over both their members and their ter-
ritor[ies],' . . . and that 'tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and
subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States'... .252
Despite much rhetoric and some appearances to the contrary, tribes
are almost exactly like local governments under our law. As creatures
of their respective states, local governments lack inherent power and
248. See supra notes 143-45, 158-61, 172-73 and accompanying text; see also Tsosie,
supra note 12, at 55 (noting that the IGRA must still be reconciled with a contem-
porary federalism, preserving "the respective sovereignty of each entity, while
still promoting the unity of the nation as a whole"); id. at 65 (stating that the
IGRA does not limit state sovereignty, since a state has no jurisdiction over tribal
gaming except as the statute authorizes); id. at 81 (arguing that one of the great-
est injuries of the IGRA is that it makes tribal sovereignty negotiable, in an
abridgement of federal trust obligations); id. at 89 ("[The IGRA] appears to imple-
ment the balancing test ... to determine the appropriateness of state regulation
on the reservation.").
249. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959) (upholding the application of state
law to Indians, in the absence of a governing federal statute); see Tsosie, supra
note 12, at 89. The Williams "infiingement" test is a departure from Worcester
which held that state law cannot be applied because of its harmful effect on tribal
sovereignty. But see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (stating that
the Indian Commerce Clause divested states "of virtually all authority over In-
dian commerce and Indian tribes"); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 138 (1980) (utilizing a balancing test to invalidate state taxation of non-
Indian businesses on reservations).
250. See supra notes 174-201 and accompanying text; see also Monaghan, supra note
178, at 103 (stating that although Seminole inflates the rhetoric of "inherent
state sovereignty," state accountability in federal court for violations of federal
law is "left firmly in place"); id. at 116 (noting that the Seminole Court failed to
treat the tribe as sovereign, and the suit as one of "sovereigns v. sovereigns").
251. See Kalish, supra note 93, at 1351-52; see also Toward Consent, supra note 242,
at 565 (discussing Court's failure to articulate the scope of preemption analysis
concerning tribes).
252. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987); id. at
213 (stating that because an exercise of federal authority is in question, there is
"no danger of state encroachment on Indian tribal sovereignty"); id. at 216 (not-
ing that a balancing of federal and tribal interests is reflected in federal law); id.
at 221 (stating that state regulation to prevent infiltration of organized crime
would "impermissibly infringe on tribal government"). But see United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (stating that by treaty and exercise of congres-
sional "plenary control," tribes are "necessarily divested ... of some aspects of
sovereignty they had previously exercised").
[Vol. 78:263
NATIVE AMERICAN CASINOS
sovereignty; their existence, form, powers, and property are generally
subject to ongoing state control. 253 Tribes are similarly subject to a
plenary power and control in law: as Stephanie Levin puts it, "tribes
are entirely subordinate to the federal government's power to regulate
them at wi11."254 Confusions over tribal sovereignty among well-
meaning commentators persist nonetheless, 2 55 and Indians frequently
express anger, resignation, and pragmatism.2 56
253. See 2 EUGENE McQunIAN, THE LAw op MuNicaAL CORPORATIONS, §§ 4.01 to .132
(3d rev. ed. 1979).
254. Levin, Environment, supra note 98, at 171; see Cobo, Volume V, supra note 210,
at 5, (128; Nagel et al., supra note 93, at 47 ("[IThe rhetoric of tribal self-determi-
nation might just as well ... mask the decline of federal trust responsibilities as
to advertise the dawn of a new age of tribal independence." (quoting Jean Guil-
lermin)); Monaghan, supra note 178, at 116; id. at 118 (stating that the Seminole
Court sweeps "away arguments based on the special nature of Indian tribes");
Rand & Light, supra note 59, at 393 (discussing a rhetoric of tribal sovereignty
and self-determination "preoccupied with appearances" (quoting Russell Barsh));
Rosen, supra note 107, at 258; Snipp, supra note 67, at 3; Tsosie, supra note 12,
at 81.
255. See Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs. Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998) ("In our
interdependent and mobile society,... tribal immunity extends beyond what is
needed to safeguard tribal self-governance"-especially "in the Nation's com-
merce'--and this immunity may thus have to be abrogated); Green, supra note
127, at 149 ("[Tribes are] semi-independent..., not as possessed of the full attrib-
utes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their
internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the
Union or of the state within whose limits they resided."); Kelly, supra note 100, at
218 (describing the Commission as a "delicate balancing mechanism" among sov-
ereignties of tribes, states, and other parts of the federal government (quoting
Tony Hope)); Olson, supra note 140, at 78 ("While the degree of tribal sovereignty
has been subjected to varying legal interpretations and... degrees of recognition
and defense, it still forms the basis of an understanding of Native American polit-
ical status."); Rand & Light, supra note 59, at 386 (discussing tribes' current "lim-
ited sovereignty," governed by federal plenary powers and trust responsibilities);
Taylor, supra note 103, at 251 (describing the necessarily complex accounting for
federal, state, and tribal sovereignties within a technically confusing tax law);
Tsosie, supra note 12, at 53 ("[Tiribal sovereignty is a contemporary reality
within American federalism, although there are many different interpretations of
its nature, scope, and limitations."); id. at 63 (stating that the IGRA recognizes
that the "sovereign spheres" of tribe and state overlap, in a "federative union");
see also S. REP. No. 100-446, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C-A.N. 3071
3075 ("[Bly virtue of their original tribal sovereignty, tribes reserved certain
rights ... and.., today, tribal governments retain all rights that were not ex-
pressly relinquished.").
256. See QOODA.N, supra note 2, at 161 (quoting a former Cherokee Chief, who de-
scribes tribal gaming as a 'Trojan horse" for extending non-Indian gaming);
Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 111, at 98-99 (describing Indians' separation from
the past and abandonment of old stories, values, and practices-especially those
of sharing rather than adopting marketplace values (citing Louise Erdrich)); Hil-
lerman, supra note 81 (stating that for "tribal traditionalists, the sovereignty is-
sue looks foolish" because nobody has sovereignty); id. ("[S]overeignty often
involves more than how to save what they have from the whites who yearn for
it."); Levin, Betting, supra note 1, at 132 (stating that the IGRA met with Indian
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In the Coasian games described earlier,257 the tribes are really mi-
nor players, like local governments or the international human rights
community: capable of influencing the course of play, but lacking in
the power-sovereignty and the related control over assets-needed
to win the game regularly or even to engage in arms-length bargain-
ing on a reasonably even footing. This legal debility appears to violate
international law,2 58 and international law indicates the direction re-
forms should take. In the United States, sovereignty reposes in the
people, who cede it to governments under restrictions imposed by
state and federal constitutions. Tribes lose out in this conceptual
scheme because they were excluded from the mutuality of concession
that occurred at the founding of the Republic,259 and because they are
otherwise deemed unqualified under ethnocentric theories of a govern-
mental legitimacy. This sovereign power is seen to be absolute and
indivisible, a right to control the actions of others subject only to con-
stitutional constraints. 2 60
In other words, American notions of sovereignty echo those prevail-
ing in international law prior to World War II: you cannot be a little
bit sovereign, and entities like Indian tribes are entitled to little legal
claims that "they are sovereign governments that are at least co-equal to the
states"); Mohawk, supra note 57, at 496 (objecting to BIA as "realtor, banker,
teacher, social worker... and also guardian, protector, and spokesman"); id. at
502 ("Indian sovereignty is being redefined according to what an Indian nation
can actually do."); Rosen, supra note 107, at 255 (stating that the "ethnocide"
arguments should distinguish "government programs aimed at the eradication of
languages or customs and those that seek to freeze native cultures in a form ac-
ceptable to the interests of government or business"); Snipp, supra note 67, at 10
(describing Indians' response to a paucity of development resources as similar to
that of many Third World countries-assertions of sovereignty); Egan, supra note
70, at 22 (describing the growth of "the civil rights movement for Native Ameri-
cans"); id. ("Over the years, we have had sovereign recognition from Spain, from
Mexico and the United States." (quoting Chair of All-Indian Pueblo Council));
George Lardner, Jr., Federal Crackdown Nears on Indian Reservations, WASH.
POST, May 11, 1998, at A9 (discussing nonviolent resistance to an FBI "invasion"
of gaming on a California reservation, and noting that gun battles and blockades
resulted from other such actions); Souder, supra note 105, at A3 (noting that a
long trail of contradictory court orders and treaties notwithstanding, the Ojibwe
"would never have knowingly relinquished rights essential to their survival");
Tsosie, supra note 12, at 28, 32 (quoting Vine Deloria Jr.'s lament for the end of
"treaty federalism" or "treaty constitutionalism," of overlapping sovereignties ac-
commodating a cultural pluralism, that creates the Indians' current negotiating
disadvantage); Walsh, Boom, supra note 13 (stating that if California Governor
Wilson's treatment of gaming tribes was applied to "the 50 states, the governors
would be up in arms, saying you can't dictate to us" (quoting Tim Wapato)).
257. See supra notes 113-203 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 216-34 and accompanying text.
259. See Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc. 523 U.S. 751, 754-55 (1998); Trim-
ble, supra note 210, at 1996.
260. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 111, at 103; Levin, Environment, supra note
98, at 169.
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respect because they are not recognized as states. Since World War II,
the proliferation of centers of international power, and the growing
international consensus over remedying denials of self-determination
and other human rights, have resulted in a (sometimes partial and
uneven) abandonment of this absolutist sovereignty, as the anchor for
international jurisprudence. There has been a similar proliferation of
centers of power in the United States, of what neoclassical economists
call organized special interest groups. Also, state and tribal sover-
eignties have been eroding since the founding of our Republic, the spo-
radic efforts of the Supreme Court notwithstanding. In the United
States and under international law, the situation now approximates
the traditional Native American view that nobody has a fully blown
sovereignty, the capacity to exclude competitors. 2 61
The relational and situational sovereignty increasingly prevalent
in international law, based on the duty to cooperate and other interna-
tional process values,2 62 contrasts sharply with the transactional sov-
ereignty tacitly assumed by Ronald Coase: the contractual, bribed-for,
winner's right to use property and to exclude others. This new sover-
eignty is a flexible basket of rights and obligations that echoes Ameri-
can legal rhetoric, if not the outcomes, over protecting different
aspects of tribal sovereignty at different times. 26 3
American sovereignty baskets could easily be repacked to recog-
nize the tribal right to run casinos, with little or no diminution of
states' sovereignty and on developmental grounds: the more distribu-
tively equitable use of rents, which are dissipating because of Coasian
bribes and the saturation of gambling markets, to fund tribal eco-
261. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 111, at 102-03; Hillerman, supra note 81 (ad-
ding that "most Indians these days are not traditionalists"); see also Brietzke,
Insurgents, supra note 210, at 12 and n.20 (describing a movement in interna-
tional law, away from the isolation and coexistence of sovereign political units
and toward pursuit of common interests); Brietzke, Self-Determination, supra
note 210, at 92-94 (stating that self-determination limits state sovereignty, but
legitimates that which it limits); id. at 103.
262. See Brietzke, Insurgents, supra note 210, at 28 (stating that cooperation and
other process values in international law limit everyone's sovereignty); Brietzke,
Self-Determination, supra note 210, at 94 (stating that such limitations aim at
order and justice); Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 111, at 103 (applying similar
analyses to Indian law); Tsosie, supra note 12, at 72 (stating that parties must
pledge to respect each other's sovereignty, since 'the rights of each party depend
to a large extent on the approval and participation of the other parties" (citing
Frank Pommersheim)).
263. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 111, at 102; see also California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207; Brietzke, Insurgents, supra note 210,
at 48, 50 (describing the implementation of particular bundles of rights in inter-
national law by allowing them to trump rival rights in particular circumstances,
to shift the balance of power and burdens of proof); Rand & Light, supra note 59,
at 437 (stating that federal laws and policies should reinforce tribal sovereignty,
rather than create unexpected subversions of it).
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nomic opportunities in admittedly limited ways.2 6 4 This reform
should be considered a deregulation: returning to a status quo ante
the IGRA, a step that would better serve the public interest in (now-
inevitable) gambling rents, and reduce the wastage of scarce resources
though rent seeking and (sometimes corrupting) Coasian bribes.265
In constitutional law, such a reconfiguration of the Commerce
Clauses and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments may sound dry and
esoteric, but tribal prosperity and perhaps survival turn on it. Semi-
nole is unlikely to prove more durable than its predecessors, 2 66 espe-
cially if the IGRA is discarded or substantially altered by Congress.
But a status quo ante which features Cabazon26 7 would continue to be
264. See Brietzke, Self-Determination, supra note 210, at 99 (arguing that "Rous-
seauian" dilemmas concerning self-determination can be resolved only by al-
lowing particular rights to trump others in particular circumstances, and
balancing only those interests that cannot be adjusted in this fashion); Croley,
supra note 10, at 60 (stating that neopluralist theories of administration stress
more robust standing rights for underpresented interest groups); Grant, supra
note 105, at 188 (noting that the IGRA gave states "a measure of control... that
the Indian Commerce Clause would clearly deny them"); Goldberg-Ambrose,
supra note 111, at 100 (claiming that gaming "must not be confused with what
really matters to the tribe'-sovereignty and fending off cultural assaults); id. at
103, 109 (stating that a relational sovereignty now means less the capacity to
exclude others than an effectiveness in negotiations, based on recognition as a
respected participant); id. at 108 (noting that gaming enhances tribal sovereignty
to the extent that revenues are used to bargain with others to protect sover-
eignty); Levin, Betting, supra note 1, at 125 (arguing that gambling is changing
Native American sovereignty "from an obscure and esoteric topic to one with a
new and concrete immediacy"); Rand & Light, supra note 59, at 417 (stating that
the IGRA "creates incentives for tribes to engage in gaming at the expense of
tribal sovereignty"); supra notes 19, 59, 83-91, 230-37 and accompanying text.
265. See Croley, supra note 10, at 69 (citing modem public interest theories which
predict that, while special interest outcomes sometimes result, the public interest
is achieved "more frequently than not"); id. at 74-75; id. at 152 (stating that
"while rule making comports with the neopluralist theory, and while adjudication
(to some extent) but not rule-making comports with the public choice theory, the
combination provides some support for the public interest theory" that empha-
sizes reductions in the "slack" between stated goals and actual administrative
behavior); Egan, supra note 144 ("Asking Americans to accept this level of impo-
tence" over tribal affairs "is a violation of the basic tenets of our civic culture"
(quoting Chris Vance)); Samuelson, supra note 78, at A23 ("[Als issues become
more important, money's influence fades"--"politicians think mainly of them-
selves and some 'public interest.'"); supra notes 58, 65, 67, 71, 80-82, 131, 158,
173, 185 and accompanying text.
266. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 273-76 (describing the desire to
maintain the "structural integrity of the constitutional design," in disputes in-
volving tribes); Field, supra note 181, at 3-4; Levin, Betting, supra note 1, at 125;
Monaghan, supra note 178, at 116 (stating that the Seminole Court could have
recognized the Tribe's independent sovereignty, thus placing it outside 11th
Amendment language, or distinguished the Indian and Interstate Commerce
Clauses, thus postponing the Union Gas fight); supra notes 179-82, 191 and ac-
companying text.
267. See supra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
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politically unacceptable, probably because it accords tribes more sov-
ereignty over gambling than their (developing) political power can
support in the long run. We rarely have the luxury of starting over in
law, so that pragmatic reforms would involve rehabilitating the IGRA
scheme. 268
The chief reform would be to discard the compacting process that
has created legal quandaries like Seminole and an expensive, incoher-
ent, and corrupting Coasian gridlock.269 In its place, the feds could,
without infringing state sovereignty, rebate tribal tax revenues to the
states or fix the taxes states could collect from tribal casinos. Setting
the levels of such taxes would admittedly be a difficult task: the net
social costs of gambling to the states are unquantified and probably
unquantifiable, in ways that all of the players would accept; these
costs are unlikely ever to be fully covered by tax revenues anyway.2 70
This reform would generate new, much more modest, Coasian
games.2 7 1 The efficiency gains that would result are clear-less wast-
age of scarce resources on rent seeking and Coasian bribes, but such a
reform would reduce the feds' opportunity to act as a regulatory free
rider over tribal casinos.2 72
Congress will soon consider amendments to the IGRA, and it may
well tolerate additional federal regulatory responsibilities, and per-
haps greater opportunities for Coasian bribes at the federal level, to
attain a more workable scheme. Other reforms revolve around mat-
ters of institutional design, to improve the information flows, incen-
tives, and sense of trust among the players. A better publicity and
transparency is needed, especially in the more informal decision mak-
ing procedures. Legal reforms should require that better data on the
social costs of gambling, and on the other consequences of regulatory
decisions, be disseminated widely. The general public could then play
a more informed role in scrutinizing the regulatory process. Better
incentives for revealing information about the true preferences and
actual tactics of the players would reduce opportunistic behavior and
268. See Brietzke, Insurgents, supra note 210, at 42.
269. See Safire, Bribes, supra note 82; supra notes 152-61, 174-78, 206-09 and accom-
panying text.
270. See Kindt, Taxpayers, supra note 54, at 929 (stating 50% should be the starting
point for calculations of casino taxes); supra notes 27-52, 102-06 and accompany-
ing text.
271. See Martz, supra note 15, at 486. In this new game, gainers (tribes rather than
politician and bureaucrats receiving Coasian bribes) would have to actually com-
pensate losers (states) in part, and still come out ahead, or else the tribal casino
would not be run. Accept nce of tax revenues would presumably bar any Elev-
enth Amendment objections the states might have, and in any event, Congress
could bar states' objections under its plenary power and the Indian Commerce
Clause. My proposed reform is thus a variation of Farber's. See supra notes 183-
185 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 69, 151, 157 and accompanying text.
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increase the benefits of a voluntary cooperation. Free riders and hold-
outs could be sanctioned in various ways, especially by excluding them
from profitable networks of cooperation. Even if the compacting pro-
cess is discarded, the feds should enforce the good faith requirement
that Alex Skibine suggests would best conform with congressional in-
tent in the IGRA, and that also conforms to process values in interna-
tional law and to the newer requirements of contact law.2 73 These
reforms are similar to Senator John McCain's proposals.274
Tribal bargaining power could be enhanced in other ways, so as to
approximate James Tully's "multicultural pluralism" or Adeno Addis's
"critical pluralism:" the ability to make tribal claims in tribal terms,
rather than always and necessarily fitting tribal claims into the domi-
nant society's institutions and concepts. 27 5 IGRA reforms should fo-
cus on an un-Coasian, international- and tribal-style, building of
relationships and responsibilities, based on perceptions of mutual ben-
efit and pursuit of the common ground.2 76 This may sound far-
fetched, but it would reduce transaction costs and rent seeking, and
273. See Skibine, supra note 203, at 169; see also S. REP. No. 100-446, at 1-8 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3077; Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104
F.3d 1546, 1559 ("The only hope for a satisfactory solution" over tribal gaming, is
through dialogue and good faith negotiation between all involved parties.");
Aceves, supra note 117, at 250-52, 254; Croley, supra note 10, at 12 (citizens can't
overcome problems of coordination and cooperation by themselves; institutional
means are needed to facilitate coordination and cooperation); id. at 37-38, 50, 57,
60; id. at 100-01 (for neopluralists, "administrative procedures are and should be
designed to accommodate broad, diverse participation in regulatory decisionmak-
ing"-in "a fairly information-rich environment" with many participants and low-
cost monitoring); id. at 105, 164; Farrell, supra note 66, at 117 ("Property rights
and negotiation will not yield first-best outcomes when there is important private
information."); Martz, supra note 15, at 470-71 (discussing applying anti-discre-
tionary principles to riverboat gambling, to restructure the oversight function of
regulations); supra notes 14, 133-34, 224, 240 and accompanying text.
274. See McCain, supra note 144, at 1-2.
275. See id. at 2; Tsosie, supra note 12, at 38, 91; see also Goldberg-Ambrose, supra
note 111, at 103 (sovereignty means the respect which is based on effective partic-
ipation in negotiations); supra notes 159, 232 and accompanying text.
276. Farber, Parody, supra note 6, at 409 (California ranchers in Robert Ellickson, Of
Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shashta County, 38
STAN. L. REv. 623 (1986), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAw, 215 (El-
lickson, et al., eds. (1995) use canons of "neighborliness" and treat litigation as
deviance, while confirming Coase's conclusion that conduct is unaffected by legal
rules); id. at 423-24 (Hobbesian perspectives rare in Chicago School economics,
where humans are inherently social animals with many, ingenious ways of coop-
erating); McGinnis, supra note 134, at 213-15, 220 (stating "self-interest ... en-
compasses familial affection, reciprocal altruism, and some degree of succorance
toward those in need"-attitudes which cost little but provide great benefits);
Tsosie, supra note 12, at 93 (building on the ideas of Annette Baier, Phyllis Ber-
nard, Martha Minow, and Richard Rorty, IGRA reforms could inspire justice
based on the Indian tradition of"restoring relationships and the integrity of com-
munities, as well as identifying mutual values").
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would be similar to the rather successful ADR provisions of SARA and
CERCLA, in environmental law.2 77 The feds could also monitor the
developmental uses of tribal casino revenues. This would infringe tri-
bal sovereignty, much as the World Bank or the IMF infringes Indone-
sia's sovereignty, but any misappropriation of tribal gaming rents
could thus be sanctioned. It may make sense to develop special rules
for tribal casinos operated off the reservation, perhaps by auctioning
off such sites among demonstrably needy tribes. While the develop-
mental need for such a casino may be great for a particular tribe, and
while non-reservation lands taken into trust for a tribe by the feds
become "Indian country" under current law, sovereignty arguments
concerning the right to make land use decisions on the reservation
become irrelevant.278 A few general gambling law reforms are
sketched in the footnote.2 79
277. See McGinnis, supra note 134, at 213-15; Tsosie, supra note 12, at 38, 67-69, 93;
see also Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1559; Cobo, Volume V, supra note 210,
at 32, 408-09 (governments should establish consultative or advisory bodies,
containing nongovernmental representatives and an indigenous representation,
which should also be present within the bureaucracy); NEEDHAM, supra note 58,
at 443-44 (need for "disequilibrium adjustment rules," feedback mechanisms, and
incentives to reveal information honestly); Aceves, supra note 117, at 241 (insti-
tutions can promote cooperation, even in the absence of formal governance struc-
tures); id. at 246 (path dependence reinforces behaviors based on a principle or
rule); id. at 254 (sanctions on free riders important when information on prefer-
ences imperfect, and reputation thus has value); id. at 256-60 (cooperation
achieved in international law through treaties and the customary international
law that increases stability of expectations; these increase reciprocity and the
importance of reputation); Brietzke, Insurgents, supra note 210, at 11-12 (inter-
national law movement away from coexistence of isolated sovereignties and to-
ward the cooperation of common interests); id. at 14-16 ("new" international law
less of a positivist gloss on narrow, doctrinal topics, and more an emphasis on law
as a social control and on shame as a sanction); Croley, supra note 10, at 6 (theo-
ries of administrative law generalize about abstractions lying far above the ac-
tual processes, with little attention to institutions); id. at 143 (negotiation and
consensus decisionmaking antithetical to rent-seeking, while formal adjudication
can favor special interests).
278. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 465, 2719(b)(1)(A); Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs. Inc.,
523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998) ("To date, our cases have sustained tribal immunity
from suit without drawing a distinction based on where the tribal activities oc-
curred."); Kolkema, supra note 101, at 376; id. (stating tribal sovereignty is "a
rather weak interest" when applied to off-reservation activities); supra notes 128,
164-68, 230, 237 and accompanying text.
279. General gambling reforms include: regulate the advertising of gambling in a
manner consistent with commercial free speech doctrines, including ending cer-
tain exemptions from the FTC's "truth in advertising" jurisdiction; ban and per-
haps criminalize attempts to collect gambling debts; prohibit and perhaps
criminalize gambling on credit; and automatically revoke gambling and liquor
licenses where persons under 21 are allowed to gamble. See 141 CONG. REC.
S10916. (daily ed. July 31, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simon); Kindt, Taxpayers,
supra note 54, at 926.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
At the turn of the Century, Ambrose Bierce (apparently) said:
"The gambling known as business looks with austere disfavor on the
business known as gambling."2s0 Times have changed, and a progres-
sive legalization of gambling has contributed to its quasi-legitimate
status among business people, politicians, the public, and even many
economists. Data are scant and biased, but analyses show that the
social costs of gambling likely exceed its social benefits. In any event,
few of these social costs are internalized in fact: governmental reve-
nues from gambling are typically spent on schools and roads, rather
than on ameliorating the costs of gambling. These costs are thus
borne only in part and by the people least able to bear them: gambling
addicts and poorer, frequently minority gamblers and the bystanders
who have a casino sited in their neighborhood.281
Tribal casinos on reservations differ significantly from their non-
Indian counterparts: net social costs are somewhat lower,2 82 develop-
mental potentials are somewhat more favorable, 28 3 and distributive
effects are much more equitable: the typical beneficiaries of tribal casi-
nos are much poorer and in greater need than are the shareholders in
non-Indian casinos.28 4 The benefit in question is the opportunity to
obtain gambling rents. Rent seeking, and the dissipation of rents
through Coasian bribes and the growing saturation of gaming mar-
kets, drive the regulation of gambling.2 85 We thus begin with a fairly
conventional analysis of gambling regulation,28 6 and then glean addi-
tional insights by analyzing the regulation of tribal casinos as seven-
sided, poker-like Coasian games.28 7
The players' moves, counter-moves, and forum shopping during
these Coasian games created increasingly complex, and incoherent,
expensive, and deadlocked institutions and rules concerning tribal
casinos. Coasian bribes and other transaction costs have burgeoned,
as have opportunities to cheat and act as a free rider or holdout.
280. Despite research, we are unable to find a cite for this quote. It is not in THE
DEvL'S DICTIONARY, and readers are invited to enlighten us.
281. See supra notes 27-51 and accompanying text.
282. Compare supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text (tribal casinos), with supra
notes 27-51 and accompanying text (non-Indian casinos).
283. Compare supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text (tribal casinos), with supra
notes 39-47 and accompanying text (non-Indian casinos).
284. Compare supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (tribal casinos), with supra
notes 83-90 (non-Indian casinos).
285. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
286. See Croley, supra note 10, at 40 (the preference for market outcomes in public
choice theory limits regulators' power to increase social welfare); id. at 165; supra
notes 60-81 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 114-34 and accompanying text; supra notes 135-205 and accom-
panying text (the course of play in Coasian games over tribal casinos).
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These opportunities reflect an overall lack of trust and cooperation in
the tribal casino process.28 8 Modifying Coasian analyses in two ways
provides additional insights, and some suggestions for reform of this
unworkable scheme: taking the international2 89 and the sover-
eignty29O dimensions of tribal casinos into account. The Coase Theo-
rem then loses much of its decentralizing "bite," since isolated
bargains do not create a wealth maximization that is coextensive with
the public interest. Some conclusions under conventional Coasian
analyses are also cast into doubt: about our ability to account for infor-
mation costs and (gambling) rents, and about the irrelevance of chang-
ing the criteria for assigning property rights.291
Rights count: morally, politically, and in a rent seeking economy, if
not under the Coase Theorem. For tribes, the relevant rights concern
sovereignty and international human rights to self-determination and
development. The United States has endorsed a policy of "self-deter-
mination" for the tribes since the late 1960s, but in so narrow and
qualified a fashion as to amount to a denial of the international
human right that is fully binding under United States law since
1992.292 Institutional safeguards are thus suggested, of the tribal dig-
nity and survival that capitalism otherwise tends to undervalue. 293
Every society must decide how to deploy its resources and wealth.
Markets obviously loom large as the means for such decisions in the
United States, but command-and-control by governments also plays
important roles. These roles are not fully understood by neoclassical
economists like Coase. Among other things, they neglect the role sov-
ereignty-market and other forms of power-plays in the economy,
especially its impact on the distributive equity and developmental op-
portunities that neoclassicists mostly ignore.2 94 As Arthur Selwyn
288. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text; Croley, supra note 10, at 51 n.141
("Unhappily, public choice theory demonstrates what experience suggests-that
our institutions of collective choice have a limited capacity to serve the public
interest."); supra notes 135-205, 264-79 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 124, 210-39 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 124, 239-64 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 114, 121, 123-25, 135, 208 and accompanying text.
292. See LAZARUS, supra note 238, at 143; supra notes 132, 216-17, 246-51 and accom-
panying text.
293. See WIILIAIMSON, supra note 10, at 405 ("[C]apitalist man is nonhumanist.").
294. See WILLAMSON, supra note 10, at 405; Coase, Social Cost, supra note 5, at 154
("As Frank H. Knight has so often emphasized, problems of welfare economics
must ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and morals."); Farber, Parody,
supra note 6, at 410; Roe, supra note 240, at 241 (stating that law and economics
misperceives such laws as part of the special interest "porkbarrel"); supra notes
9-10, 239-240 and accompanying text. But see Croley, supra note 10, at 57 (stat-
ing that only the most efficient groups succeed with efficient policies-and regu-
lators are mere conduits for accumulating preferences (citing Gary Becker in
part)); Heckman, supra note 9, at 329. Coase argues convincingly that "[tihe eco-
nomic problem in all cases of harmful effects is how to maximize the value of
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Miller puts it, "constitutional law is mainly juristic theories of politics
and economics," so we must get our theories right2 95 and improve
upon Seminole and its progeny29 6 in particular.
Sovereignty, self-determination, and development analyses com-
bine to support a central reform: assign a fairly strong casino (prop-
erty) right to the tribes initially, because corrections of any other
assignment are too expensive in transaction cost terms and are other-
wise very difficult for the tribes to accomplish. Historical inconsisten-
cies and current incoherent statutes and case law create much
confusion over tribal sovereignty, but the reality is that tribes have
little or none. 297 This is the main legal reason that tribes increasingly
lose Coasian casino games: Tribes were previously denied the material
and psychological means to bargain effectively in Coasian ways, as a
consequence of past "bargains" with the Anglos. Most tribes still lack
the power to acquire these means, as Cabazon2 98 fades into the back-
ground and Seminole29 9 comes to the fore. Otherwise valuable Coa-
sian insights are thus stacked against the tribes because Coase
implicitly assumes capacities most tribes lack.
We suggest additional reforms to "level the (Coasian) playing field"
over tribal casinos. The emphasis is on pragmatic institutional
redesigns to improve information flows, incentives, and an un-Coasian
sense of trust and cooperation.3OO Perhaps, needless to say, such re-
forms would reduce Coasian bribes and other transaction costs. We
should not expect too much, however: all institutions and reforms of
them are more or less failures, and as Robert Goodman puts it, "[tihe
current rise of the gambling industry is a reflection of larger economic
dilemmas"-especially "the paucity of... long-range solutions to the
problems of economic development."3 0 Tribal casinos are a real, if
production." But 'maximize" for who is the question: whose utility calculus is to
count?
295. ARHumu SELWYN MILLER, DEMOcRATIc DICrATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CONSTITU-
TION OF CONTROL ix (1981).
296. See supra notes 174-203 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 174-203, 236-56 and accompanying text.
298. Compare supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text (Cabazon's temporary em-
powering of tribes), with supra notes 231-32, 258 and accompanying text (tribes'
lack of bargaining power before and soon after Cabazon).
299. See supra notes 179-203 and accompanying text.
300. See WILLumsON, supra note 10, at 405 (stating that economists' "calculativeness
can get in the way of trust," the trade of which in markets may not be technically
possible or even meaningful); Farber, Parody, supra note 6, at 421 ("Today, we
are in the midst of a revival of interest in pragmatism," with striking similarities
to Coase's approach); Rosen, supra note 107, at 258; supra notes 157-61, 275-77,
and accompanying text.
301. GOODMAN, supra note 2, at 14; see WmLAmSON, supra note 10, at 350 (noting that
"the cost of good intentions needs to be evaluated" through a comparative institu-
tional approach, given that "regulation is highly imperfect, assessed in terms of
an abstract ideal"); supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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imperfect and short-term solution to some of the pressing problems
Native Americans face. Let's use it, in a less distorted and handi-
capped fashion than in the past, until something better comes along.
